First Amendment Commons^™

Assessing The Future Of “Offended Observer” Standing In Establishment Clause Cases, Larry J. Obhof

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article looks at the anomaly of “offended observer” standing in Establishment Clause challenges. It calls for greater consistency in the courts’ application of constitutional standing requirements.

Under Article III, Plaintiffs seeking to raise claims in federal court must allege a concrete and particularized injury in fact in order to support federal jurisdiction. Likewise, plaintiffs seeking to challenge a government policy must allege a unique injury that is separate from the interests of the public at large. The notable exception is where plaintiffs claim personal offense at alleged government entanglement in religion. These “offended observers” are frequently given access to …

Government Speech And The Establishment Clause, Alexander Tsesis

Scholarly Publications

This Article argues that the Establishment Clause prohibits public actors or agencies from adopting religious messages and symbols. The limitation is explicitly stated in the First Amendment, which restricts government from encroaching on religious belief and ritual. Separation between private and public spheres protects thought, belief, and practice under the Free Exercise Clause and prevents official orthodoxy under the Establishment Clause. One religion clause requires government to respect deeply held personal beliefs that are parallel to beliefs in God, while the other clause prohibits government from participating in sectarian conduct. Government speech can describe, explain, contextualize, and characterize religious rituals …

A Framework For Thinking About The Government’S Speech And The Constitution, Helen Norton

Publications

This Essay sketches a framework for mapping and navigating the constitutional implications of the government’s speech—and then illustrates this framework’s application to some contemporary constitutional disputes. My hope is that this framework will help us sort through the constitutional puzzles triggered by the government’s expressive choices—puzzles that confront courts and policymakers with increasing frequency. What I call “first-stage government speech questions” require us to determine when the government is speaking itself and when it is instead (or also) regulating others’ speech. This determination matters because the rules that apply to the government as speaker are very different from those that …

Las Medidas De “Acomodación” De La Religión En El Derecho Estadounidense [Accommodation Of Religion In U.S. Law], Michael W. Mcconnell, Nathan Chapman

Scholarly Works

En este trabajo se analizan las medidas de acomodación de la religión, que gozan de una gran tradición en el derecho constitucional de los Estados Unidos, así como los debates que han generado desde el punto de vista de su conformidad con las cláusulas de la Primera Enmienda de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos: la cláusula de no establecimiento de una religión oficial y la cláusula de libre ejercicio de la religión. A lo largo del trabajo se analiza la principal jurisprudencia recaída sobre las medidas de acomodación y los test que se han construido para enjuiciarlas.

[This paper …

Fundamental Funds: Tax Credits And The Increasing Tension Between The Free Exercise Clause And Establishment Clause—Espinoza V. Montana Department Of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), Elizabeth Jacobson

Mitchell Hamline Law Review

No abstract provided.

Forgotten Federal-Missionary Partnerships: New Light On The Establishment Clause, Nathan Chapman

Scholarly Works

Americans have long disputed whether the government may support religious instruction as part of an elementary education. Since Everson v. Board of Education (1947), the Supreme Court has gradually articulated a doctrine that permits states to provide funds, indirectly through vouchers and in some cases directly through grants, to religious schools for the nonreligious goods they provide. Unlike most other areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, however, the Court has not built this doctrine on a historical foundation. In fact, in Trinity Lutheran v. Comer (2017), the dissenters from this doctrine were the ones to rely on the founding-era record.

Intriguingly, …

Left With No Name: How Government Action In Intra-Church Trademark Disputes Violates The Free Exercise Clause Of The First Amendment, Mary Kate Nicholson

Washington and Lee Law Review

The United States was founded in part on the principle of freedom of religion, where citizens were free to practice any religion. The founding fathers felt so strongly about this principle that it was incorporated into the First Amendment. The Free Exercise Clause states that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” The Supreme Court later adopted the neutral principles approach to avoid Free Exercise violations resulting from courts deciding real property disputes. Without the application of the same neutral principles to intellectual property disputes between churches, however, there is …

The Locke Exception: What Trinity Lutheran Means For The Future Of State Blaine Amendments, Christopher Tyler Prosser

Pepperdine Law Review

At its core, this Article is about whether states have the discretion to discriminate against religious organizations by excluding them from generally available secular government aid programs. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Locke v. Davey, the federal courts have developed conflicting interpretations of whether the Court’s holding in Locke permits states to exclude religious organizations from generally available secular aid programs. However, the Court’s 2017 decision in Trinity Lutheran v. Comer has cast doubt on the ability of states to exclude religious organizations from such programs and seemingly restricts the Court’s prior decision in Locke …

Legislative Prayer: Historical Tradition And Contemporary Issues, Chad West

Utah Law Review

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”1 There is a great deal of confusion among scholars, lower federal courts, and the Justices of the Supreme Court over appropriate Establishment Clause principles,2 but it is at least clear that the government “may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”3 It has long been settled that state and local legislative bodies may, …

Is There Any Silver Lining To Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. V. Comer?, Caroline Mala Corbin

Articles

No abstract provided.

