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Articles 1 - 30 of 39
Full-Text Articles in Judges
Where To Place The “Nones” In The Church And State Debate? Empirical Evidence From Establishment Clause Cases In Federal Court, Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise
Where To Place The “Nones” In The Church And State Debate? Empirical Evidence From Establishment Clause Cases In Federal Court, Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise
St. John's Law Review
In this third iteration of our ongoing empirical examination of religious liberty decisions in the lower federal courts, we studied all digested Establishment Clause decisions by federal circuit and district court judges from 2006 through 2015. The first clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution directs that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” That provision has generated decades of controversy regarding the appropriate role of religion in public life.
Holding key variables constant, we found that Catholic judges approved Establishment Clause claims at a 29.6% rate, compared with a 41.5% rate before non-Catholic …
Original(Ism) Sin, G. Alex Sinha
Original(Ism) Sin, G. Alex Sinha
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
During President Trump’s term in office, the Senate confirmed nearly 250 of his federal judicial nominees, including 3 to the Supreme Court of the United States. That number amounts to nearly a third of the federal judiciary’s roughly 800 active members. By and large, the judges nominated by President Trump purport to apply some form of originalist constitutional interpretation or construction, though the subject of originalism featured perhaps most prominently at the confirmation hearings for Amy Coney Barrett, whom President Trump nominated in October of 2020 to replace Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Whatever one thinks of the vast literature …
The Limits Of Permissible Judicial Campaign Speech In New York, Vito M. Destefano
The Limits Of Permissible Judicial Campaign Speech In New York, Vito M. Destefano
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
In December 2018, New York’s Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics (“ACJE”), which I proudly served on for ten years, issued Opinion 17-28, concerning an inquiry by a judicial candidate as to whether he or she could respond to a candidate questionnaire prepared by the New York State Right to Life Committee (“RTL questionnaire”). In the RTL questionnaire, the candidate is asked a series of questions concerning the candidate’s personal beliefs on abortion, the beginning of life, Roe v. Wade, the definition of personhood, the New York and United States Constitutions, and so on. Each question asking for the …
"We Are All Textualists Now": The Legacy Of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
"We Are All Textualists Now": The Legacy Of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
One of my favorite extra-judicial activities is meeting with law students, and it is a pleasure to be with you today. But it is a special privilege to come back to the Jamaica campus of St. John’s College from which I graduated 60 years ago, long before the Law School had moved here from Schermerhorn Street in Brooklyn, and when there was only one building on this former golf course.
I was honored to call Justice Scalia a role model and friend. What I hope to convey to you today, however, is the effect Justice Scalia’s tenure on the …
President Nixon's Prescience: The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, Timothy John Casey
President Nixon's Prescience: The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, Timothy John Casey
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
Judges And Judicial Process In The Jurisprudence Of St. Thomas Aquinas, Charles P. Nemeth, J.D., Ph.D., Ll.M.
Judges And Judicial Process In The Jurisprudence Of St. Thomas Aquinas, Charles P. Nemeth, J.D., Ph.D., Ll.M.
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
Moral Issues And The Virtuous Judge: Reflections On The Nomination And Confirmation Of Supreme Court Justices, Robert J. Araujo, S.J.
Moral Issues And The Virtuous Judge: Reflections On The Nomination And Confirmation Of Supreme Court Justices, Robert J. Araujo, S.J.
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
Guideline Amendments Dramatically Change The Structure Of Organizational Fines, Paul E. Fiorelli
Guideline Amendments Dramatically Change The Structure Of Organizational Fines, Paul E. Fiorelli
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
Toward A Theory Of Judicial Decisionmaking: A Synthesis Of Ideologist Jurisprudence And Doctrinalism, Raymond A. Belliotti
Toward A Theory Of Judicial Decisionmaking: A Synthesis Of Ideologist Jurisprudence And Doctrinalism, Raymond A. Belliotti
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
Stare Decisis Sed Concreta Intelligence - Precedent And Lonergan's Common Sense, William R. Moriarty
Stare Decisis Sed Concreta Intelligence - Precedent And Lonergan's Common Sense, William R. Moriarty
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
Judicial Activism - The Violation Of An Oath, Edward J. Melvin, C.M.
Judicial Activism - The Violation Of An Oath, Edward J. Melvin, C.M.
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
The Rights Of The Child - What Can An International Body Of Catholic Jurists Do?, Christine Godsil Cooper
The Rights Of The Child - What Can An International Body Of Catholic Jurists Do?, Christine Godsil Cooper
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
Judicial Reform, John F. Market
Improving Judicial Administration By Repealing The Requirements For Three-Judge District Courts, Michael J. Mullen
Improving Judicial Administration By Repealing The Requirements For Three-Judge District Courts, Michael J. Mullen
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
Stare Decisis And The Judicial Process, Edward D. Re
Stare Decisis And The Judicial Process, Edward D. Re
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
American College Of Trial Lawyers Report And Recommendation On Disruption Of The Judicial Process
American College Of Trial Lawyers Report And Recommendation On Disruption Of The Judicial Process
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
The Jury As A Political Institution, Jon M. Van Dyke
The Jury As A Political Institution, Jon M. Van Dyke
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
The Partnership Of Bench And Bar, Edward D. Re
The Partnership Of Bench And Bar, Edward D. Re
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
Note: Canons Of Judicial Ethics - Extra Judicial Activities
Note: Canons Of Judicial Ethics - Extra Judicial Activities
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
Thomas More - Saint And Judge, William J. Brennan, Jr.
Thomas More - Saint And Judge, William J. Brennan, Jr.
The Catholic Lawyer
No abstract provided.
