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Full-Text Articles in Criminal Procedure

Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar Jan 2006

Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar

Articles

June marks the 40th anniversary of one of the most praised, most maligned-and probably one of the most misunderstood-U.S. Supreme Court cases in American history, Miranda v. Arizona. The opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren conditions police questioning of people in custody on the giving of warnings about the right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the waiver of those rights. 384 U.S. 436. This ruling represents a compromise of sorts between the former elusive, ambiguous and subjective voluntariness/totality-of-the-circumstances test and extreme proposals that would have eliminated police interrogation altogether. But William H. Rehnquist didn't see Miranda that …


Taking Miranda's Pulse, William T. Pizzi, Morris B. Hoffman Jan 2005

Taking Miranda's Pulse, William T. Pizzi, Morris B. Hoffman

Publications

No abstract provided.


Grappling With The Meaning Of 'Testimonial', Richard D. Friedman Jan 2005

Grappling With The Meaning Of 'Testimonial', Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Crawford v. Washington, has adopted a testimonial approach to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Under this approach, a statement that is deemed to be testimonial in nature may not be introduced at trial against an accused unless he has had an opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the statement and that person is unavailable to testify at trial. If a statement is not deemed to be testimonial, then the Confrontation Clause poses little if any obstacle to its admission.2 A great deal therefore now rides on the meaning of the word "testimonial."


Confrontation After Crawford, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2005

Confrontation After Crawford, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

The following edit excerpt, drawn from "The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed," 2003-04 Cato Supreme Court Review 439 (2004), by Law School Professor Richard D. Friedman, discusses the impact, effects, and questions generated by the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington last year that a defendant is entitled to confront and cross-examine any testimonial statement presented against him. In Crawford, the defendant, charged with attacking another man with a knife, contested the trial court's admission of a tape-recorded statement his wife made to police without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine. The tiral court admitted the statement, and …


Adjusting To Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2004

Adjusting To Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court radically transformed its doctrine governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Craitiord is a very positive development, restoring to its central position one of the basic protections of the common law system of criminal justice. But the decision leaves many open questions, and all lawyers involved in the criminal justice process will have to adjust to the new regime that it creates. This article outlines and summarizes the problems with the law as it stood before Crait/brd. It then explains the theoretical …


The Crawford Transformation, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2004

The Crawford Transformation, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), is one of the most dramatic Evidence cases in recent history, radically transforming the doctrine governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Crawford is a very positive development, but leaves many open questions - and forces Evidence teachers to rethink how they teach hearsay and confrontation.


Postscript: Another Look At Patane And Seibert, The 2004 Miranda 'Poisoned Fruit' Cases, Yale Kamisar Jan 2004

Postscript: Another Look At Patane And Seibert, The 2004 Miranda 'Poisoned Fruit' Cases, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Some months after I finished writing an article that, inter alia, discussed the lower court opinions in Patane and Seibert (an article that appears elsewhere in this issue of the Journa),1 the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in those cases.2 In Patane, a 5-4 majority held admissible a Glock pistol located as a result of a failure to comply with Miranda. In Seibert, a 5-4 majority agreed with the state court that a "second confession," one obtained after the police had deliberately used a two-stage interrogation technique designed to undermine the Miranda warnings, was inadmissible. 3 In Patane, Justice …


The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted And Transformed, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2004

The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted And Transformed, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

For several centuries, prosecution witnesses in criminal cases have given their testimony under oath, face to face with the accused, and subject to cross-examination at trial. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the procedure, providing that ‘‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witness against him.’’ In recent decades, however, judicial protection of the right has been lax, because the U.S. Supreme Court has tolerated admission of outof- court statements against the accused, without cross-examination, if the statements are deemed ‘‘reliable’’ or ‘‘trustworthy.’’ …


Face To Face With The Right Of Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2004

Face To Face With The Right Of Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman

Other Publications

This article is an edited excerpt from the amicus curiae brief filed in Crawford v. Washington, heard before the United States Supreme Court on November 10, 2003. Prof. Friedman wrote the brief for the Court.


Justice White And Judicial Review, Philip J. Weiser Jan 2003

Justice White And Judicial Review, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

No abstract provided.


