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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Towards A Dramaturgical Theory Of Constitutional Interpretation, Jessica Rizzo Jan 2022

Towards A Dramaturgical Theory Of Constitutional Interpretation, Jessica Rizzo

Seattle University Law Review

Like legal texts, dramatic texts have a public function and public responsibilities not shared by texts written to be appreciated in solitude. For this reason, the interpretation of dramatic texts offers a variety of useful templates for the interpretation of legal texts. In this Article, I elaborate on Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson’s neglected account of law as performance. I begin with Balkin and Levinson’s observation that both legal and dramatic interpreters are charged with persuading audiences that their readings of texts are “authoritative,” analyzing the relationship between legal and theatrical authority and tradition. I then offer my own theory …


Anti-Modalities, David E. Pozen, Adam Samaha Jan 2021

Anti-Modalities, David E. Pozen, Adam Samaha

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional argument runs on the rails of “modalities.” These are the accepted categories of reasoning used to make claims about the content of supreme law. Some of the modalities, such as ethical and prudential arguments, seem strikingly open ended at first sight. Their contours come into clearer view, however, when we attend to the kinds of claims that are not made by constitutional interpreters – the analytical and rhetorical moves that are familiar in debates over public policy and political morality but are considered out of bounds in debates over constitutional meaning. In this Article, we seek to identify the …


The Declaration Of Independence And Constitutional Interpretation, Alexander Tsesis Jun 2019

The Declaration Of Independence And Constitutional Interpretation, Alexander Tsesis

Alexander Tsesis

This Article argues that the Reconstruction Amendments incorporated the human dignity values of the Declaration of Independence. The original Constitution contained clauses, which protected the institution of slavery, that were irreconcilable with the normative commitments the nation had undertaken at independence. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments set the country aright by formally incorporating the Declaration of Independence's principles for representative governance into the Constitution.

The Declaration of Independence provides valuable insights into matters of human dignity, privacy, and self-government. Its statements about human rights, equality, and popular sovereignty establish a foundational rule of interpretation. While the Supreme Court has …


Construction, Originalist Interpretation And The Complete Constitution, Richard Kay Dec 2016

Construction, Originalist Interpretation And The Complete Constitution, Richard Kay

Richard Kay

 In recent years, the literature of constitutional originalism has adopted a new concept, “constitutional construction.” This Essay critically examines that concept. Contrary to some claims, the difference between “interpretation” and “construction” is not well established in common law adjudication. Furthermore, contemporary descriptions of constitutional construction tend to leave some ill-defined discretion in the hands of constitutional decision-makers. Finally, the Essay disputes the claim that constitutional construction is indispensable because the constitutional text is incomplete, that failing to provide a decision-rule for many—indeed for most—constitutional disputes. The Constitution would indeed be incomplete if interpreted according to the “new” or “public …


The Declaration Of Independence And Constitutional Interpretation, Alexander Tsesis Jan 2016

The Declaration Of Independence And Constitutional Interpretation, Alexander Tsesis

Faculty Publications & Other Works

This Article argues that the Reconstruction Amendments incorporated the human dignity values of the Declaration of Independence. The original Constitution contained clauses, which protected the institution of slavery, that were irreconcilable with the normative commitments the nation had undertaken at independence. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments set the country aright by formally incorporating the Declaration of Independence's principles for representative governance into the Constitution.

The Declaration of Independence provides valuable insights into matters of human dignity, privacy, and self-government. Its statements about human rights, equality, and popular sovereignty establish a foundational rule of interpretation. While the Supreme Court has …


I Am Textualism, Stephen Durden Dec 2010

I Am Textualism, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This essay, consisting of merely 1100 words, satirizes textualism, particularly as applied to the Constitution. Inspired by the idea of something being all things to all people in order to win converts, the essay demonstrates that because textualism has so many different definitions that it in fact has no meaning other than the meaning given by each textualist. Each textualist embraces his or her own version of textualism. Textualists battle to define true textualism. Given the different versions of textualism, each textualist faces the Textualist Conundrum. As each textualist seeks to embraceor prove a purer form of textualism the textualist …


Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules Or Predilective Tools, Stephen Durden Jan 2010

Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules Or Predilective Tools, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

