Jurisprudence Commons^™

The Judicial Role In Constraining Presidential Non-Enforcement Discretion: The Virtues Of An Apa Approach, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars, lawyers, and, indeed, the public at large increasingly worry about what purposive presidential inaction in enforcing statutory programs means for the rule of law and how such discretionary inaction can fit within a constitutional structure that compels Presidents to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Yet those who have recognized the problem have been hesitant to assign a role for the court in policing the constitutional limits they articulate, mostly because of the strain on judicial capacity that any formulation of Take Care Clause review would cause. In this Article, I argue that courts still can and …

Qualified Immunity When Facts Are In Dispute, Leon Friedman

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

“Spooky Action At A Distance”: Intangible Injury In Fact In The Information Age, Seth F. Kreimer

All Faculty Scholarship

Two decades after Justice Douglas coined “injury in fact” as the token of admission to federal court under Article III, Justice Scalia sealed it into the constitutional canon in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. In the two decades since Lujan, Justice Scalia has thrown increasingly pointed barbs at the permissive standing doctrine of the Warren Court, maintaining it is founded on impermissible recognition of “Psychic Injury.” Justice Scalia and his acolytes take the position that Article III requires a tough minded, common sense and practical approach. Injuries in fact must be "tangible" "direct" "concrete" "de facto" realities in time and …

Recovering Forgotten Struggles Over The Constitutional Meaning Of Equality, Helen Norton

Publications

No abstract provided.

Just Listening: The Equal Hearing Principle And The Moral Life Of Judges, Barry Sullivan

Faculty Publications & Other Works

No abstract provided.

Originalism’S Bite, William Baude, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

Is originalism toothless? Richard Posner seems to think so. He writes that repeated theorizing by "intelligent originalists," one of us happily included, has rendered the theory "incoherent" and capable of supporting almost any result. We appreciate the attention, but we fear we've been misunderstood. Our view is that originalism permits arguments from precedent, changed circumstances, or whatever you like, but only to the extent that they lawfully derive from the law of the founding. This kind of originalism, surprisingly common in American legal practice, is catholic in theory but exacting in application. It might look tame, but it has bite.

Specifically Authorized By Binding Precedent Does Not Mean Suggested By Persuasive Precedent: Applying Good-Faith Exception After Davis V. United States, Zachary C. Bolitho

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Constitutional Rhetoric Of White Innocence

Cecil J. Hunt II

This article discusses the Supreme Court’s use of the rhetoric of white innocence in deciding racially inflected claims of constitutional shelter. It argues that the Court’s use of this rhetoric reveals that it has adopted a distinctly white-centered-perspective which reveals only a one-sided view of racial reality and thus distorts its ability to accurately appreciate the true nature of racial reality in contemporary America. This article examines the Court’s habit of consistently choosing a white-centered-perspective in constitutional race cases by looking at the Court’s use of the rhetoric of white innocence first in the context of the Court’s concern with …

First Amendment; Freedom Of The Press; Erosion Of New York Times Co. V. Sullivan; Herbert V. Lando, Edward Howlett

Akron Law Review

In Herbert v. Lando the Supreme Court announced that the first amendment does not require a constitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry into the editorial process. While the decision may seem correct in its overturning of the absolute privilege afforded to the editorial process by the Second Circuit, nevertheless, by refusing to grant even a qualified privilege to the editorial process the Court may have upset the delicate balance between an individual's interest in his reputation and society's interest in a free flow of information recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.

Equal Protection; State Alimony Statutes; Sex Discrimination; Orr V. Orr, David A. Detec, Jane L. Thomas-Moore

Akron Law Review

In Orr v. Orr the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Alabama alimony statutes which provided that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce. The Court's principal reason for so holding was the statutes' violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment on the basis of sex discrimination.

Sixth Amendment; Right To Counsel; Use Of Prior Uncounseled Convictions; Lewis V. United States And Baldasar V. Illinois, Rita Marks

Akron Law Review

Once again the Supreme Court has spoken on the issue of the right to counsel. Within three months the Court rendered two decisions which appear to be inconsistent, not only with one another, but with prior decisions of the Court

Constitutional Amendment; Rescission Of Ratification; Extension Of Ratification Period, State Of Idaho V. Freeman, John Carrol

Akron Law Review

The court's ruling in Freeman is in conflict with both the Supreme Court's apparent trend involving article V issues, and most of the recent scholarly opinion on point. As a result of this departure, and the fact that the ERA failed to be adopted, this decision is likely to have slight precedential value. Nonetheless, the district court's discussion of the ERA in light of recent changes in the political question doctrine has significance in interpreting article V.

