Jurisprudence Commons^™

The Dilemma Of Interstatutory Interpretation, Anuj C. Desai

Washington and Lee Law Review

Courts engage in interstatutory cross-referencing all the time, relying on one statute to help interpret another. Yet, neither courts nor scholars have ever had a satisfactory theory for determining when it is appropriate. Is it okay to rely on any other statute as an interpretive aid? Or, are there limits to the practice? If so, what are they? To assess when interstatutory cross-referencing is appropriate, I focus on one common form of the technique, the in pari materia doctrine. When a court concludes that two statutes are in pari materia or (translating the Latin) “on the same subject,” the court …

For Legal Principles, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

Most legal thinkers believe that legal rules and legal principles are meaningfully distinguished. Many jurists may have no very precise distinction in mind, and those who do might not all agree. But it is widely believed that legal norms come in different logical types, and that one difference is reasonably well captured by a nomenclature that distinguishes “rules” from “principles.” Larry Alexander is the foremost challenger to this bit of legal-theoretic orthodoxy. In several articles, but especially in “Against Legal Principles,” an influential article co-authored with Ken Kress two decades ago, Alexander has argued that legal principles cannot exist.

In …

Juxtaposition And Intent: Analyzing Legal Interpretation Through The Lens Of Literary Criticism, Joel Graczyk

Marquette Law Review

Disagreement exists within both the literary and legal communities about authorial intent’s proper role in interpretation. In an effort to balance textualism’s strict limits with intentionalism’s risk of constructed meaning, this Comment approaches the debate from a literary perspective focused on the text but open to limited evidence of the author’s intended meaning. Some literary critics suggest that evidence of an author’s understanding of and associations with particular words can provide a useful tool for objective interpretation. A judge drawing on such evidence could analyze statutory text by juxtaposing a statute’s language with limited evidence of the enacting legislature’s understanding …

Interpretation, Francis J. Mootz Iii

Scholarly Works

In this chapter from "Law and the Humanities: An Introduction," published by Cambridge University Press, I first survey various theoretical approaches to interpretation, including natural law, analytical legal positivism, law as communication (originalism, intentionalism, and new textualism), and the hermeneutical turn. I then discuss the role of interpretation in contract law, statutory law and constitutional law, to situate the theories in practice.

Formulaic Deliberation, Andre L. Smith

ExpressO

Formulaic Deliberation describes the major interpretive regimes--textualism, intentionalism, purposivism, and pragmatism—and represents them formulaically. By classifying them this way, it more precisely describes them as theories, so that we can more precisely perform them as deliberative techniques. And, if we agree that none of them, individually, fits all cases at all times, we can formulaically describe how to synthesize them toward a discrete decision.

William Eskridge, Stanley Fish, Hon. Antonin Scalia, Richard Posner, Ronald Dworkin, John Hart Ely, Adrian Vermeule, Hon. Stephen Breyer, Cass Sunstein, Lawrence Lessig. All of them are right, their method for deciding cases produces benefits with …

Statutory Interpretation In Securities Jurisprudence: A Failure Of Textualism, Ediberto Román

Faculty Publications

This Article critiques the development of textualist theory in securities jurisprudence and analyzes the Central Bank decision as an example of the defects inherent in the application of a textualist approach. It demonstrates how the development of textualist securities jurisprudence stemmed from decisions that casually rejected precedent and mischaracterized existing law, thereby resulting in a distortion of the legislature’s intent. An analysis of the Securities Exchange Act demonstrates how the Central Bank Court’s approach towards statutory interpretation led to its failure to analyze other relevant Exchange Act provisions, including the most relevant provision – Section 20(a). The first section of …

Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, And The Law Of Evidence , Eileen A. Scallen

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

That Obscure Object Of Desire: Hermeneutics And The Autonomous Legal Text, Paul Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, And A Misleading Version Of Democracy, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

No one theory or school of thought consistently dominates judicial application of statutes, but the basic methodology employed by courts seems well-established if not always well-defined. Most mainstream judges and lawyers faced with a statutory construction task will look at (although with varying emphasis) the text of the statute, the legislative history of the provision, the context of the enactment, evident congressional purpose, and applicable agency interpretations, often employing the canons of construction for assistance. Although orthodox judicial thought suggests that the judge's role is confined to discerning textual meaning or directives of the enacting legislature, courts also often examine …

Rules And Standards, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

Framers Intent: The Illegitimate Uses Of History, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.