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Full-Text Articles in Evidence
Conditional Probative Value And The Reconstruction Of The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Dale A. Nance
Conditional Probative Value And The Reconstruction Of The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Dale A. Nance
Michigan Law Review
In a recent article, Richard Friedman articulates a modified and generalized version of the doctrine of conditional relevance, which he calls "conditional probative value." This version comes in response to a substantial body of academic criticism of the traditional doctrine. As one of the critics to whom Professor Friedman responds, I offer this reply with two purposes in mind: (1) to clarify the relationship between Friedman's analysis and my earlier reinterpretation of the conditional relevance doctrine; and (2) to address Friedman's specific proposals with regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence. I conclude that Friedman's articulation helps clarify the logic …
Response: Exaggerated And Misleading Reports Of The Death Of Conditional Relevance, Peter Tillers
Response: Exaggerated And Misleading Reports Of The Death Of Conditional Relevance, Peter Tillers
Michigan Law Review
In 1980 the late Professor Vaughn C. Ball of the University of Georgia published an article called The Myth of Conditional Relevancy. Ball's article is widely admired. One well-known evidence scholar, Ronald J. Allen, liked Ball's article so much that he borrowed its title word for word. Although the extent of Allen's enthusiasm for Ball's analysis may be unmatched, a good number of students of evidence - including this writer - have said that Ball's analysis of conditional relevance is both original and important. Richard Friedman, by contrast, cannot be counted as one of Ball's more ardent admirers. Although Friedman …
In Suport Of The Thayer Theory Of Presumptions, Charles V. Laughlin
In Suport Of The Thayer Theory Of Presumptions, Charles V. Laughlin
Michigan Law Review
A learned judge once said to a young lawyer, "If you are ever a trial court judge, never give reasons for your decisions. Your rulings will probably be right, but your reasons will likely be wrong." That statement may aptly apply to judicial pronouncements relating to the subject of presumptions. Decisions are largely free from criticism so far as concerns the results reached, but the reasoning processes by which they are reached appear to be in hopeless confusion. It is believed that a theory can be presented which will both reconcile these confusions of judicial techniques and explain the general …