Scott V. Harris And The Future Of Summary Judgment, Tobias Barrington Wolff

All Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Harris has quickly become a staple in many Civil Procedure courses, and small wonder. The cinematic high-speed car chase complete with dash-cam video and the Court’s controversial treatment of that video evidence seem tailor-made for classroom discussion. As is often true with instant classics, however, splashy first impressions can mask a more complex state of affairs. At the heart of Scott v. Harris lies the potential for a radical doctrinal reformation: a shift in the core summary judgment standard undertaken to justify a massive expansion of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction in qualified immunity cases. …

Wynne: It's Not About Double Taxation, Michael S. Knoll, Ruth Mason

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article discusses Wynne v. Comptroller, a dormant Commerce Clause case against Maryland pending before the Supreme Court. We use economic analysis to rebut Maryland’s claim that its tax regime does not discriminate against interstate commerce. We also argue that the parties’ framing of the central issue in the case as whether the Constitution requires states to relieve double taxation draws focus away from the discrimination question, and therefore could undermine the Wynnes’ case and lead to unjustified narrowing of the dormant Commerce Clause. We also show how our approach to tax discrimination resolves many of the issues that …

The Fixation Thesis: The Role Of Historical Fact In Original Meaning, Lawrence B. Solum

Lawrence B. Solum

The central debate in contemporary constitutional theory is the clash between originalists and living constitutionalists. Originalism is the view that the original meaning of the constitutional text should constrain or bind constitutional practice—paradigmatically, the decision of constitutional cases by the United States Supreme Court. Living constitutionalists contend that the content of constitutional law should evolve over time in response to changing values and circumstances. One of the central questions in this debate is over the question whether the meaning of the constitutional text is fixed or changeable. This essay makes the case for the Fixation Thesis—the claim that the linguistic …

A Tradition At War With Itself: A Reply To Professor Rana's Review Of America's Forgotten Constitutions: Defiant Visions Of Power And Community, Robert Tsai

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This essay responds to Professor Aziz Rana's review essay, "The Many American Constitutions," 93 Texas Law Review 1193 (2015).

He contends: (1) my portrayal of American constitutionalism might contain a “hidden” teleological understanding of the development of constitutional law; (2) my notion of "conventional sovereignty" sometimes seems content-free and at other times "interlinked with liberal egalitarianism"; and (3) a focus on failed constitutions "inadvertently tends to compartmentalize the overall tradition."

I answer in the following ways: (1) I reject any sense that constitutional law has moved in an arc of steady progress toward Enlightenment and instead embrace a tradition of …

Judge Posner’S Simple Law, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

The world is complex, Richard Posner observes in his most recent book, Reflections on Judging. It follows that, to resolve real-world disputes sensibly, judges must be astute students of the world’s complexity. The problem, he says, is that, thanks to disposition, training, and professional incentives, they aren’t. Worse than that, the legal system generates its own complexity precisely to enable judges “to avoid rather than meet and overcome the challenge of complexity” that the world delivers. Reflections concerns how judges needlessly complexify inherently simple law, and how this complexification can be corrected.

Posner’s diagnoses and prescriptions range widely—from the Bluebook …

A Few Thoughts On Free Speech Constitutionalism, Helen Norton

Publications

No abstract provided.

Originalism As A Theory Of Legal Change, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

Originalism is usually defended as a theory of interpretation. This Article presents a different view. Originalism ought to be defended, if at all, not based on normative goals or abstract philosophy, but as a positive theory of American legal practice, and particularly of our rules for legal change.

One basic assumption of legal systems is that the law, whatever it is, stays the same until it's lawfully changed. Originalism begins this process with an origin, a Founding. Whatever rules we had when the Constitution was adopted, we still have today -- unless something happened that was authorized to change …

Bait And Switch: Why United States V. Morrison Is Wrong About Section Five, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

All Faculty Scholarship

As the title suggests, the article examines Morrison’s creation of the rule that the Section Five power cannot be used to regulate private individuals. This is one of the most meaningful and, thus far, durable constraints that the Court has placed on federal power. It is the more surprising, then, that it turns out to be based on essentially nothing at all. The Morrison Court asserted that its rule was derived by—indeed, “controlled by”—precedent, but a closer reading of the Reconstruction-era decisions it cites shows that this is simply not the case. An independent evaluation of the rule against regulation …

The Jury's Constitutional Judgment, Nathan Chapman

Scholarly Works

Despite the early American jury’s near-mythical role as a check on overreaching government agents, the contemporary jury’s role in constitutional adjudication remains opaque. Should the jury have the right to nullify criminal statutes on constitutional grounds? Should the jury apply constitutional doctrine in civil rights suits against government officers? Should courts of appeals defer to the jury’s application of constitutional law, or review it de novo?

This Article offers the first holistic analysis of the jury’s role in constitutional adjudication. It argues that the Constitution’s text, history, and structure strongly support the jury’s authority to apply constitutional law to the …

Developing Environmental Law For All Citizens, Patricia W. Moore, Eliana S. Pereira, Gillian Duggin

Faculty Articles

On 20 May 2002, Timor-Leste became a country. Its Constitution, which came into force on 20 May 2002, is based on civil law, with many similarities to Portugal's legal system. The Constitution also laid the foundation for environmental law, which the government has been developing ever since. This overview of the development of environmental law in Timor-Leste describes the constitutional provisions that are the source of environmental law in the country; presents the policy basis for environmental law; reviews the legal instruments governing the environment that the government has adopted since 2002; introduces draft laws under consideration at the end …

The Emergence Of Constitutionalism As An Evolutionary Adaptation, Fabio Portela Almeida

