Jurisprudence Commons^™

Levels Of Free Speech Scrutiny, Alexander Tsesis

Indiana Law Journal

Inconsistencies abound throughout current exacting, strict, and most exacting scrutiny doctrines. Formalism also runs throughout recent cases that have opportunistically relied on the First Amendment in matters peripherally concerned with core principles of free speech. Jurisprudence that relies on the exacting scrutiny standard remains significantly under-theorized. The uncertainty creates doctrinal flux that shifts from case-to-case. The same unexplained malleability appears in the most exacting scrutiny jurisprudence. The Court, moreover, sometimes refers to these two standards as equivalent to strict scrutiny. On the other hand, during the last decade, and most recently in 2021, various opinions have also used exacting scrutiny …

Compelled Speech And Doctrinal Fluidity, David Han

Indiana Law Journal

Even within the messy and complicated confines of First Amendment jurisprudence, compelled speech doctrine stands out in its complexity and conceptual murkiness— a state of affairs that has only been exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in NIFLA v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. This Essay observes that as the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence has grown increasingly complex, it has also manifested a troubling degree of fluidity, where the doctrinal framework has grown so incoherent, imprecise, and unstable that it can be readily shaped by courts to plausibly justify a wide range of …

Can Speech Act Theory Save Notice Pleading?, Susan E. Provenzano

Indiana Law Journal

Countless scholars have debated—and lower courts have attempted to apply—the plausibility pleading regime that the Supreme Court introduced in Twombly and Iqbal. Iqbal took Twombly’s requirement that a complaint plead plausibly and turned it into a two-step test. Under that test, the life or death of a lawsuit rests on the distinction between “well-pleaded” and “conclusory” allegations. Only the former are assumed true on a motion to dismiss. Seven decades of pleading precedent had taken a sensible, if unstable, approach to the truth assumption, making a single cut between factual contentions (assumed true) and legal conclusions (ignored). But Iqbal redrew …

What's The Deal With Revlon?, Zachary Gubler

Indiana Law Journal

Under the Revlon doctrine, courts are to apply a higher level of scrutiny in certain takeover situations in an attempt to control potential conflicts of interest that might prejudice target shareholders. However, the doctrine has always had sufficient “play in the joints” that one might reasonably wonder whether it has much of an effect in practice on short-term shareholder returns. Additionally, in recent years, the trend in Delaware’s Revlon jurisprudence seems to be to defer to the target board as long as there are no glaring conflicts of interest. Taken together, these facts raise concern over the continued relevance of …

How To Fix Legal Scholarmush, Adam Kolber

Indiana Law Journal

Legal scholars often fail to distinguish descriptive claims about what the law is from normative claims about what it ought to be. The distinction couldn’t be more important, yet scholars frequently mix it up, leading them to mistake legal authority for moral authority, treat current law as a justification for itself, and generally use rhetorical strategies more appropriate for legal practice than scholarship. As a result, scholars sometimes talk past each other, generating not scholarship but “scholarmush.”

In recent years, legal scholarship has been criticized as too theoretical. When it comes to normative scholarship, however, the criticism is off the …

The Fourth Amendment At Home, Thomas P. Crocker

Indiana Law Journal

A refuge, a domain of personal privacy, and the seat of familial life, the home holds a special place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Supreme Court opinions are replete with statements affirming the special status of the home. Fourth Amendment text places special emphasis on securing protections for the home in addition to persons, papers, and effects against unwarranted government intrusion. Beyond the Fourth Amendment, the home has a unique place within constitutional structure. The home receives privacy protections in addition to sheltering other constitutional values protected by the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. For example, under the Due …

The Kavanaugh Court And The Schechter-To-Chevron Spectrum: How The New Supreme Court Will Make The Administrative State More Democratically Accountable, Justin Walker

Indiana Law Journal

In a typical year, Congress passes roughly 800 pages of law—that’s about a seveninch

stack of paper. But in the same year, federal administrative agencies promulgate

80,000 pages of regulations—which makes an eleven-foot paper pillar. This move

toward electorally unaccountable administrators deciding federal policy began in

1935, accelerated in the 1940s, and has peaked in the recent decades. Rather than

elected representatives, unelected bureaucrats increasingly make the vast majority

of the nation’s laws—a trend facilitated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in three

areas: delegation, deference, and independence.

