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Articles 31 - 54 of 54
Full-Text Articles in Criminal Law
The New Deterrence: Crime And Policy In The Age Of Globalization, Patrick Keenan
The New Deterrence: Crime And Policy In The Age Of Globalization, Patrick Keenan
ExpressO
Globalization has made it much easier for criminal activity to cross borders, but deterrence theory has not kept up with this changed reality. I draw insights from both law-and-economics and criminology literature to enrich our understanding of deterrence. I ground my theoretical discussion in the real-world problem of sex tourism as an example of the kind of unwanted activity that now crosses borders and has complicated our understanding of deterrence. I focus on two issues central to deterrence that have not gotten sufficient scholarly attention: the phenomenon of displacement and the role of status. I argue that informal sanctions, as …
Organizational Misconduct: Beyond The Principal-Agent Model, Kimberly D. Krawiec
Organizational Misconduct: Beyond The Principal-Agent Model, Kimberly D. Krawiec
ExpressO
This article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991, the United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational liability. Under this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exercised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organization had in place internal compliance structures ostensibly designed …
Knowledge And Power In The Mechanical Firm: Planning For Profit In Austrian Perspective, Richard Adelstein
Knowledge And Power In The Mechanical Firm: Planning For Profit In Austrian Perspective, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
A theory of central planning employing Austrian themes and applied to private firms and Taylorism.
Whistle Blowing, Ben Depoorter, Jef De Mot
Whistle Blowing, Ben Depoorter, Jef De Mot
George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series
For law enforcement purposes corruption and fraud are hard battles. Because of the highly secretive and premeditated nature of these crimes, prime witnesses are themselves often implicated in the fraudulent transaction. Promises of immunity and whistle blowing rewards are often required to resolve these information asymmetries. These insights have set a trend, both in scholarship and law enforcement practice, towards reward-based approaches (carrots), as an alternative or complement to punishment based deterrence (sticks). Applying the U.S. False Claims Act (FCA) as an analytical framework, we provide a critical review of the efficiency limitations of whistle blowing. More specifically, the formal …
The Law And Economics Of Cybersecurity: An Introduction, Mark F. Grady, Francesco Parisi
The Law And Economics Of Cybersecurity: An Introduction, Mark F. Grady, Francesco Parisi
George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series
One of the most controversial theoretical issues of our time is the governance of cybersecurity. Computer security experts, national security experts, and policy analysts have all struggled to bring meaningful analysis to cybersecurity; however, the discipline of law & economics has yet to be fully applied to the issue. This introduction presents work by leading national scholars who examine this complex national security challenge from a law and economics perspective. The focus spans from a discussion of pure market solutions to public-private issue analysis, providing a valuable basis for policy considerations concerning the appropriate governmental role on the issue of …
Screening, Plea Bargains And The Innocent Problem, Oren Gazal
Screening, Plea Bargains And The Innocent Problem, Oren Gazal
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009
Courts in common law countries reject plea-agreements only when the agreed upon sentence is seen as exceedingly lenient. This judicial intervention is designed to ensure that plea-bargaining does not undermine deterrence. Many legal scholars argue against this policy, claiming that courts should prohibit plea-bargaining all together. They argue that the plea-bargaining system increases the risk of wrongful convictions. Economists often criticize this judicial intervention as well, but for a different reason. Rather than advocating the abolition of plea-bargaining, many economists argue that the courts should accept all plea-agreements without review. They claim that plea-bargaining can help ensure an efficient use …
Corporate Defendants And The Protections Of Criminal Procedure: An Economic Analysis, Vikramaditya S. Khanna
Corporate Defendants And The Protections Of Criminal Procedure: An Economic Analysis, Vikramaditya S. Khanna
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009
Corporations are frequently treated as “persons” under the law. One of the fundamental questions associated with this treatment is whether corporations should receive the same Constitutional protections and guarantees as natural persons. In particular, should corporations receive the Constitutional protections of Criminal Procedure? After all, corporations cannot be sent to jail so the sanctions they face are essentially the same as in civil proceedings. If so, then why not have the same procedural protections for corporate defendants in civil and criminal cases? Little scholarly analysis has focused on this issue from an economic perspective and this article aims to fill …
The Market For Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control And Jurisdictional Competition, Doron Teichman
The Market For Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control And Jurisdictional Competition, Doron Teichman
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009
