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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Evidence
Elm In The Courtroom: Application To Trial Juries, Natalie Claire Hopkins
Elm In The Courtroom: Application To Trial Juries, Natalie Claire Hopkins
Communication Studies
No abstract provided.
Visual Jurisprudence, Richard Sherwin
Visual Jurisprudence, Richard Sherwin
Articles & Chapters
Lawyers, judges, and jurors face a vast array of visual evidence and visual argument inside the contemporary courtroom. From videos documenting crimes and accidents to computer displays of their digital simulation, increasingly, the search for fact-based justice is becoming an offshoot of visual meaning making. But when law migrates to the screen it lives there as other images do, motivating belief and judgment on the basis of visual delight and unconscious fantasies and desires as well as actualities. Law as image also shares broader cultural anxieties concerning not only the truth of the image, but also the mimetic capacity itself, …
A Very Brief Primer On Bayesian Methods In Evidence, Richard D. Friedman
A Very Brief Primer On Bayesian Methods In Evidence, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
I have been asked to write an extremely short explanation of the Bayesian approach to evidentiary issues, for the benefit of those who regard themselves as probabilistically challenged. Although the application of Bayesian probability to evidence has generated a good deal of debate, its use as a heuristic device should not be particularly controversial. Evidence concerns propositions that are uncertain. Accordingly, some concept of probability must play a role. Standards of persuasion, such as "more likely than not" and "beyond a reasonable doubt" are clearly probabilistic, and the definition of relevant evidence, as expressed in Fed. R. Evid. 40 I, …
A Presumption Of Innocence, Not Of Even Odds, Richard D. Friedman
A Presumption Of Innocence, Not Of Even Odds, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Now I know how the Munchkins felt. Here I have been, toiling in the fields of Evidenceland for some years, laboring along with others to show how use of Bayesian probability theory can assist in the analysis and understanding of evidentiary problems.' In doing so, we have had to wage continuous battle against the Bayesioskeptics-the wicked witches who deny much value, even heuristic value, for probability theory in evidentiary analysis.2 Occasionally, I have longed for law-and-economics scholars to help work this field, which should be fertile ground for them.3 So imagine my delight when the virtual personification of law and …
Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman
Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In recent years, some scholars of evidence, myself among them, have made active use of subjective probability theory - what is sometimes referred to as Bayesianism - in thinking about issues and problems related to the law of evidence. But, at the same time, this use has been challenged to various degrees and in various ways by scholars to whom I shall apply the collective, if somewhat misleading, label of Bayesioskeptics. I present this brief paper to defend this use of probability theory, and to discuss what I believe is its proper role in discourse about evidentiary issues.
Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman
Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
If I understand them correctly, several leading Bayesioskeptics (Allen, Callen, Stein) acknowledge - with varying degrees of specificity and varying degrees of grudgingness - that standard probability theory can be useful as an analytical tool in considering evidentiary doctrines and the probative value of evidentiary items.
Dealing With Evidentiary Deficiency, Richard D. Friedman
Dealing With Evidentiary Deficiency, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Lack of information distorts litigation. Claims or defenses that a party might prove easily, or that might even be undisputed, in a world of perfect information can be difficult or impossible to prove in the real world of imperfect information. Some information deficiencies are inevitable, at least in the sense that we could not eliminate them without incurring undue social costs. In some cases, however, a person's conduct may have caused the deficiency. More generally, the person may have had available a reasonable alternative course of conduct that would have eliminated, or at least mitigated, the deficiency. Ariel Porat and …
Conditional Probative Value And The Reconstruction Of The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Dale A. Nance
Conditional Probative Value And The Reconstruction Of The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Dale A. Nance
Michigan Law Review
In a recent article, Richard Friedman articulates a modified and generalized version of the doctrine of conditional relevance, which he calls "conditional probative value." This version comes in response to a substantial body of academic criticism of the traditional doctrine. As one of the critics to whom Professor Friedman responds, I offer this reply with two purposes in mind: (1) to clarify the relationship between Friedman's analysis and my earlier reinterpretation of the conditional relevance doctrine; and (2) to address Friedman's specific proposals with regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence. I conclude that Friedman's articulation helps clarify the logic …
Refining Conditional Probative Value, Richard D. Friedman
Refining Conditional Probative Value, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
The subject of conditional relevance, or what I think is better called "conditional probative value," must seem hopelessly ard to many. It continues to engage the attention of evidence scholars, however, because it forms part of the conceptual underpinnings of many parts of evidentiary law. Dale'Nance, one of the most astute evidence scholars of our time, has previously written at length on the subject' and has done so now more briefly in response to an article of mine. I offer an even briefer continuation of the discussion.
Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, Richard D. Friedman
Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
The concept of conditional relevance is an essential aspect of the classical model of evidentiary law. Some of the great scholars of evidence have endorsed and shaped it.1 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) it plays a crucial role in the division of responsibility between judge and jury,2 as well as in the application of the personal knowledge3 and authentication 4 requirements. And the Supreme Court has applied it with great force.5 In recent years, though, the concept has come under attack from several notable scholars. The late Vaughn Ball led the assault, calling the concept a "myth."'6 Peter Tillers, …
Response: Exaggerated And Misleading Reports Of The Death Of Conditional Relevance, Peter Tillers
Response: Exaggerated And Misleading Reports Of The Death Of Conditional Relevance, Peter Tillers
Michigan Law Review
In 1980 the late Professor Vaughn C. Ball of the University of Georgia published an article called The Myth of Conditional Relevancy. Ball's article is widely admired. One well-known evidence scholar, Ronald J. Allen, liked Ball's article so much that he borrowed its title word for word. Although the extent of Allen's enthusiasm for Ball's analysis may be unmatched, a good number of students of evidence - including this writer - have said that Ball's analysis of conditional relevance is both original and important. Richard Friedman, by contrast, cannot be counted as one of Ball's more ardent admirers. Although Friedman …
Standards Of Persuasion And The Distinction Between Fact And Law, Richard D. Friedman
Standards Of Persuasion And The Distinction Between Fact And Law, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
The invitation to respond in these pages to Gary Lawson's very interesting article, Proving the Law, was tempting enough. But what made it irresistible was Professor Lawson's comment that he is "addressing, with a brevity that borders on the irresponsible, subjects well beyond [his] depth." Now, that's the kind of debate I really like. Let me jump right in. A principal question raised by Lawson, which I find quite interesting, may be phrased in general, and purposefully ambiguous, terms as follows: Before an actor treats a proposition as a valid2 proposition of law, what standard of persuasion should that proposition …
In Suport Of The Thayer Theory Of Presumptions, Charles V. Laughlin
In Suport Of The Thayer Theory Of Presumptions, Charles V. Laughlin
Michigan Law Review
A learned judge once said to a young lawyer, "If you are ever a trial court judge, never give reasons for your decisions. Your rulings will probably be right, but your reasons will likely be wrong." That statement may aptly apply to judicial pronouncements relating to the subject of presumptions. Decisions are largely free from criticism so far as concerns the results reached, but the reasoning processes by which they are reached appear to be in hopeless confusion. It is believed that a theory can be presented which will both reconcile these confusions of judicial techniques and explain the general …