This trend is about to be reversed. In the coming years, Congress will …

Arizona's Torres V. Terrell And Section 318.03: The Wild West Of Pre-Embryo Disposition, Catherine Wheatley

Indiana Law Journal

In this Note, Part I examines the three main approaches used in other state supreme court decisions to decide pre-embryo disposition disputes, as well as three perspectives on the legal status of the pre-embryo, and compares them with Arizona’s emerging law. Part II summarizes Arizona’s Torres trial court order and opinion and section 318.03. Part III then analyzes whether the Torres orders and Arizona’s new statutory “most likely to lead to birth standard”12 present constitutional issues and concludes that the trial court’s order, if reinstated by the Arizona Supreme Court, and section 318.03 can be challenged on substantive due process …

Ordinary Causation: A Study In Experimental Statutory Interpretation, James Macleod

Indiana Law Journal

In a series of recent split decisions interpreting criminal and tort-like legislation, the Supreme Court has purported to give statutory causation requirements their ordinary, plain meaning. Armed with dictionaries, examples from everyday speech, and commonsense intuitions, the Court’s majority has explained that statutory phrases like “because of” and “results from” entail but-for causation as a matter of ordinary usage. There’s just one problem: The Court’s majority (and the many state and federal courts following its lead) is wrong on the facts—specifically, the facts about how people ordinarily interpret, understand, and use causal language.

This Article considers a novel approach to …

Implicit Racial Bias And Students' Fourth Amendment Rights, Jason P. Nance

Indiana Law Journal

Tragic acts of school violence such as what occurred in Columbine, Newtown, and, more recently, in Parkland and Santa Fe, provoke intense feelings of anger, fear, sadness, and helplessness. Understandably, in response to these incidents (and for other reasons), many schools have intensified the manner in which they monitor and control students. Some schools rely on combinations of security measures such as metal detectors; surveillance cameras; drug-sniffing dogs; locked and monitored gates; random searches of students’ belongings, lockers, and persons; and law enforcement officers. Not only is there little empirical evidence that these measures actually make schools safer, but overreliance …

Sticks, Stones, And So-Called Judges: Why The Era Of Trump Necessitates Revisiting Presidential Influence On The Courts, Quinn W. Crowley

Indiana Law Journal

This Note will be primarily divided into three main sections. Part I of this Note will begin by discussing the importance of judicial independence in modern society and the role of elected officials in shaping the public perception of the courts. Additionally, as problems of judicial legitimacy are age-old and date back to America’s founding, Part I will include a brief discussion of an early clash between President Thomas Jefferson and the courts.

Parts II and III of this Note will seek to place President Trump’s conduct towards the judicial branch within the proper historical context. Part II examines the …

Eliminating Circuit-Split Disparities In Federal Sentencing Under The Post-Booker Guidelines, Elliot Edwards

Indiana Law Journal

This Note will explore the rarely discussed consequences that result when courts of appeals freely interpret the Sentencing Guidelines. This Note will not address appellate review of sentences in general, nor will it discuss disparities caused by trial courts. Instead, the discussion below will address a very specific situation, namely when a court of appeals vacates a sentence because, in its estimation, the trial court misapplied the Guidelines. Part I will relate the history of the recent sentencing re-form movement in America, noting particularly which bodies have the authority to decide sentencing policy. Part II will then analyze the interpretive …

Intangible Fish And The Gulf Of Understanding: Yates V. United States And The Court's Approach To Statutory Interpretation, John M. Garvin

Indiana Law Journal

Is a fish a tangible object? The answer in most cases is obviously “yes.” But in Yates v. United States, the Supreme Court held that fish are outside the meaning of the phrase “tangible object” as it is used in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. This Note argues that the Yates decision provides a lens with which to examine the Court’s contemporary methods of statutory interpretation. In adopting the textualist vocabulary most famously associated with the late Justice Scalia, the Justices have committed to speaking the same language. Still, fundamental differences between the Justices remain. These differences expose the …

Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Promote “Autonomy”?, Hiro N. Aragaki

Indiana Law Journal

In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has helped transform arbitration law into a radical private-ordering regime in which freedom of contract has come to eclipse public regulation. Arbitration jurisprudence justifies this transformation in part on a profound and longstanding commitment to the ideal of individual autonomy, understood as the freedom—lacking in litigation—to select a disputing process best suited to one’s needs.

