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Confrontation Clause

Discipline
Institution
Publication Year
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Articles 31 - 58 of 58

Full-Text Articles in Evidence

Cheating The Constitution, Pamela R. Metzger Jan 2006

Cheating The Constitution, Pamela R. Metzger

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

It is black letter constitutional law: To prove a criminal offense, the prosecution must prove every element of the offense, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the constitution entitles a defendant to confront and cross-examine all witnesses against him. Yet, for the past thirty years, state legislatures have quietly approved laws that cheat the constitution. By that, I mean that these laws fly, undetected, beneath the constitutional radar while violating fundamental constitutional rights.

Although other constitutional cheats abound, in this article I consider one archetypical cheat: statutes that permit state prosecutors to use hearsay state crime laboratory reports, in …


Admissibility Of Co-Conspirator Statements In A Post-Crawford World, Michael L. Seigel, Daniel Weisman Jan 2006

Admissibility Of Co-Conspirator Statements In A Post-Crawford World, Michael L. Seigel, Daniel Weisman

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article takes the position that co-conspirator statements must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they are testimonial and thus subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause. Further, in light of the fact that the author of the majority opinions in Crawford and Davis was Justice Antonin Scalia, this Article examines whether interpreting the Sixth Amendment as a bar to the admission of certain coconspirator statements would violate an originalist interpretation of that provision. The conclusion reached is that it would not. In the current era of ever-narrowing rights for criminal defendants, reaffirming the law's commitment to …


The Story Of Crawford, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2006

The Story Of Crawford, Richard D. Friedman

Book Chapters

Michael Crawford had been charged with assault. At his trial, the prosecution offered a statement made in the police station on the night of the incident by Crawford's wife Sylvia, who did not testify at trial. He objected, in part on the ground that this violated his right under the Confrontation Clause. The trial court nevertheless admitted the statement, and Crawford was convicted. The Washington Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment. In rejecting the Confrontation Clause challenge, that court purported to apply the then governing doctrine of Ohio v. Roberts, under which the Clause posed no obstacle to admissibility if …


We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2006

We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

I closed my petition for certiorari in Hammon v. Indiana by declaring, “ ‘We really mean it!’ is the message that lower courts need to hear, and that decision of this case can send.” The prior year, Crawford v. Washington had transformed the law of the Confrontation Clause, holding that an out-ofcourt statement that is testimonial in nature may be admitted against an accused only if the maker of the statement is unavailable and the accused has had an opportunity to cross-examine her. But Crawford deliberately left undetermined what the term “testimonial” meant. Many lower courts gave it a grudging …


Crawford At Two: Testimonial Hearsay And The Confrontation Clause, H. Patrick Furman Jan 2006

Crawford At Two: Testimonial Hearsay And The Confrontation Clause, H. Patrick Furman

Publications

This article addresses the response of Colorado courts, and that of certain other jurisdictions, to the 2004 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington.


Crawford Surprises: Mostly Unpleasant, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2005

Crawford Surprises: Mostly Unpleasant, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Crawford v. Washington should not have been surprising. The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The doctrine of Ohio v. Roberts, treating the clause as a general proscription against the admission of hearsay-except hearsay that fits within a "firmly rooted" exception or is otherwise deemed reliable-had so little to do with the constitutional text, or with the history or principle behind it, that eventually it was bound to be discarded. And the appeal of a testimonial approach to the clause seemed sufficiently strong to yield high hopes that ultimately the …


Grappling With The Meaning Of 'Testimonial', Richard D. Friedman Jan 2005

Grappling With The Meaning Of 'Testimonial', Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Crawford v. Washington, has adopted a testimonial approach to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Under this approach, a statement that is deemed to be testimonial in nature may not be introduced at trial against an accused unless he has had an opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the statement and that person is unavailable to testify at trial. If a statement is not deemed to be testimonial, then the Confrontation Clause poses little if any obstacle to its admission.2 A great deal therefore now rides on the meaning of the word "testimonial."


Confrontation After Crawford, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2005

Confrontation After Crawford, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

The following edit excerpt, drawn from "The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed," 2003-04 Cato Supreme Court Review 439 (2004), by Law School Professor Richard D. Friedman, discusses the impact, effects, and questions generated by the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington last year that a defendant is entitled to confront and cross-examine any testimonial statement presented against him. In Crawford, the defendant, charged with attacking another man with a knife, contested the trial court's admission of a tape-recorded statement his wife made to police without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine. The tiral court admitted the statement, and …


Face To Face With The Right Of Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2004

Face To Face With The Right Of Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman

Other Publications

This article is an edited excerpt from the amicus curiae brief filed in Crawford v. Washington, heard before the United States Supreme Court on November 10, 2003. Prof. Friedman wrote the brief for the Court.