Justice Scalia proclaims homage to the “dead” Constitution. Justice Brennan honors the “living” Constitution. Others believe in “a partially living and partially dead Constitution.” But, whichever moniker selected, constitutional analysis remains (to the interpreter) personal; however, personal does not necessarily mean irrational or even singular (i.e., that no one else agrees with the interpretation). Rather, personal means that no matter how narrow the interpretational method, an interpreter of the Constitution inevitably makes personal choices when using any interpretational method - choices not required by, or perhaps even inconsistent with, the chosen interpretational method. This Article uses canons of construction to …


Partial Textualism, Stephen Durden Jan 2010

Partial Textualism, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This Article seeks to demonstrate that plain meaning textualists do not apply plain meaning textualism to the entire Constitution. Instead, plain meaning textualists indulge their personal predilections and apply the doctrine of “partial textualism,” which selectively applies plain meaning textualism to only part of, rather than the entire, Constitution. Partial textualism destroys any possible fairness value to plain meaning textualism. Indeed, such an approach is entirely inconsistent with the goals of plain language textualism. Through examining the Takings Clause, this Article demonstrates that a plain meaning textualist will commonly apply plain meaning textualism to a part of the Constitution that …


Ugly American Hermeneutics, Francis J. Mootz Iii Jan 2010

Ugly American Hermeneutics, Francis J. Mootz Iii

Nevada Law Journal

This article will appear in a Symposium on comparative legal hermeneutics that includes four articles by American scholars and four articles by Brazilian scholars. I argue that the "ugly American" hermeneutics exemplified in Justice Scalia's opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller is unfortunate, even if we supplement Justice Scalia's hermeneutical fantasy with the much more careful and balanced philosophical work by Larry Solum, Keith Whittington and other scholars. Nevertheless, the pragmatic work of interpretation by lawyers and judges in the day-to-day world of legal practice shows a plain-faced integrity of which we Americans can be proud.


Ugly American Hermeneutics, Francis J. Mootz Iii Jan 2010

Ugly American Hermeneutics, Francis J. Mootz Iii

Scholarly Works

This article will appear in a Symposium on comparative legal hermeneutics that includes four articles by American scholars and four articles by Brazilian scholars. I argue that the "ugly American" hermeneutics exemplified in Justice Scalia's opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller is unfortunate, even if we supplement Justice Scalia's hermeneutical fantasy with the much more careful and balanced philosophical work by Larry Solum, Keith Whittington and other scholars. Nevertheless, the pragmatic work of interpretation by lawyers and judges in the day-to-day world of legal practice shows a plain-faced integrity of which we Americans can be proud.


Legal Interpretation: The Window Of The Text As Transparent, Opaque, Or Translucent, George H. Taylor Jan 2010

Legal Interpretation: The Window Of The Text As Transparent, Opaque, Or Translucent, George H. Taylor

Articles

It is a common metaphor that the text is a window onto the world that it depicts. In legal interpretation, the metaphor has been developed in two ways – the legal text as transparent or opaque – and the Article proposes a third – the legal text as translucent. The claim that the legal text is transparent has been associated with more liberal methodological approaches. According to this view (often articulated by critics), the legal text does not markedly delimit meaning. Delimitation comes from the interpreters. By contrast, stress on the opacity of the legal text comes from those who …


Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections Are More Equal Than Others, Stephen Durden Jan 2008

Plain Language Textualism: Some Personal Predilections Are More Equal Than Others, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This Article challenges the validity of plain language textualism, an allegedly superior method of constitutional interpretation based solely on the “plain language” of the Constitution. First, this Article demonstrates that, notwithstanding the ebb and flow of support for this interpretive method, both the Supreme Court and its individual Justices often seek to “plainly” define various provisions in the Constitution. What matters most to this Article is not whether any individual “plain language” interpretation of a constitutional provision seems reasonable or even best, but rather whether the use of “plain language” is consistent with the expressed and unexpressed objectives and purposes …


Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow Dec 2007

Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow

Donald J. Kochan

Conflicts created by concurrences and pluralities in court decisions create confusion in law and lower court interpretation. Rule of law values require that individuals be able to identify controlling legal principles. That task is complicated when pluralities and concurrences contribute to the vagueness or uncertainty that leaves us wondering what the controlling rule is or attempting to predict what it will evolve to become. The rule of law is at least handicapped when continuity or confidence or confusion infuse our understanding of the applicable rules. This Article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States to …


Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophony Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Matthew J. Parlow, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2007

Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophony Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Matthew J. Parlow, Donald J. Kochan

Matthew Parlow

Conflicts created by concurrences and pluralities in court decisions create confusion in law and lower court interpretation. Rule of law values require that individuals be able to identify controlling legal principles. That task is complicated when pluralities and concurrences contribute to the vagueness or uncertainty that leaves us wondering what the controlling rule is or attempting to predict what it will evolve to become. The rule of law is at least handicapped when continuity or confidence or confusion infuse our understanding of the applicable rules. This Article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States to …


Sign Amortization Laws: Insight Into Precedent, Property, And Public Policy, Stephen Durden Jan 2007

Sign Amortization Laws: Insight Into Precedent, Property, And Public Policy, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This Article will (1) briefly overview Takings Clause jurisprudence; (2) state a paradigmatic fact pattern; (3) review how the Takings Clause has been applied to sign amortization codes by the United States Supreme Court; (4) review paradigmatic cases from Florida courts and federal courts with Florida jurisdiction; (5) discuss the precedential value of these cases; (6) discuss Lingle and whether it requires an overturning of this precedent; and (7) discuss whether failure to overturn these cases serves the purpose of precedential jurisprudence.


Nude Entertainment Zoning, Stephen Durden Jan 2001

Nude Entertainment Zoning, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

Local government regulation, as opposed to prohibition, of nude entertainment began in earnest in the 1970's. These regulations generally fell into four categories: (1) zoning; (2) prohibiting nude entertainment in conjunction with the service of alcohol; (3) licensing; and (4) regulating conduct, e.g., hours of operation, distance from customers, prohibition of private booths. The proliferation of these many and varied approaches began soon after the Supreme Court in California v. LaRue held that nude dancing is, or at least might be, protected by the First Amendment. Prior to LaRue, states regularly prohibited nude entertainment via general prohibitions on lewd and …


Litter Or Literature: Does The First Amendment Protect Littering Of Neighborhoods?, Stephen Durden Jan 1997

Litter Or Literature: Does The First Amendment Protect Littering Of Neighborhoods?, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

Pamphlets can be as simple as a single piece of paper or as voluminous as a small newspaper placed in a plastic bag. Each method of distribution engenders its own particular problems. The purpose of this Article is to examine the legal implications of pamphlet distribution, particularly distribution on residential property. Are these pamphlets litter or literature? Or, might they be called “litter-ature”--a combination of both? The first part of this Article sets forth some of the problems associated with the distribution of pamphlets, especially on residential property. The second part examines the First Amendment speech implications of distributing literature …


Democracy And Feminism , Tracy E. Higgins Jan 1996

Democracy And Feminism , Tracy E. Higgins

Faculty Scholarship

Although feminist legal theory has had an important impact on most areas of legal doctrine and theory over the last two decades, its contribution to the debate over constitutional interpretation has been comparatively small. In this Article, Professor Higgins explores reasons for the limited dialogue between mainstream constitutional theory and feminist theory concerning questions of democracy, constitutionalism, and judicial review. She argues that mainstream constitutional theory tends to take for granted the capacity of the individual to make choices, leaving the social construction of those choices largely unexamined. In contrast, feminist legal theory's emphasis on the importance of constraints on …


Reflections Inspired By My Critics, Philip Chase Bobbitt Jan 1994

Reflections Inspired By My Critics, Philip Chase Bobbitt

Faculty Scholarship

The crucial idea in constitutional law is legitimacy; the crucial idea in jurisprudence is justification.

For some time, the academic debate about U.S. constitutionalism has looked for justifications for our practices, believing this would confer legitimacy on them. In my work, I have endeavored to derive legitimacy from the practices themselves, reserving the task of justification for other purposes.

By showing the way in which legitimacy is established and maintained in a constitutional system like ours, I hoped to derive solutions to a number of classical questions, all of which, I believe, are at bottom questions about legitimacy and legitimation. …