Evidence Commons^™

Evidentiary Use Of Prior Acquittals: When Analysis Exceeds Reality, Paul Harper

Akron Law Review

The purpose of this note is to assess the basis and propriety of that decision and to highlight some potential problems with the Court's conclusion. Additionally, this casenote will attempt to envision how this holding may affect future prosecutions.

Finally it will offer an alternative model which may more adequately address the tension between the government's legitimate prosecutorial interests and the defendant's interest in finality of judgment.

State V. Jenks Fails To Clarify Appellate Standards Of Evidence Review In Ohio, Kevin L. Leffel

Akron Law Review

The analysis that follows focuses on two points. First, many reviewing courts in Ohio have failed to discern between reversing a conviction because it was against the manifest weight of the evidence and reversing because the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction. The concepts and associated standards of review are separate and distinct. Jenks failed to clarify the distinction and may actually add to the confusion. Second, the elimination of the circumstantial evidence rule has implications concerning the definition of reasonable doubt in Ohio.

The Trial Judge As Gatekeeper For Scientific Evidence: Will Ohio Rule Of Evidence 102 Frustrate The Ohio Courts' Role Under Daubert V. Merrell Dow?, Michael Lepp, Chrisopher B. Mcneil

Akron Law Review

This article considers the role of the trial court in responding to the changes wrought by scientific innovation. Particular consideration is given to the impact likely to be realized in Ohio trial courts from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

[...]In order to appreciate the significance of Ohio Evidence Rule 102 in this context, it is helpful to first examine some of the events leading to Daubert, especially the application (and in some instances, the rejection) of Frye both in Ohio and at the federal level. Following that, this article will …

Lilly V. Virginia: Silencing The "Firmly Rooted" Hearsay Exception With Regard To An Accomplice's Testimony And Its Rejuvenation Of The Confrontation Clause, Leslie Morsek

Akron Law Review

This Note examines the impact on the confrontation clause of introducing an accomplice's custodial statements which inculpate a defendant. Part II delves into the background of this issue by examining the confrontation clause's origin, the significance of hearsay with respect to the confrontation clause, and important cases in this area. Part III provides a statement of the facts, the procedural history, and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lilly. Finally, Part IV analyzes the Lilly decision and its rejuvenation of the confrontation clause.

Protecting The Wolf In Sheep's Clothing: Perverse Consequences Of The Mckennon Rule, Jenny B. Wahl

Akron Law Review

What follows is, first, a description of the typical scenarios that arise in after-acquired-evidence cases and the law surrounding McKennon. Section II discusses how the economic literature on information and signaling applies to such cases; section III elaborates upon the motives behind and the perversities of McKennon; and section IV offers conclusions.

Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert?, Malcolm B. Coate, Jeffrey H. Fischer

Akron Law Review

In Section II of this Article, we review the Supreme Court’s standard for allowing expert testimony as explained in Daubert and related opinions, and discuss in detail the City of Tuscaloosa and Concord Boat decisions that, following Daubert, excluded the economic expert testimony on which the plaintiffs relied. Section III presents an overview of the Chicago School of Economics, which sets a foundation for our commentary on the Post-Chicago school and serves as a basis for the evaluation of Chicago-based testimony in Section V. Section IV discusses the Post-Chicago School approach to antitrust analysis as a refinement of the Chicago …

Get On Board For The Ride Of Your Life! The Ups, The Downs, The Twists, And The Turns Of The Applicability Of The "Gatekeeper" Function To Scientific And Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho'sexpansion Of Daubert, Leslie Morsek

Akron Law Review

This Comment examines the history of scientific and non-scientific expert evidence, its current status, and the future of scientific and non-scientific evidence based on recent court decisions. Part II explores the background of these issues by examining the earlier standard for admitting expert testimony, the effect of Congress’ promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the influential cases in this area. Part III analyzes the importance of subjecting nonscientific expert testimony to the same rigors as scientific expert testimony. Lastly, Part IV predicts the future of expert evidence.

Culpability Evaluations In The State Supreme Courts From 1977 To 1999: A "Model" Assessment, Dannye Holley

Akron Law Review

A key premise of this article is that a fair assessment of the performance of state supreme court judges with regard to culpability evaluations must begin by differentiating among the states based upon the relative quality of statutory guidance available to each court on this crucial substantive criminal law issue. In light of the above discussion defining culpability evaluation and legislative action with regard thereto, this article categorizes states based on relative improvement in their statutory culpability evaluation scheme: first are those states with a set of hierarchical culpability concepts, which are specifically defined in relation to types of objective …

Judicial Notice And The Law's "Scientific" Search For Truth, Christopher Onstott

Akron Law Review

Part I of this Article begins by introducing the concept of judicial notice followed by a short background defining the scope of scientific and technical principles. Part II addresses the problems created by the current judicial notice standard. The standard’s text is problematic, and courts’ diverse interpretations of the standard have also created problems. Part III analyzes whether scientific and technical principles merit a different judicial notice standard specifically for them. This Part concludes that the inherent inconsistency of science and technical knowledge with the current standard and the judicial shortcomings in scientific/technical competence justify different legal treatment. Finally, Part …

Daubert, Probabilities And Possibilities, And The Ohio Solution: A Sensible Approach To Relevance Under Rule 702 In Civil And Criminal Applications, Andrew W. Jurs