In this Article, I question the cogency of this justification. I argue, first, that autonomy has had different and sometimes conflicting meanings even within arbitration jurisprudence. Second, depending on the meaning one ascribes to autonomy, it is at …

Standing For (And Up To) Separation Of Powers, Kent H. Barnett

Indiana Law Journal

The U.S. Constitution requires federal agencies to comply with separation-of-powers (or structural) safeguards, such as by obtaining valid appointments, exercising certain limited powers, and being sufficiently subject to the President’s control. Who can best protect these safeguards? A growing number of scholars would allow only the political branches—Congress and the President—to defend them. These scholars would limit or end judicial review because private judicial challenges are aberrant to justiciability doctrine and lead courts to meddle in minor matters that rarely affect regulatory outcomes.

This Article defends the right of private parties to assert justiciable structural causes of action, arguing that …

A Referee Without A Whistle: Magistrate Judges And Discovery Sanctions In The Seventh Circuit, Landyn Wm. Rookard

Indiana Law Journal

This Note ultimately argues that, if the Seventh Circuit is not willing to reverse its holdings in Alpern v. Lieb and Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago in light of recent developments, Congress should again clarify its intent. In the face of the crushing "costs of discovery [that] threaten to exceed the amount at issue in all but the largest cases," it is the Seventh Circuit's responsibility to employ all just and legal devices to comply with Congress's mandate "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."

Do Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, Jason Iuliano

Indiana Law Journal

Despite two hundred years of jurisprudence on the topic of corporate personhood, the Supreme Court has failed to endorse a philosophically defensible theory of the corporation. In this Article, I attempt to fill that void. Drawing upon the extensive philosophical literature on personhood and group agency, I argue that corporations qualify as persons in their own right. This leads me to answer the titular question with an emphatic yes. Contrary to how it first seems, that conclusion does not warrant granting expansive constitutional rights to corporations. It actually suggests the opposite. Using the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate as a …

Why Twombly Is Good Law (But Poorly Drafted) And Iqbal Will Be Overturned, Luke Meier

Indiana Law Journal

The conventional wisdom with regard to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal is that these two cases work together to usher in a new era of pleading. This reading of the cases, however, is wrong. In reality, Twombly was a valid application of the uncontroversial principle that a complaint must describe the real-world events on which the suit is based with some degree of factual specificity. The Iqbal opinion, unfortunately, mangled this concept by applying it to a complaint that described the real-world events on which the suit was based with sufficient …

Law & Politics: The Case Against Judicial Review Of Direct Democracy, Corey A. Johanningmeier

Indiana Law Journal

This Note argues against strong judicial review of direct democracy. Judicial review has been the dominant answer in legal scholarship for the perceived danger of majoritarian tyranny in any democratic system. But Progressive movements throughout American history, as well as a growing number of respected law professors, have questioned the assumption that courts or even legislatures are better protectors of discrete and insular minorities than the rights-respecting populace. Although the vast majority of legal scholarship still displays a crippling cynicism about popular competence, this view cannot continue to block progressives from participating in initiative campaigns. Exclusive resort to elitist procedural …

Building Support For Strong, Fair, And Impartial Courts, Michael A. Wolff

Indiana Law Journal

Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators Annual Meeting July 29-August 2, 2006 Indianapolis, Indiana.

Misplaced Angst: Another Look At Consent-Search Jurisprudence, Daniel R. Williams

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Judicial Intervention In A Twenty-First Century Republic: Shuffling Deck Chairs On The Titanic?, Kristofor J. Hammond

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Truth?, Bruce A. Markell

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The American Judicial Review Quagmire: A Canadian Proposal, Caroline S. Earle

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

On First Considering Whether Law Binds, Rex J. Zedalis

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Material Basis Of Jurisprudence, Richard A. Posner

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Concept Of Offensiveness In Establishment And Free Exercise Jurisprudence, William P. Marshall

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Authoritarianism And The Rule Of Law, Lynne Henderson

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Limits Of A Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court And Psychology, J. Alexander Tanford

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Pushing Aside The General Rule In Order To Raise New Issues On Appeal, Rhett R. Dennerline

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.