Fabio P L Almeida

The emergence of modern societies is an evolutionary puzzle. Homo sapiens is the only animal species capable of cooperating in large-scale societies consisting of genetically unrelated individuals. From a biological point of view, this feature leads to enormous questions. Social scientists typically assume that human life is lived in large-scale societies as a result of cultural, social and institutional history. In this perspective, social institutions such as law, economy and religion enhance cooperation to higher levels. Gene-culture coevolutionary theories have studied this issue in an integrated framework that accounts for social and biological theories of cooperation. These theoretical approaches have …

It's The Constitution, Stupid: Two Liberals Pay Tribute To Antonin Scalia's Legacy, Adam Lamparello, Charles E. Maclean

Adam Lamparello

Living constitutionalism may achieve “good” results, but with each Roe v. Wade, and Bush v. Gore, the Constitution’s vision takes more shallow breaths, and democracy fades into elitism’s shadow. The debate over constitutional interpretation is, in many ways, reducible to this question: if a particular outcome is desirable, and the Constitution’s text is silent or ambiguous, should the United States Supreme Court (or any court) disregard constitutional constraints to achieve that outcome? If the answer is yes, nine unelected judges have the power to choose outcomes that are desirable. If the answer is no, then the focus must be on …

It's The Constitution, Stupid: Two Liberals Pay Tribute To Antonin Scalia's Legacy, Adam Lamparello, Charles E. Maclean

Adam Lamparello

Living constitutionalism may achieve “good” results, but with each Roe v. Wade, and Bush v. Gore, the Constitution’s vision takes more shallow breaths, and democracy fades into elitism’s shadow. The debate over constitutional interpretation is, in many ways, reducible to this question: if a particular outcome is desirable, and the Constitution’s text is silent or ambiguous, should the United States Supreme Court (or any court) disregard constitutional constraints to achieve that outcome? If the answer is yes, nine unelected judges have the power to choose outcomes that are desirable. If the answer is no, then the focus must be on …

Justice Sotomayor's Undemocratic Dissent In Schuette V. Coalition To Defend Affirmative Action, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

There are compelling reasons to support affirmative action programs. The effects of racial discrimination, and racism itself, remain prevalent throughout the country. Pretending otherwise would be to ignore reality. Arguing that the equal protection clause compels a state to implement race-based affirmative action programs, however, would make a mockery of the Constitution. Former Supreme Court Justice Hughes famously stated, “at the constitutional level where we work, 90 percent of any decision is emotional.” The remaining 10 percent is “[t]he rational part … [that] supplies the reasons for supporting our predilections.” It is time for this type of judging to end. …

Catalogs, Gideon Parchomovsky, Alex Stein

All Faculty Scholarship

It is a virtual axiom in the world of law that legal norms come in two prototypes: rules and standards. The accepted lore suggests that rules should be formulated to regulate recurrent and frequent behaviors, whose contours can be defined with sufficient precision. Standards, by contrast, should be employed to address complex, variegated, behaviors that require the weighing of multiple variables. Rules rely on an ex ante perspective and are therefore considered the domain of the legislator; standards embody a preference for ex post, ad-hoc, analysis and are therefore considered the domain of courts. The rules/standards dichotomy has become a …

Through Our Glass Darkly: Does Comparative Law Counsel The Use Of Foreign Law In U.S. Constitutional Adjudication?, Kenneth Anderson

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This (35 pp.) essay appears as a contribution to a law review symposium on the work of Harvard Law School professor Mary Ann Glendon in comparative law. The essay begins by asking what comparative law as a scholarly discipline might suggest about the use of foreign (or unratified or nationally "unaccepted" international law) by US courts in US constitutional adjudication. The trend seemed to be gathering steam in US courts between the early-1990s and mid-2000s, but by the late-2000s, it appeared to be stalled as a practice, notwithstanding the intense scholarly interest throughout this period.

Practical politics within the US …

Restoring Constitutional Equilibrium, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

In areas such as the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court's lack of institutional restraint has affected citizens of every political persuasion. In Bush v. Gore, the Florida Supreme Court’s recount order was blocked. ‘Liberals,’ lost. In Roe v. Wade, the Court required state legislatures to allow most abortions in the first trimester. ‘Conservatives’ lost. In Clinton v. City of New York and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the coordinate branch’s attempt to ensure a more efficient and fairer government was thwarted. Average citizens lost. The problem is not a liberal or conservative one, whatever those words mean. It is …

The Criminalization Of Consensual Adult Sex After Lawrence, Richard Broughton

Richard Broughton

Ten years after the Supreme Court’s supposedly momentous decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the case still confounds not merely constitutional law, but the criminal law of sex, as well. This Article seeks to advance the literature on both Lawrence and the criminal law by examining Lawrence’s impact upon sex crimes that involve consensual, private, non-prostitution conduct between adults. It positions Lawrence as a relatively conservative opinion as to sex crimes generally, especially in light of the “Exclusions Paragraph” on page 578 of the Court’s opinion. Still, Lawrence (albeit ambiguously) must protect some form of private, consensual, non-prostitution adult sexuality beyond …