Crawford V. Washington, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2003

Crawford V. Washington, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

On June 9, by granting certiorari in Crawford v. Washington, 02-9410, the Supreme Court signaled its intention to enter once again into the realm of the Confrontation Clause, in which it has found itself deeply perplexed. This time there was a difference, however, because the grant indicated that the Court might be willing to rethink its jurisprudence in this area. Crawford, like Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), and Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), presents a classic case of what might be called station-house testimony. Michael Crawford was accused of stabbing another man. His wife, Sylvia, was …


Dial-In Testimony, Richard D. Friedman, Bridget Mary Mccormack Jan 2002

Dial-In Testimony, Richard D. Friedman, Bridget Mary Mccormack

Articles

For several hundred years, one of the great glories of the common law system of criminal justice has been the requirement that prosecution witnesses give their testimony in the presence of the accused" face to face," in the time-honored phrase-under oath, subject to cross-examination, and, unless unfeasible, in open court. In the United States, this principle is enshrined in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." But now a new way is developing for witnesses for the prosecution …


From Miranda To §3501 To Dickerson To...(Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future Of Confession Law), Yale Kamisar Jan 2001

From Miranda To §3501 To Dickerson To...(Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future Of Confession Law), Yale Kamisar

Articles

Once the Court granted [certiorari in Dickerson] court-watchers knew the hour had come. At long last the Court would have to either repudiate Miranda, repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases [the cases viewing Miranda's requirements as not rights protected by the Constitution, but merely "prophylactic rules"] or offer some ingenious reconciliation of the two lines of precedent. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, doesn't "have to" do anything, as the decision in Dickerson once again reminds us.


Miranda And Some Puzzles Of 'Prophylactic' Rules, Evan H. Caminker Jan 2001

Miranda And Some Puzzles Of 'Prophylactic' Rules, Evan H. Caminker

Articles

Constitutional law scholars have long observed that many doctrinal rules established by courts to protect constitutional rights seem to "overprotect" those rights, in the sense that they give greater protection to individuals than those rights, as abstractly understood, seem to require.' Such doctrinal rules are typically called "prophylactic" rules.2 Perhaps the most famous, or infamous, example of such a rule is Miranda v. Arizona,' in which the Supreme Court implemented the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination4 with a detailed set of directions for law enforcement officers conducting custodial interrogations, colloquially called the Miranda warnings. 5


Free-Standing Due Process And Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's Search For Interpretive Guidelines, Jerold H. Israel Jan 2001

Free-Standing Due Process And Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's Search For Interpretive Guidelines, Jerold H. Israel

Articles

When I was first introduced to the constitutional regulation of criminal procedure in the mid-1950s, a single issue dominated the field: To what extent did the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose upon states the same constitutional restraints that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments imposed upon the federal government? While those Bill of Rights provisions, as even then construed, imposed a broad range of constitutional restraints upon the federal criminal justice system, the federal system was (and still is) minuscule as compared to the combined systems of the fifty states. With the Bill of Rights provisions …


Lilly V. Virginia Glimmers Of Hope For The Confrontation Clause?, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2000

Lilly V. Virginia Glimmers Of Hope For The Confrontation Clause?, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In 1662, in The Case of Thomas Tong and Others, which involved charges of treason against several defendants, the judges of the King's Bench conferred on a crucial set of points of procedure. As reported by one of the judges, Sir John Kelyng, the judges agreed unanimously that a pretrial confession made to the authorities was evidence against the Party himself who made the Confession, and indeed, if adequately proved could support a conviction of that party without additional witnesses to the treason itself. But -- again unanimously, and quite definitively -- the judges also agreed that the confession cannot …


Congress' Arrogance, Yale Kamisar Jan 2000

Congress' Arrogance, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Does Dickerson v. U.S., reaffirming Miranda and striking down §3501 (the federal statute purporting to "overrule" Miranda), demonstrate judicial arrogance? Or does the legislative history of §3501 demonstrate the arrogance of Congress? Shortly after Dickerson v. U.S. reaffirmed Miranda and invalidated §3501, a number of Supreme Court watchers criticized the Court for its "judicial arrogance" in peremptorily rejecting Congress' test for the admissibility of confessions. The test, pointed out the critics, had been adopted by extensive hearings and debate about Miranda's adverse impact on law enforcement. The Dickerson Court did not discuss the legislative history of §3501 at all. However, …


Lilly V. Virginia: A Chance To Reconceptualize The Confrontation Right, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1999

Lilly V. Virginia: A Chance To Reconceptualize The Confrontation Right, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In Lilly v. Virginia, the Supreme Court once again has the opportunity to grapple with the meaning of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendmel).t. The basic facts of Lilly are simple, for they present the ageold problem of accomplice confessions. Three men, Gary Barker and Ben and Mark Lilly, went on a crime spree, during which one of them shot to death a young man they had robbed and kidnaped. Ben Lilly was charged with being the triggerman, and Barker testified to that effect at Ben's trial. Mark did not testify. But Mark had made a statement to the …


Confrontation Confronted, Richard D. Friedman, Margaret A. Berger, Steven R. Shapiro Jan 1999

Confrontation Confronted, Richard D. Friedman, Margaret A. Berger, Steven R. Shapiro