For the most part, the United States has a decentralized criminal justice system. State legislatures define the majority of crimes and set out the punishments for those crimes. In addition, the enforcement of criminal laws lies, in most cases, in the hands of local law enforcement agencies. This article points out how this decentralized structure drives local jurisdictions to harshen their criminal justice system in order to displace crime to neighboring jurisdictions. More precisely, local jurisdictions can attempt to displace crime in two distinct ways. First, they can raise the expected sanction to a level that is higher than that …
Sex, Shame, And The Law: An Economic Perspective On Megan's Law, Doron Teichman
Sex, Shame, And The Law: An Economic Perspective On Megan's Law, Doron Teichman
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009
This Article focuses on the question, how should policymakers aiming to minimize the cost of sanctioning utilize legal and nonlegal sanctions when designing a system of criminal sanctions. After presenting the general economic case for the use of nonlegal sanctions the article turns to present a model of shaming, which unlike existing models, incorporates the endogenous effects of legal and nonlegal sanctions. This model demonstrates that tailoring an efficient regime that combines legal and nonlegal sanctions might be more difficult than previously perceived by law and economics scholars. A specific case study presented in this article is of the current …
A Public Choice Theory Of Criminal Procedure, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Keith N. Hylton
A Public Choice Theory Of Criminal Procedure, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Keith N. Hylton
ExpressO
We provide a more persuasive justification for the pro-defendant bias in Anglo-American criminal procedure than the most commonly forwarded justifications to date. The most commonly forwarded rationale for the pro-defendant bias is that the costs of false convictions – specifically, the sanctioning and deterrence costs associated with the erroneous imposition of criminal sanctions – are greater than the costs of false acquittals. We argue that this rationale provides at best a partial justification for the extent of pro-defendant procedural rules. Under our alternative justification, pro-defendant protections serve primarily as constraints on the costs associated with improper enforcement or rent seeking …
Equity And Efficiency In Markets For Ideas, Richard Adelstein
Equity And Efficiency In Markets For Ideas, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
Intellectual property and patent protection in light of the AIDS crisis in Africa.
Toward A Comparative Economics Of Plea Bargaining (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein
Toward A Comparative Economics Of Plea Bargaining (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
A comparison of adversarial and inquisitorial approaches to criminal adjudication and its implications for plea bargaining.
Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein
Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
A brief recasting of the price exaction model.
Four Entries, Richard Adelstein
Four Entries, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
Four entries: "American Institutional Economics and the Legal System" (I: 61-66); "John Rogers Commons" (I: 324-327); Richard Theodore Ely" (II: 28-29); and "Plea Bargaining: A Comparative Approach"
Deciding For Bigness, Richard Adelstein
Deciding For Bigness, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
Antitrust as a constitutional constraint on the growth of firms.
The Competition Of Technologies In Markets For Ideas: Copyright And Fair Use In Evolutionary Perspective (With Steven Peretz), Richard Adelstein
The Competition Of Technologies In Markets For Ideas: Copyright And Fair Use In Evolutionary Perspective (With Steven Peretz), Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
A theory of intellectual goods as distinct from public or private goods, and the rationale for copyright that flows from it.
The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein
The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
A comparative view of adjudication by guilty plea in the US and the UK.
Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein
Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
An extended development of the foundations of the price exaction model of the criminal process.
The Moral Costs Of Crime: Prices, Information And Organization, Richard Adelstein
The Moral Costs Of Crime: Prices, Information And Organization, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
More on price exaction, and punishments as conveyors of cost information in the criminal process.
Informational Paradox And The Pricing Of Crime: Capital Sentencing Standards In Economic Perspective, Richard Adelstein
Informational Paradox And The Pricing Of Crime: Capital Sentencing Standards In Economic Perspective, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
A further development of the price exaction model and an application to the problem of sentencing standards.
The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework For Analysis, Richard Adelstein
The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework For Analysis, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
An early exposition of the price exaction framework and the place of plea bargaining in it.
Subdivision Exactions And Congestion Externalities (With Noel Edelson)
Subdivision Exactions And Congestion Externalities (With Noel Edelson)
Richard Adelstein
A model of congestion in housing and pricing policy to address it.
Just Compensation And The Assassin's Bequest: A Utilitarian Approach, Richard Adelstein
Just Compensation And The Assassin's Bequest: A Utilitarian Approach, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
An analysis of Porter v. United States (1973), a case involving the value of items owned by Lee Harvey Oswald.