Adjusting To Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2004

Adjusting To Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court radically transformed its doctrine governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Craitiord is a very positive development, restoring to its central position one of the basic protections of the common law system of criminal justice. But the decision leaves many open questions, and all lawyers involved in the criminal justice process will have to adjust to the new regime that it creates. This article outlines and summarizes the problems with the law as it stood before Crait/brd. It then explains the theoretical …


The Crawford Transformation, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2004

The Crawford Transformation, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), is one of the most dramatic Evidence cases in recent history, radically transforming the doctrine governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Crawford is a very positive development, but leaves many open questions - and forces Evidence teachers to rethink how they teach hearsay and confrontation.


Face To Face': Rediscovering The Right To Confront Prosecution Witnesses, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2004

Face To Face': Rediscovering The Right To Confront Prosecution Witnesses, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right of an accused 'to confront the witnesses against him'. The United States Supreme Court has treated this Confrontation Clause as a broad but rather easily rebuttable rule against using hearsay on behalf of a criminal prosecution; with respect to most hearsay, the exclusionary rule is overcome if the court is persuaded that the statement is sufficiently reliable, and the court can reach that conclusion if the statement fits within a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception. This article argues that this framework should be abandoned. The clause should not be regarded …


The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted And Transformed, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2004

The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted And Transformed, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

For several centuries, prosecution witnesses in criminal cases have given their testimony under oath, face to face with the accused, and subject to cross-examination at trial. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the procedure, providing that ‘‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witness against him.’’ In recent decades, however, judicial protection of the right has been lax, because the U.S. Supreme Court has tolerated admission of outof- court statements against the accused, without cross-examination, if the statements are deemed ‘‘reliable’’ or ‘‘trustworthy.’’ …


Confrontation As A Hot Topic: The Virtues Of Going Back To Square One, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2003

Confrontation As A Hot Topic: The Virtues Of Going Back To Square One, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

I have been working so obsessively on the accused's right to confront the witnesses against him 1 that I am gratified that the organizers of this conference have designated confrontation as one of the "hot topics" of Evidence law. I am not so egotistical as to think that my work has made confrontation into a hot topic; I am just glad to know that I am working where a good deal of action is, and that other scholars recognize that confrontation is an important area in which dramatic changes may be occurring.


Crawford V. Washington, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2003

Crawford V. Washington, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

On June 9, by granting certiorari in Crawford v. Washington, 02-9410, the Supreme Court signaled its intention to enter once again into the realm of the Confrontation Clause, in which it has found itself deeply perplexed. This time there was a difference, however, because the grant indicated that the Court might be willing to rethink its jurisprudence in this area. Crawford, like Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), and Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), presents a classic case of what might be called station-house testimony. Michael Crawford was accused of stabbing another man. His wife, Sylvia, was …


Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2002

Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Recently, the Supreme Court declined to pass on to Congress a proposed change to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 submitted to it by the Judicial Conference. In this Article, Professor Friedman addresses this proposal, which would allow for more extensive use of remote, video-based testimony at criminal trials. He agrees with the majority of the Court that the proposal raised serious problems under the Confrontation Clause. He also argues that a revised proposal, in addition to better protecting the confrontation rights of defendants, should include more definite quality standards, abandon its reliance on the definition of unavailability found in …


The Conundrum Of Children, Confrontation, And Hearsay, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2002

The Conundrum Of Children, Confrontation, And Hearsay, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

The adjudication of child abuse claims poses an excruciatingly difficult conundrum. The crime is a terrible one, but false convictions are abhorrent. Often the evidence does not support a finding of guilt or innocence with sufficient clarity to allow a decision free of gnawing doubt. In many cases, a large part of the problem is that the prosecution's case depends critically on the statement or testimony of a young child. Even with respect to adult witnesses, the law of hearsay and confrontation is very perplexing, as anyone who has studied American evidentiary law and read Supreme Court opinions on the …


Dial-In Testimony, Richard D. Friedman, Bridget Mary Mccormack Jan 2002

Dial-In Testimony, Richard D. Friedman, Bridget Mary Mccormack

Articles

For several hundred years, one of the great glories of the common law system of criminal justice has been the requirement that prosecution witnesses give their testimony in the presence of the accused" face to face," in the time-honored phrase-under oath, subject to cross-examination, and, unless unfeasible, in open court. In the United States, this principle is enshrined in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." But now a new way is developing for witnesses for the prosecution …


Confronting The Reluctant Accomplice, John G. Douglass Jan 2001

Confronting The Reluctant Accomplice, John G. Douglass

Law Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court treats the Confrontation Clause as a rule of evidence that excludes unreliable hearsay. But where the hearsay declarant is an accomplice who refuses to testify at defendant's trial, the Court's approach leads prosecutors and defendants to ignore real opportunities for confrontation, while they debate the reliability of hearsay. And even where the Court's doctrine excludes hearsay, it leads prosecutors to purchase the accomplice's testimony through a process that raises equally serious questions of reliability. Thus, the Court's approach promotes neither reliability nor confrontation. This Article advocates an approach that applies the Confrontation Clause to hearsay declarants in …


Lilly V. Virginia Glimmers Of Hope For The Confrontation Clause?, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2000

