Evidence Commons^™

Cross-Racial Identification Errors In Criminal Cases, Sheri Johnson

Sheri Lynn Johnson

No abstract provided.

Juror Perceptions Of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, Timothy G. Wykes

Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive)

Jurors rely on eyewitness testimony in deciding a defendant’s guilt or innocence. Archival analyses of hundreds of post-conviction DNA exonerations have identified eyewitness misidentification as the highest individual factor contributing to wrongful convictions (Innocence Project, 2014). Internationally, criminal justice systems have employed procedural safeguards (PSs) to educate juries on factors affecting eyewitness identification accuracy. Two such safeguards include the introduction of eyewitness expert testimony during trial proceedings and the reading of cautionary instructions by a presiding judge. In an independent factorial design, this research sought to examine the effects of a model judicial caution drafted by the Ontario Judicial Council …

The New Rules For Admissibility Of Expert Testimony: Part Ii, Robert Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

As described in the last Criminal Justice column for the Santa Barbara Lawyer magazine, the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Sargon Enterprises v. University of Southern California, 55 Cal. 4th 747, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 614 (2012) made it clear that California is now, (and perhaps unsuspectingly has been for some time), a Daubert jurisdiction. This requires the trial court be the “gatekeeper” and make a determination as to the admissibility of scientific or expert testimony and to determine the limits of any testimony, if it is introduced. The Court held that there are essentially three criteria: The first criterion …

Jailhouse Informants, Robert M. Bloom

Robert Bloom

No abstract provided.

The New Rules For Admissibility Of Expert Testimony: Part I, Robert Sanger

Robert M. Sanger

In a previous series of articles for this magazine, I took the position that California really was a Daubert jurisdiction in the sense that Kelly and Frye and thenexisting case law required that the court be the “gatekeeper” and make a determination as to: 1) whether a science (or area of expertise) was a science (or area of expertise); 2) whether the witness was a scientist (or expert); 3) whether the data was reliable; and then, and only then, 4) what a true scientist (or expert) could say based on the science and based on the reliable data. In the …

Vocational Testimony In Social Security Hearings, Daniel F. Solomon

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Tender Is The Night: Should Your Expert Be?, Cynthia Ford

Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

This article discusses the practice of tendering an expert for acceptance or certification by the court at trial in the presence of the jury. The article considers Tennessee and Montana state and federal evidence law. The author suggests that Montana courts and lawyers should comply with the A.B.A. Updated Civil Trial Standard 14 and let juries assess the testimony of a Rule 702 witness without a special designation accorded by the judge certifying a witness as an "expert" in his or her field.

Logic, Not Evidence, Supports A Change In Expert Testimony Standards: Why Evidentiary Standards Promulgated By The Supreme Court For Scientific Expert Testimony Are Inappropriate And Inefficient When Applied In Patent Infringement Suits, Claire R. Rollor

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

The (In)Admissibility Of False Confession Expert Testimony, David A. Perez

Touro Law Review

This Comment discusses the relationship between police interrogation tactics and false confessions in order to address the admissibility of false confession expert testimony, a question that has traditionally been left to the discretion of the trial judge. The current literature-indeed, the prevailing consensus-argues for drastic changes to police interrogation practices to prevent false confessions and, in combination with such changes, demands that expert testimony on false confessions be admitted in criminal trials. Despite the relative unanimity in the literature, state and federal courts remain bitterly divided on the question of admissibility of false confession expert testimony. Each decision in this …

Musical Copyright Infringement: The Replacement Of Arnstein V. Porter - A More Comprehensive Use Of Expert Testimony And The Implementation Of An "Actual Audience" Test , Michelle V. Francis

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Jailhouse Informants, Robert M. Bloom

Robert M. Bloom

No abstract provided.

