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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Discretion To Disobey: A Study Of Lawful Departures From Legal Rules, Bernard Adell May 1976

Discretion To Disobey: A Study Of Lawful Departures From Legal Rules, Bernard Adell

Dalhousie Law Journal

The authors' purpose in this important and intriguing book is to contribute to what they call "the jurisprudence of departures from rules" [p. 5]. They try to establish that non-compliance with rules of law may sometimes be justified not only on moral grounds but also on legal grounds - that is, that the legal system itself has considerable built-in tolerance of non-compliance with its own rules, and that an official or an ordinary citizen who contravenes a legal rule may well be able to make out a claim that he is acting "legally" after all. It is central to the …


Discretion To Disobey: A Study Of Lawful Departures From Legal Rules, Bernard Adell May 1976

Discretion To Disobey: A Study Of Lawful Departures From Legal Rules, Bernard Adell

Dalhousie Law Journal

The authors' purpose in this important and intriguing book is to contribute to what they call "the jurisprudence of departures from rules" [p. 5]. They try to establish that non-compliance with rules of law may sometimes be justified not only on moral grounds but also on legal grounds - that is, that the legal system itself has considerable built-in tolerance of non-compliance with its own rules, and that an official or an ordinary citizen who contravenes a legal rule may well be able to make out a claim that he is acting "legally" after all. It is central to the …


Discretion To Disobey: A Study Of Lawful Departures From Legal Rules, Bernard Adell May 1976

Discretion To Disobey: A Study Of Lawful Departures From Legal Rules, Bernard Adell

Dalhousie Law Journal

The authors' purpose in this important and intriguing book is to contribute to what they call "the jurisprudence of departures from rules" [p. 5]. They try to establish that non-compliance with rules of law may sometimes be justified not only on moral grounds but also on legal grounds - that is, that the legal system itself has considerable built-in tolerance of non-compliance with its own rules, and that an official or an ordinary citizen who contravenes a legal rule may well be able to make out a claim that he is acting "legally" after all. It is central to the …


Discretion To Disobey: A Study Of Lawful Departures From Legal Rules, Bernard Adell May 1976

Discretion To Disobey: A Study Of Lawful Departures From Legal Rules, Bernard Adell

Dalhousie Law Journal

The authors' purpose in this important and intriguing book is to contribute to what they call "the jurisprudence of departures from rules" [p. 5]. They try to establish that non-compliance with rules of law may sometimes be justified not only on moral grounds but also on legal grounds - that is, that the legal system itself has considerable built-in tolerance of non-compliance with its own rules, and that an official or an ordinary citizen who contravenes a legal rule may well be able to make out a claim that he is acting "legally" after all. It is central to the …


The Legal Point Of View, L. C. Green Sep 1975

The Legal Point Of View, L. C. Green

Dalhousie Law Journal

What is Law? By what criteria do we recognize valid law? These questions have exercised the minds of distinguished jurisprudential thinkers of the past. Every solution that has been propounded, whether in terms of natural law theory, command models, norm or rule models, seems to have been defective in one way or another. The main thesis of this book is that every attempt to find some "essence of law" - whether in terms of commands, rules or whatever - is bound to fail. The reason given is that there is not one and only one "true" conception of law. There …


The Legal Point Of View, L. C. Green Sep 1975

The Legal Point Of View, L. C. Green

Dalhousie Law Journal

What is Law? By what criteria do we recognize valid law? These questions have exercised the minds of distinguished jurisprudential thinkers of the past. Every solution that has been propounded, whether in terms of natural law theory, command models, norm or rule models, seems to have been defective in one way or another. The main thesis of this book is that every attempt to find some "essence of law" - whether in terms of commands, rules or whatever - is bound to fail. The reason given is that there is not one and only one "true" conception of law. There …


Frames Of Reference For Legal Ideals, W. L. Morison Feb 1975

Frames Of Reference For Legal Ideals, W. L. Morison

Dalhousie Law Journal

The publication of Canada's most newly established legal journal by Canada's oldest established common law school naturally prompts reflections concerning the elements of continuity and change in legal writing, and legal thinking generally. Legal writing has so radically changed during the existence of Canada's oldest common law school, or for that matter during the existence of Australia's oldest law school to which the writer belongs, that articles written even during the earlier part of this century excite feelings of nostalgia in some people. In welcoming an article published in the Sydney Law Review in the nineteen fifties, Dean Erwin Griswold …


The Jurisprudence Of Karl Llewellyn, Simon N. Verdun-Jones Oct 1974

The Jurisprudence Of Karl Llewellyn, Simon N. Verdun-Jones

Dalhousie Law Journal

Jurisprudence means to me: any careful and sustained thinking about any phase of things legal, if the thinking seeks to reach beyond the practical solution of an immediate problem in hand. Jurisprudence thus includes any type at all of honest and thoughtful generalization in the field of the legal.' Alongside Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewellyn dominated the American jurisprudential stage for more than thirty years. Indeed, his diverse interests, broadly-based achievements and colorful personality compel the attention of any serious student of modern jurisprudence. Furthermore, the very profusion of roles played by Llewellyn render him one of the most remarkable legal …


New Approaches To Legal Study, Philip Slayton Sep 1973

New Approaches To Legal Study, Philip Slayton

Dalhousie Law Journal

Most lawyers - be they practitioners, judges, or just plain academics - have a fairly clear idea of what it is they must do when "studying law". Most lawyers, without giving the matter very much thought, concern themselves with interpreting statutes according to well-understood principles, analysing cases using time-honoured notions such as stare decisis, ratio decidendi, and obita dicta, and occasionally (very occasionally, with much trepidation and many disclaimers) venturing a policy suggestion or two. Not many have wanted to do much else, and few have suggested any virtue in trying anything new. But the winds of change appear to …


A Theory Of Justice, Richmond Campbell Sep 1973

A Theory Of Justice, Richmond Campbell

Dalhousie Law Journal

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls constructs a comprehensive social contract theory of justice to stand as a substantive alternative to utilitarianism. This work combines and develops the ideas of earlier essays, such as "Justice as Fairness" (1958), "The Sense of Justice" (1963), "Constitutional Liberty" (1963) and "Civil Disobedience" (1966), into a systematic moral and political philosophy of astonishing power and subtlety. I shall sketch its main principles, their derivation and justification, and then raise some questions about the supposed opposition between the standards of justice and utility.


Necessity As A Justification: A Critique Of Perka, Donald Galloway Jun 1956

Necessity As A Justification: A Critique Of Perka, Donald Galloway

Dalhousie Law Journal

In his characteristically trenchant and influential investigation, "A Plea for Excuses",' J. L. Austin reminded us that we can and do use different strategies of defending a person when it is claimed that he has done wrong. He drew attention to two distinct tactics: One way of going about this (defending a person) is to admit that he, X, did that very thing, A, but to argue that it was a good thing, or the right or sensible thing, or a permissible thing to do . . . To take this line is to justify the action, to give reasons …