Education Funding In Maine In Light Of Zelman And Locke: Too Much Play In The Joints?, Sarah M. Lavigne

Maine Law Review

The United States Supreme Court has struggled with the countervailing directives of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause for decades. One area in which this battle has been particularly contentious is the issue of public funding of religious schools. On one hand, opponents argue that such funding is an impermissible co-mingling of church and state, thereby violating the Establishment Clause. Meanwhile, proponents of public funding of religious schools argue that, to withhold funding from religious schools would place a burden on those wishing to send their children to religious schools, thereby impermissibly preventing individuals from practicing their faith …

Fighting The New Wars Of Religion: The Need For A Tolerant First Amendment, Leslie C. Griffin

Maine Law Review

Religious wars have broken out around the country about the legality of gay marriage, the consequences of gay ordination for property ownership, the funding of faith-based organizations and the placement of crosses and Ten Commandments (but not Seven Aphorisms) on public land. To resolve such impassioned disputes, Americans traditionally look to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, which state "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Unfortunately, the Court's modern decisions interpreting those clauses have shed more heat than light on the discussion and have provoked ongoing controversy instead of …

Eclecticism, Nelson Tebbe

Nelson Tebbe

This short piece comments on Kent Greenawalt's new book, Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and Fairness. It argues that although Greenawalt's eclectic approach carries certain obvious costs, his theory cannot be evaluated without comparing its advantages and disadvantages to those of its competitors. It concludes by giving some sense of what that comparative calculus might look like.

Privatizing And Publicizing Speech, Nelson Tebbe

Nelson Tebbe

When and how should governments be permitted to use private-law mechanisms to manage their public-law obligations? This short piece poses that question in the context of Summum, which the Supreme Court decided earlier this year, and Buono, which it will hear in the fall. In both cases, the government manipulated formal property rules in order to fend off constitutional challenges. In Summum, the government took ownership of a religious symbol in the face of a free speech challenge, while in Buono it shed ownership of land containing another sectarian symbol in an effort to moot an Establishment Clause problem. Although …

Government Nonendorsement, Nelson Tebbe

Nelson Tebbe

What are the constitutional limits on government endorsement? Judges and scholars typically assume that when the government speaks on its own account, it faces few restrictions. In fact, they often say that the only real restriction on government speech is the Establishment Clause. On this view, officials cannot endorse, say, Christianity, but otherwise they enjoy wide latitude to promote democracy or denigrate smoking. Two doctrines and their accompanying literatures have fed this impression. First, the Court’s recent free speech cases have suggested that government speech is virtually unfettered. Second, experts on religious freedom have long assumed that there is no …

Catholic Institutions In Court: The Religion Clauses And Political-Legal Compromise, Angela C. Carmella

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

First Amendment Decisions From The October 2006 Term, Erwin Chemerinsky, Marci A. Hamilton

Erwin Chemerinsky

No abstract provided.

An Overview Of The October 2006 Supreme Court Term, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

No abstract provided.

Recent Applications Of The Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach To Religious Doctrine: From Hosanna-Tabor And Holt To Hobby Lobby And Zubik, Samuel J. Levine

Scholarly Works

In each of the past four terms, the United States Supreme Court has decided a case with important implications for the interpretation and application of the Religion Clauses of the United States Constitution: Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., Holt v. Hobbs, and, most recently, Zubik v. Burwell. Although the Court’s decisions in these cases addressed—and seemed to resolve—a number of questions central to Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, including recognition of the “ministerial exception” and religious rights of a corporate entity, the decisions left a number of questions unanswered, such as …

To Accommodate Or Not To Accommodate: (When) Should The State Regulate Religion To Protect The Rights Of Children And Third Parties?, Hillel Y. Levin, Allan J. Jacobs, Kavita Shah Arora

Washington and Lee Law Review

When should we accommodate religious practices? When should we demand that religious groups instead conform to social or legal norms? Who should make these decisions, and how? These questions lie at the very heart of our contemporary debates in the field of Law and Religion.