Behavioral Science Evidence In The Age Of Daubert: Reflections Of A Skeptic, Mark S. Brodin

Mark S. Brodin

The piece briefly traces the history of the use of social science in the courtroom, and proceeds to critically measure this form of proof (particularly “syndrome” evidence) against both the reliability standards imposed by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the traditional requirements for admission of expert testimony. Drawing upon empirical research concerning juries and decision-making as well as transcripts of the use of behavioral evidence at trial, I conclude that much of this testimony should be rejected. Rather than providing meaningful assistance to the jury, social science experts can distort the accuracy of the fact-finding process and imperil …

Williams V. Illinois And The Confrontation Clause: Does Testimony By A Surrogate Witness Violate The Confrontation Clause?, Paul F. Rothstein, Ronald J. Coleman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article comprises a four-part debate between Paul Rothstein, Professor of Law at Georgetown Law Center, and Ronald J. Coleman, who works in the litigation practice group at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, on Williams v. Illinois, a Supreme Court case that involves the Confrontation Clause, which entitles a criminal defendant to confront an accusing witness in court. The issue at hand is whether said clause is infringed when a report not introduced into evidence at trial is used by an expert to testify about the results of testing that has been conducted by a non-testifying third party. …

Vol. Xxi, Tab 58 - Declaration Of Jennifer L. Spaziano In Support Of Rosetta Stone's Response To Google's Objections To Evidence And Motion To Strike, Jennifer Spaziano

Rosetta Stone v. Google (Joint Appendix)

Exhibits from the un-sealed joint appendix for Rosetta Stone Ltd., v. Google Inc., No. 10-2007, on appeal to the 4th Circuit. Issue presented: Under the Lanham Act, does the use of trademarked terms in keyword advertising result in infringement when there is evidence of actual confusion?

Vol. Ix, Tab 44 - Rosetta Stone's Opposition To Google's Motion For Summary Judgment, Rosetta Stone

Rosetta Stone v. Google (Joint Appendix)

Exhibits from the un-sealed joint appendix for Rosetta Stone Ltd., v. Google Inc., No. 10-2007, on appeal to the 4th Circuit. Issue presented: Under the Lanham Act, does the use of trademarked terms in keyword advertising result in infringement when there is evidence of actual confusion?

Vol. Ix, Tab 45 - Rosetta Stone's Opposition To Google's Motion For Summary Judgment, Rosetta Stone

Rosetta Stone v. Google (Joint Appendix)

Exhibits from the un-sealed joint appendix for Rosetta Stone Ltd., v. Google Inc., No. 10-2007, on appeal to the 4th Circuit. Issue presented: Under the Lanham Act, does the use of trademarked terms in keyword advertising result in infringement when there is evidence of actual confusion?

Vol. Xviii, Tab 55 - Google's Reply Memorandum Of Law In Further Support Of Its Motion To Exclude The Expert Report And Opinion Of Dr. Kent Van Liere, Google

Rosetta Stone v. Google (Joint Appendix)

Exhibits from the un-sealed joint appendix for Rosetta Stone Ltd., v. Google Inc., No. 10-2007, on appeal to the 4th Circuit. Issue presented: Under the Lanham Act, does the use of trademarked terms in keyword advertising result in infringement when there is evidence of actual confusion?

Admissibility Of Scientific Evidence And Expert Testimony: One Potato, Two Potato, Daubert, Frye, Lynn Mclain

All Faculty Scholarship

This handout from a Maryland Judicial Institute presentation covers the Maryland Rules concerning expert testimony and the ways they differ from the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Vol. Ix, Tab 43 - Google Memorandum In Support Of Its Motion To Exclude Expert Report And Opinion Of Dr. Kent Van Liere, Google

Rosetta Stone v. Google (Joint Appendix)

Exhibits from the un-sealed joint appendix for Rosetta Stone Ltd., v. Google Inc., No. 10-2007, on appeal to the 4th Circuit. Issue presented: Under the Lanham Act, does the use of trademarked terms in keyword advertising result in infringement when there is evidence of actual confusion?

Vol. Xiv, Tab 51 - Google's Objection To Evidence And Motion To Strike, Google

Rosetta Stone v. Google (Joint Appendix)

Exhibits from the un-sealed joint appendix for Rosetta Stone Ltd., v. Google Inc., No. 10-2007, on appeal to the 4th Circuit. Issue presented: Under the Lanham Act, does the use of trademarked terms in keyword advertising result in infringement when there is evidence of actual confusion?