Akron Law Review

Probability for expert opinions is the correct standard for civil cases based on the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. Among other effects, the probability requirement reduces jury speculation, avoids absurdity, appropriately adopts legal relevance as the standard for admission, and avoids negative effects on the out-of-courtroom practices of professionals. Expert opinions explaining possibilities, while inappropriate for civil case consideration, have Rule 702 relevance and are useful in criminal cases based upon the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof. Based on an evaluation of federal and state cases, Rule 702, and the purposes of expert testimony, the Ohio …

After Rape Law: Will The Turn To Consent Normalize The Prosecution Of Sexual Assault?, Donald Dripps

Akron Law Review

This essay explores the new rape exceptionalism. My thesis holds that rape exceptionalism is rooted in a divide between elite opinion, reflected in statutes, court decisions, and academic commentary, and popular opinion, as reflected in jury verdicts. Elite opinion values sexual autonomy and suspects, when it does not despise, sexual aggression. Popular opinion supposes that sexual autonomy may be forfeited by female promiscuity or flirtation, and views male sexual aggression as natural, if not indeed admirable...pressions of consent,8 is an academic exercise. If we really want to normalize rape law, we must bypass the jury openly. We can’t conceal the …

Calculating Credibility: State V. Sharma And The Future Of Polygraph Admissibility In Ohio And Beyond, Vincent V. Vigluicci

Akron Law Review

Almost a century after its inception, the polygraph test remains one of the most fascinating forms of evidence. Firmly entrenched in popular mythology, the polygraph offers the promise of calculating truth and credibility with scientific certainty, a proposition that continues to capture the public’s imagination. At the same time, the polygraph has also been viewed with great trepidation as a flawed and dangerous instrument of oppression. Commonly called a “lie detector,” the polygraph does not actually detect lying; it measures subtle changes in blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and the skin’s resistance to electricity that are thought to result from the …

Back To The Future: Lorraine V. Markel American Insurance Co. And New Findings On The Admissibility Of Electronically Stored Information, Hon. Paul W. Grimm, Michael V. Ziccardi Esq., Alexander W. Major Esq.

Akron Law Review

Imagine the following hypothetical, patterned on an actual case pending in federal court, and you can begin to appreciate why there is a growing awareness of the need to have clear analytical thinking regarding the admissibility of electronically stored information, variously referred to as “ESI,” “digital,” “electronic,” “computer generated,” or “computer stored” evidence in state and federal courts. ConsumerPro is a corporation that provides installment credit to consumers with poor or un-established credit records to enable them to purchase on credit expensive electronic and computer products like flat screen televisions, computers, and entertainment systems. Under their business plan, a purchaser …

Black Boxes: Fmri Detection And The Role Of The Jury, Julie Seaman

Akron Law Review

Before I offer some thoughts on that question, let me mention three real-life cases in which cutting-edge neuroscientific evidence either did – or conceivably might in a not-so-distant future – influence the outcome of a criminal prosecution. In the first case, reported last week in the New York Times, EEG brain-fingerprinting-type evidence was admitted against a woman on trial in India for murdering her husband. She was convicted. In the second case, in England recently, neuroscientists performed an fMRI lie-detection scan on a woman who had previously been convicted of poisoning a child in her care. She claimed that she …

"His Brain Has Been Mismanaged With Great Skill": How Will Jurors Respond To Neuromimaging Testimony In Insanity Defense Cases?, Michael L. Perlin

Akron Law Review

A review of the literature on neuroimaging, predictably, reveals a broad array of positions, promises and prophecies. Carter Snead argues that the ambition of cognitive neuroscientists is “to use the claims of their discipline and the new powers conferred by neuroimaging to overthrow retributive justice as a legitimate justification for criminal sanctions.” In this paper, I do not take sides on this debate. Rather, I discuss a related, but distinctly separate issue: which of these positions will jurors think is right, especially in the context of deciding insanity defense cases. The primary and robust debate that has taken place so …

Two Wrongs Don't Make A Right: Federal Death Eligibility Determinations And Judicial Trifurcations, Michael D. Pepson, John N. Sharifi

Akron Law Review

Broadly speaking, the purpose of this article is to bring attention to this radical and irreconcilable disparity between the unequivocal Sixth Amendment right of confrontation criminal defendants are afforded at trial,and the limited, qualified right of confrontation the FDPA grants federal capital defendants during death-eligibility determinations, which occur as part of the sentencing phase. It advances the argument that there is no tenable principled distinction on which this disparate procedural treatment may rest. We will attempt to demonstrate that, as written, the statutory provision that governs the admission of evidence at capital sentencings—18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)—is unconstitutional on its face …

Six Summary Judgment Safeguards, Edward Brunet

Akron Law Review

This article sets forth a more optimistic assessment of the current status of summary judgment. Numerous potential safeguards deter improper grants of summary judgment motions and serve to temper trial judges who are prone to rule favorably on summary judgment requests. While some of the safeguards act more as ineffectual clichés or slogans, others provide a set of significant deterrents to overly adventuresome treatment of Rule 56 motions. The goal of this article is to critique six possible summary judgment safeguards and, in so doing, to determine whether the state of contemporary summary judgment is as bleak as leading critics …