Articles

The following article is an edited version of the amicus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1998, in the case of Benjamin Lee Lilly v. Commonwealth of Virginia (No. 98-5881). "This case raises important questions about the meaning of the confrontation clause, which has been a vital ingredient of the fair trial right for hundreds of years," Professor Richard Friedman and his co-authors say. "In particular, this case presents the Court with an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the confrontation clause and the law of hearsay." On June 10 the …


Confrontation: The Search For Basic Principles, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1998

Confrontation: The Search For Basic Principles, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the accused in a criminal prosecution the right "to be confronted with the Witnesses against him."' The Confrontation Clause clearly applies to those witnesses who testify against the accused at trial. Moreover, it is clear enough that confrontation ordinarily includes the accused's right to have those witnesses brought "face-toface," in the time-honored phrase, when they testify.2 But confrontation is much more than this "face-to-face" right. It also comprehends the right to have witnesses give their testimony under oath and to subject them to crossexamination. 3 Indeed, the Supreme Court has treated the accused's …


Truth And Its Rivals In The Law Of Hearsay And Confrontation (Symposium: Truth And Its Rivals: Evidence Reform And The Goals Of Evidence Law)." , Richard D. Friedman Jan 1998

Truth And Its Rivals In The Law Of Hearsay And Confrontation (Symposium: Truth And Its Rivals: Evidence Reform And The Goals Of Evidence Law)." , Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In this paper, I will look at the problem of hearsay and confrontation through the lens offered by this symposium's theme of "truth and its rivals." I will ask: To what extent does the law of hearsay and confrontation aspire to achieve the goal of truth in litigation? To what extent does it, or should it, seek to achieve other goals, or to satisfy other constraints on the litigation system? And, given the ends that it seeks to achieve, what should the shape of the law in this area be? My principal conclusions are as follows: In most settings, the …


On The 'Fruits' Of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, And Compelled Testimony, Yale Kamisar Mar 1995

On The 'Fruits' Of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, And Compelled Testimony, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Professor Akhil Reed Amar and Ms. Renee B. Lettow have written a lively, provocative article that will keep many of us who teach constitutional-criminal procedure busy for years to come. They present a reconception of the "first principles" of the Fifth Amendment, and they suggest a dramatic reconstruction of criminal procedure. As a part of that reconstruction, they propose, inter alia, that at a pretrial hearing presided over by a judicial officer, the government should be empowered to compel a suspect, under penalty of contempt, to provide links in the chain of evidence needed to convict him.


A Holistic Approach To Criminal Justice Scholarship, William T. Pizzi Jan 1995

A Holistic Approach To Criminal Justice Scholarship, William T. Pizzi

Publications

No abstract provided.


Prior Statements Of A Witness: A Nettlesome Corner Of The Hearsay Thicket, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1995

Prior Statements Of A Witness: A Nettlesome Corner Of The Hearsay Thicket, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In Tome v United States, for the fifth time in eight years, the Supreme Court decided a case presenting the problem of how a child's allegations of sexual abuse should be presented in court. Often the child who charges that an adult abused her is unable to testify at trial, or at least unable to testify effectively under standard procedures. These cases therefore raise intriguing and difficult questions related to the rule against hearsay and to an accused's right under the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against him. One would hardly guess that, however, from the rather arid debate …


Peremptory Challenges: Free Strikes No More, H. Patrick Furman Jan 1993

Peremptory Challenges: Free Strikes No More, H. Patrick Furman

Publications

No abstract provided.


Duckworth V. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda Case That May Cause Much Mischief, Yale Kamisar Jan 1989

Duckworth V. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda Case That May Cause Much Mischief, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Professor Yale Kamisar, the country's foremost scholar of Miranda and police interrogation, presents an analysis and critique of the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of Miranda. In Duckworth, a 5-4 Court upheld the "if and when" language systematically used by the Hammond, Indiana, Police Department: "We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." The real issue was whether the police effectively conveyed the substance of a vital part of Miranda: the right to have a lawyer appointed prior to any questioning. Professor Kamisar …


On Complaining About The Burger Court, Robert F. Nagel Jan 1984

On Complaining About The Burger Court, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.


Assaults On The Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations And Damage Remedies, Pierre J. Schlag Jan 1982

Assaults On The Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations And Damage Remedies, Pierre J. Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.


Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, And The Legacy Of The Warren Court, Jerold H. Israel Jan 1982

Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, And The Legacy Of The Warren Court, Jerold H. Israel

Book Chapters

During the 1960s, the Warren Court's decisions in the field of criminal procedure were strongly denounced by many prosecutors, police officers, and conservative politicians. Some of these critics were careful in their description of the Warren Court's record. Others let their strong opposition to several of the Court's more highly publicized decisions destroy their perception of the Court's work as a whole.


A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar Jan 1982

A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

If the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch conversations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I have participated this past summer are any indication, Miranda v. Arizona has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions do not escape attention.