Judge Posner, Judge Wilkinson, And Judicial Critique Of Constitutional Theory, Marc O. Degirolami, Kevin C. Walsh
Judge Posner, Judge Wilkinson, And Judicial Critique Of Constitutional Theory, Marc O. Degirolami, Kevin C. Walsh
Faculty Publications
Judge Richard Posner’s well-known view is that constitutional theory is useless. And Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III has lambasted constitutional theory for the way in which its “cosmic” aspirations threaten democratic self-governance. Many other judges hold similar views. And yet both Posner and Wilkinson — in the popular press, in law review articles, and in books — have advocated what appear to be their own theories of how to judge in constitutional cases. Judicial pragmatism for Posner and judicial restraint for Wilkinson seem to be substitutes for originalism, living constitutionalism, political process theory, and so on. But both Posner and …
Bringing Nuremberg Home: Justice Jackson's Path Back To Buffalo, October 4, 1946, John Q. Barrett
Bringing Nuremberg Home: Justice Jackson's Path Back To Buffalo, October 4, 1946, John Q. Barrett
Faculty Publications
During one permanently consequential decade in the history of the United States and the world, United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson delivered three major lectures at the University of Buffalo. The last of these was Jackson's May 9, 1951, James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, "Wartime Security and Liberty under Law," which inaugurated this distinguished lecture series. Justice Jackson's first formal lecture at the University of Buffalo occurred on February 23, 1942, halfway through his first year as a Supreme Court Justice and just twelve weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into World War II. …
Interpretive Divergence All The Way Down: A Response To Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl And Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges And Statutory Interpretation, 79 U Chi L Rev 1215 (2012), Anita S. Krishnakumar
Interpretive Divergence All The Way Down: A Response To Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl And Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges And Statutory Interpretation, 79 U Chi L Rev 1215 (2012), Anita S. Krishnakumar
Faculty Publications
This article is a response to the law review article cited in its title. It focuses on a corollary question raised by the article's analysis: if one takes seriously the proposition that it may make sense for elected judges to interpret statutes differently than do appointed judges, should judicial opinions written by elected judges look substantially different from those written by appointed judges? Part I examines the relative roles of judicial opinions written by elected versus appointed judges in a world in which divergence is practiced. Part II explores specific ways in which we might want or expect an elected …
Rehnquist's Missing Letter: A Former Law Clerk's 1955 Thoughts On Justice Jackson And Brown, John Q. Barrett, Brad Snyder
Rehnquist's Missing Letter: A Former Law Clerk's 1955 Thoughts On Justice Jackson And Brown, John Q. Barrett, Brad Snyder
Faculty Publications
"I think that Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be reaffirmed." That's what Supreme Court law clerk William H. Rehnquist wrote privately in December 1952 to his boss, Justice Robert H. Jackson. When the memorandum was made public in 1971 and Rehnquist's Supreme Court confirmation hung in the balance, he claimed that the memorandum reflected Jackson's views, not Rehnquist's. Rehnquist was confirmed, but his explanation triggered charges that he had lied and smeared the memory of one of the Court's most revered justices. This Essay analyzes a newly discovered document—a letter Rehnquist wrote to Justice Felix Frankfurter in 1955, …
The Anti-Messiness Principle In Statutory Interpretation, Anita S. Krishnakumar
The Anti-Messiness Principle In Statutory Interpretation, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Faculty Publications
Many of the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation opinions reflect a juisprudential aversion to interpreting statutes in a manner that will prove "messy" for implementing courts to administer. Yet the practice of construing statutes to avoid "messiness" has gone largely unnoticed in the statutory interpretation literature. This Article seeks to illuminate the Court's use of "anti-messiness" arguments to interpret statutes and to bring theoretical attention to the principle of "messiness" avoidance. The Article begins by defining the concept of anti-messiness and providing a typology of common anti-messiness arguments used by the Supreme Court. It then considers some dangers inherent in the …
Passive-Voice References In Statutory Interpretation, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Passive-Voice References In Statutory Interpretation, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Faculty Publications
The Supreme Court regularly references grammar rules when interpreting statutory language. And yet grammar references play a peculiar role in the Court's statutory cases—often lurking in the background and performing corroborative work to support a construction arrived at primarily through other interpretive tools. The inevitable legisprudential question triggered by such references is, why does the Court bother? If grammar rules provide merely a second, third, or fourth justification for an interpretation reached through other interpretive canons, then what does the Court gain—or think it gains—by including such rules in its statutory analysis?
This essay examines these questions through the lens …
Statutory Interpretation In The Roberts Court's First Era: An Empirical And Doctrinal Analysis, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Statutory Interpretation In The Roberts Court's First Era: An Empirical And Doctrinal Analysis, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Faculty Publications
This Article examines the Roberts Court's statutory cases from its 2005-2008 Terms, beginning with cases decided after January 31, 2006, when Justice Alito joined the Court, and concluding with cases decided on June 29, 2009, when Justice Souter retired. The Article's approach is both empirical and doctrinal, in that it (1) presents descriptive statistics illustrating the Court's and individual Justices' rates of reliance on fourteen different tools of statutory construction, and (2) engages in doctrinal analysis of the Court's statutory cases, highlighting discernable patterns in the individual Justices' interpretive approaches. The Article makes two significant contributions to the field of …
Legal Holes, Noa Ben-Asher
Legal Holes, Noa Ben-Asher
Faculty Publications
(Excerpt)
In the years that followed the events of September 11, 2001, a debate crystallized between those who think that “legal grey and black holes”—which I call simply “legal holes”—are necessary and integral to U.S. law and those who think that they are dangerous and should be abolished. Legal black holes “arise when statutes or legal rules ‘either explicitly exempt[] the executive from the requirements of the rule of law or explicitly exclude[] judicial review of executive action.’” Grey holes, in contrast, “arise when ‘there are some legal constraints on executive action . . . but the[y] are so insubstantial …