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Evidence Commons

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Jurisprudence

Persuasion

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Full-Text Articles in Evidence

Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1997

Towards A (Bayesian) Convergence?, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

If I understand them correctly, several leading Bayesioskeptics (Allen, Callen, Stein) acknowledge - with varying degrees of specificity and varying degrees of grudgingness - that standard probability theory can be useful as an analytical tool in considering evidentiary doctrines and the probative value of evidentiary items.


Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1997

Answering The Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In recent years, some scholars of evidence, myself among them, have made active use of subjective probability theory - what is sometimes referred to as Bayesianism - in thinking about issues and problems related to the law of evidence. But, at the same time, this use has been challenged to various degrees and in various ways by scholars to whom I shall apply the collective, if somewhat misleading, label of Bayesioskeptics. I present this brief paper to defend this use of probability theory, and to discuss what I believe is its proper role in discourse about evidentiary issues.


In Suport Of The Thayer Theory Of Presumptions, Charles V. Laughlin Dec 1953

In Suport Of The Thayer Theory Of Presumptions, Charles V. Laughlin

Michigan Law Review

A learned judge once said to a young lawyer, "If you are ever a trial court judge, never give reasons for your decisions. Your rulings will probably be right, but your reasons will likely be wrong." That statement may aptly apply to judicial pronouncements relating to the subject of presumptions. Decisions are largely free from criticism so far as concerns the results reached, but the reasoning processes by which they are reached appear to be in hopeless confusion. It is believed that a theory can be presented which will both reconcile these confusions of judicial techniques and explain the general …