Particularly thorny issues arise where religious practices may impose health-related harm to children within a religious group or to third parties. Unfortunately, legislators, courts, scholars, ethicists, and medical practitioners have not offered a consistent way to analyze such cases, so the law is inconsistent. This Article suggests, first, that the lack of consistency is a …

Religion And Social Coherentism, Nelson Tebbe

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Today, prominent academics are questioning the very possibility of a theory of free exercise or non-establishment. They argue that judgments in the area can only be conclusory or irrational. In contrast to such skeptics, this Essay argues that decisionmaking on questions of religious freedom can be morally justified. Two arguments constitute the Essay. Part I begins by acknowledging that skepticism has power. The skeptics rightly identify some inevitable indeterminacy, but they mistakenly argue that it necessarily signals decisionmaking that is irrational or unjustified. Their critique is especially striking because the skeptics’ prudential way of working on concrete problems actually shares …

Is It Unconstitutional To Prohibit Faith-Based Schools From Becoming Charter Schools?, Stephen D. Sugarman

Stephen D Sugarman

This article argues that it is unconstitutional for state charter school programs to preclude faith-based schools from obtaining charters. First, the “school choice” movement of the past 50 years is described, situating charter schools in that movement. The current state of play of school choice is documented and the roles of charter schools, private schools (primarily faith-based schools), and public school choice options are elaborated. In this setting I argue a) based on the current state of the law it would not be unconstitutional (under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause) for states to elect to make faith-based schools eligible for …

Thomas Jefferson And The Establishment Clause, Mark J. Chadsey

Akron Law Review

The purpose of this paper is to ask whether the historical record actually supports either of these assumptions. A note about my mode of analysis is necessary at this juncture. When inquiring about Jefferson’s influence on the Establishment Clause, it is important to focus on the entire process by which it was adopted rather than its mere introduction by Madison in the House of Representatives. Its adoption, after all, required the assent of two-thirds of both chambers of Congress, three-fourths of the state legislatures, and the support of a majority of the American public. Without the requisite support of all …

The First Amendment And The Socialization Of Children: Compulsory Public Education And Vouchers, Steven H. Shiffrin

Steven H. Shiffrin

Criticism of American public schools has been a cottage industry since the Nineteenth Century. In recent years the criticism has gone to the roots. Critics charge that to leave children imprisoned in the public school monopoly is to risk the standardization of our children; it is to socialize them in the preferred views of the State. They argue that it would be better to adopt a system of vouchers or private scholarships to support a multiplicity of private schools. A multiplicity of such schools, it is said, would enhance parental choice, would foster competition, and would promote a diversity of …

The Pluralistic Foundations Of The Religion Clauses, Steven Shiffrin

Steven H. Shiffrin

Contemporary Supreme Court interpretations suggest that the religion clauses are primarily rooted in the value of equality. The United States Supreme Court has argued that in the absence of discrimination against religion (or the presence of other constitutional values), there is no violation of the Free Exercise Clause when a statute inadvertently burdens religion. Similarly, equality values have played a strong role in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Many distinguished commentators have pointed to the equality focus and have argued that it gives insufficient attention to the value of religious liberty. Professor Shiffrin argues that these commentators are right in …

Five Justices Have Transformed The First Amendment’S Freedom Of Religion To Freedom From Religion, Gerald Walpin

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Fourth Amendment Framework For The Fee Exercise Clause, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

This article proposes a paradigm for resolving disputes under the free exercise clause that is analogous to the framework used by the court under the fourth amendment when balancing privacy rights against investigatory powers of law enforcement. In its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court provides varying degrees of protection to privacy – and imposes different evidentiary requirements on law enforcement – depending on the context in which privacy is affected, the intrusiveness of a particular search, and the asserted governmental interests. For example, privacy receives the strongest protections in areas such as the home, thus requiring law enforcement to have …

George Washington. Elena Kagan, And The Town Of Greece, New York: The First Amendment And Religious Minorities, Kermit V. Lipez

The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process

No abstract provided.

Foreign And Religious Family Law: Comity, Contract, And The Constitution, Ann Laquer Estin

Pepperdine Law Review

The article focuses on role of the U.S. courts in confronting religious laws in dispute resolution of various cases of domestic relations, contracts, and torts. Topics discussed include role of secular courts in maintaining constitutional balance between the free exercise and establishment clauses, constitutional challenges faced by religious adherents, and importance of legal pluralism in the U.S.

Rethinking The “Religious-Question” Doctrine, Christopher C. Lund

Pepperdine Law Review

The “religious question” doctrine is a well-known and commonly accepted notion about the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses. The general idea is that, in our system of separated church and state, courts do not decide religious questions. And from this premise, many things flow — including the idea that courts must dismiss otherwise justiciable controversies when they would require courts to resolve religious questions. Yet a vexing thought arises. The religious-question doctrine traditionally comes out of a notion that secular courts cannot resolve metaphysical or theological issues. But when one looks at the cases that courts have been dismissing pursuant to …