A Matter Of Context: Social Framework Evidence In Employment Discrimination Class Actions, Melissa Hart, Paul M. Secunda

Publications

In litigation disputes over the certification of employment discrimination class actions, social scientists have come to play a central, yet controversial, role. Organizational behavioralists and social psychologists regularly testify for the plaintiffs, offering what is commonly referred to as social framework testimony. These experts explain the general social science research on the operation of stereotyping and bias in decision making and examine the challenged workplace to identify those policies and practices that research has shown will tend to increase and those that will tend to limit the likely impact of these factors. Defendants fight hard against the admission of social …

A Moving Bar Approach To Assessing The Admissibility Of Expert Causation Testimony, Aaron Katz

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article argues that the Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert and Joiner imply an approach to the reliability, and hence admissibility, of causation experts that conflicts with the way in which courts traditionally had determined whether to allow the jury to speculate on uncertain causation-in-fact questions. Largely moving past the debate of whether Daubert and Joiner set the admissibility bar too high or low, the Article instead criticizes the decisions on the ground that they suggest that the height of the reliability bar is static and should not be adjusted depending upon the circumstances of the defendant's possibly injurious conduct. …

Science On Trial, Valerie P. Hans

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The increasing complexity of both criminal and civil jury trials raises a host of issues for lawyers and judges. For the litigator, the first question is whether a jury can be trusted with a case that turns on highly technical evidence. For the trial judge, there are decisions about the admissibility of expert testimony, whether it is based on sound science, and whether a jury is likely to be misled by scientific claims. Should the judge permit jury innovations such as note taking, question asking, and juror discussions of evidence during the trial, hoping to increase jury comprehension of the …

Experts, Mental States, And Acts, Christopher Slobogin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This article, written for a symposium on "Guilt v. Guiltiness: Are the Right Rules for Trying Factual Innocence Inevitably the Wrong Rules for Trying Culpability?," argues that the definition of expertise in the criminal justice system, derived in the federal courts and in most states from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Co., should vary depending on whether the issue involved is past mental state or past conduct. While expert psychological testimony about past acts ought to be based on scientifically verifiable assertions, expert psychological testimony about subjective mental states relevant to criminal responsibility need not meet the same threshold. This …

Statistics In The Jury Box: How Jurors Respond To Mitochondrial Dna Match Probabilities, David H. Kaye, Valerie P. Hans, B. Michael Dann, Erin J. Farley, Stephanie Albertson

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This article describes parts of an unusually realistic experiment on the comprehension of expert testimony on mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) sequencing in a criminal trial for robbery. Specifically, we examine how jurors who responded to summonses for jury duty evaluated portions of videotaped testimony involving probabilities and statistics. Although some jurors showed susceptibility to classic fallacies in interpreting conditional probabilities, the jurors as a whole were not overwhelmed by a 99.98% exclusion probability that the prosecution presented. Cognitive errors favoring the defense were more prevalent than ones favoring the prosecution. These findings lend scant support to the legal argument that mtDNA …

Judges, Juries, And Scientific Evidence, Valerie P. Hans

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The rise in scientific evidence offered in American jury trials, along with court rulings thrusting judges into the business of assessing the soundness of scientific evidence, have produced challenges for judge and jury alike. Many judges have taken up the duty of becoming “amateur scientists.” But what about juries? Surely they too could benefit from assistance as they attempt to master and apply complex testimony about scientific matters during the course of a trial. Concerns about the jury’s ability to understand, critically evaluate, and employ scientific evidence in deciding complex trials have led to many suggestions for reform.

This article …

Peer Review And Publication: Lessons For Lawyers, Susan Haack

Articles

No abstract provided.

Proving Lost Profits Under Daubert: Five Questions Every Court Should Ask Before Admitting Expert Testimony, Robert M. Lloyd

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Can Jury Trial Innovations Improve Juror Understanding Of Dna Evidence?, B. Michael Dann, Valerie P. Hans, David H. Kaye

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

A single spot of blood on a pink windowsill will tell investigators who broke a windowpane, turned a lock, and kidnapped 2-year-old Molly Evans from her bedroom in the middle of the night. An expert witness will testify that the DNA profile of the blood evidence recovered from the windowsill was entered into CODIS, an electronic database of DNA profiles. That process yielded a “hit,” identifying the defendant as the most likely source of the blood inside Molly’s room.

But will jurors be able to understand the expert’s intricate analysis and use it to reach a verdict? And what—if any—steps …

Testing Jury Reforms, Valerie P. Hans, B. Michael Dann, David H. Kaye, Erin J. Farley, Stephanie Albertson

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

DNA evidence has become a key law enforcement tool and is increasingly presented in criminal trials in Delaware and elsewhere. The integrity of the criminal trial process turns upon the jury's ability to understand DNA evidence and to evaluate properly the testimony of experts. How well do they do? Can we assist them in the process?