Lilly V. Virginia Glimmers Of Hope For The Confrontation Clause?, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In 1662, in The Case of Thomas Tong and Others, which involved charges of treason against several defendants, the judges of the King's Bench conferred on a crucial set of points of procedure. As reported by one of the judges, Sir John Kelyng, the judges agreed unanimously that a pretrial confession made to the authorities was evidence against the Party himself who made the Confession, and indeed, if adequately proved could support a conviction of that party without additional witnesses to the treason itself. But -- again unanimously, and quite definitively -- the judges also agreed that the confession cannot …


Confrontation Confronted, Richard D. Friedman, Margaret A. Berger, Steven R. Shapiro Jan 1999

Confrontation Confronted, Richard D. Friedman, Margaret A. Berger, Steven R. Shapiro

Articles

The following article is an edited version of the amicus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1998, in the case of Benjamin Lee Lilly v. Commonwealth of Virginia (No. 98-5881). "This case raises important questions about the meaning of the confrontation clause, which has been a vital ingredient of the fair trial right for hundreds of years," Professor Richard Friedman and his co-authors say. "In particular, this case presents the Court with an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the confrontation clause and the law of hearsay." On June 10 the …


Lilly V. Virginia: A Chance To Reconceptualize The Confrontation Right, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1999

Lilly V. Virginia: A Chance To Reconceptualize The Confrontation Right, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In Lilly v. Virginia, the Supreme Court once again has the opportunity to grapple with the meaning of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendmel).t. The basic facts of Lilly are simple, for they present the ageold problem of accomplice confessions. Three men, Gary Barker and Ben and Mark Lilly, went on a crime spree, during which one of them shot to death a young man they had robbed and kidnaped. Ben Lilly was charged with being the triggerman, and Barker testified to that effect at Ben's trial. Mark did not testify. But Mark had made a statement to the …


Confrontation: The Search For Basic Principles, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1998

Confrontation: The Search For Basic Principles, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the accused in a criminal prosecution the right "to be confronted with the Witnesses against him."' The Confrontation Clause clearly applies to those witnesses who testify against the accused at trial. Moreover, it is clear enough that confrontation ordinarily includes the accused's right to have those witnesses brought "face-toface," in the time-honored phrase, when they testify.2 But confrontation is much more than this "face-to-face" right. It also comprehends the right to have witnesses give their testimony under oath and to subject them to crossexamination. 3 Indeed, the Supreme Court has treated the accused's …


Focus On Faculty, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1998

Focus On Faculty, Richard D. Friedman

Other Publications

Professor Richard Friedman talks about his scholarship and work.


Truth And Its Rivals In The Law Of Hearsay And Confrontation (Symposium: Truth And Its Rivals: Evidence Reform And The Goals Of Evidence Law)." , Richard D. Friedman Jan 1998

Truth And Its Rivals In The Law Of Hearsay And Confrontation (Symposium: Truth And Its Rivals: Evidence Reform And The Goals Of Evidence Law)." , Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In this paper, I will look at the problem of hearsay and confrontation through the lens offered by this symposium's theme of "truth and its rivals." I will ask: To what extent does the law of hearsay and confrontation aspire to achieve the goal of truth in litigation? To what extent does it, or should it, seek to achieve other goals, or to satisfy other constraints on the litigation system? And, given the ends that it seeks to achieve, what should the shape of the law in this area be? My principal conclusions are as follows: In most settings, the …


Thoughts From Across The Water On Hearsay And Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1998

Thoughts From Across The Water On Hearsay And Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

This article draws on the history of the hearsay rule, and on recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, to argue that the right to confrontation should be recognised as a basic principle of the law of evidence, and that aspects of the Law Commission's proposals for reform of the hearsay rule, and of the Home Office's proposals for restrictions on the right of cross-examination, are therefore unsatisfactory.


Prior Statements Of A Witness: A Nettlesome Corner Of The Hearsay Thicket, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1995

Prior Statements Of A Witness: A Nettlesome Corner Of The Hearsay Thicket, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In Tome v United States, for the fifth time in eight years, the Supreme Court decided a case presenting the problem of how a child's allegations of sexual abuse should be presented in court. Often the child who charges that an adult abused her is unable to testify at trial, or at least unable to testify effectively under standard procedures. These cases therefore raise intriguing and difficult questions related to the rule against hearsay and to an accused's right under the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against him. One would hardly guess that, however, from the rather arid debate …


After White V. Illinois: Fundamental Guarantees To A Hollow Right To Confront Witnesses, Patricia W. Bennett Jan 1993

After White V. Illinois: Fundamental Guarantees To A Hollow Right To Confront Witnesses, Patricia W. Bennett

Journal Articles

The thrust of this Article is three-fold: (1) to discuss the historical aspects of the Confrontation Clause and its interpretation by the United States Supreme Court, (2) to show that, with White v. Illinois, the Supreme Court lost its moorings with previous decisions and drifted into treacherous constitutional seas, and (3) to suggest a textual construction of the Confrontation Clause that would be harmonious with the hearsay rule while preserving the rights of the accused to face their actual accusers.