Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Allen V. Dackman: Doing Away With Limited Liability In Maryland, Jeffrey S. Quinn

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Bricks, Mortar, And Google: Defining The Relevant Antitrust Market For Internet-Based Companies, Jared Kagan

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Good Faith In Revlon-Land, Christopher M. Bruner

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Short, But Interesting Life Of Good Faith As An Independent Liability Rule, Robert B. Thompson

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Producing Corporate Text: Courtrooms, Conference Rooms, And Classrooms, Mae Kuykendall

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Director Liability For Corporate Crimes: Lawyers As Safe Haven?, John A. Humbach

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Role Of Good Faith In Delaware: How Open-Ended Standards Help Delaware Preserve Its Edge, Renee M. Jones

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Lyondell: A Note Of Approbation, William W. Bratton

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Balancing Judicial Cognizance And Caution: Whether Transnational Corporations Are Liable For Foreign Bribery Under The Alien Tort Statute, Matt A. Vega

Michigan Journal of International Law

In the process of applying the ATS to foreign bribery, this Article will examine several unresolved issues surrounding this statutory grant. It will seek to (1) determine what constitutes a "violation of the law of nations," (2) refute the proposition that private defendants may be prosecuted under the ATS for only the most shocking and egregious jus cogens violations, (3) determine when and to what extent state action is required in ATS litigation, and (4) examine the limitations of the fundamental principles of international law on ATS litigation.

The Case For Semi-Strong-Form Corporate Scienter In Securities Fraud Actions, Paul B. Maslo

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The mental state of scienter - intent to defraud - is a required element of a securities fraud claim. The scienter inquiry is fairly straightforward when the defendant is an individual. It is more complex when a corporate entity is involved because a corporation can only act through its agents; it has no mind of its own. This article compares the three approaches courts have used to impute scienter to corporate defendants in the securities fraud context and concludes by recommending the approach which strikes an appropriate balance between several dueling public policy concerns.

Corporate And Business Law, Laurence V. Parker

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Administrative Governance As Corporate Governance: A Partial Explanation For The Growth Of China's Stock Markets, David A. Caragliano

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Note argues that during the first decade of stock market development (roughly 1990-2000) Chinese institutions, which emphasized administrative direction and control, functioned in lieu of legal and financial institutions. Preexisting modes of administrative governance introduced incentives that mitigated information asymmetry problems inherent in initial public offerings (IPOs) and contributed to enhanced market valuation during the post-IPO phase. The author focuses on two sui generis Chinese institutions employed during this time period: the quota system for equity share issuance and the Special Treatment (ST) system for underperforming issuers. In short, the thesis is that administrative governance substituted for corporate governance.

Rewarding Outside Directors, Assaf Hamdani, Reinier Kraakman

Michigan Law Review

While they often rely on the threat of penalties to produce deterrence, legal systems rarely use the promise of rewards. In this Article, we consider the use of rewards to motivate director vigilance. Measures to enhance director liability are commonly perceived to be too costly. We, however demonstrate that properly designed reward regimes could match the behavioral incentives offered by negligence-based liability regimes but with significantly lower costs. We further argue that the market itself cannot implement such a regime in the form of equity compensation for directors. We conclude by providing preliminary sketches of two alternative reward regimes. While …

The State Of Judiciary: A Corporate Perspective, Larry D. Thompson

Scholarly Works

The rule of law depends on highly talented, independent judges who conscientiously strive to ensure that the law is consistently applied in a principled and predictable manner This Essay addresses two potential threats to judicial independence and the rule of law that we believe warrant special attention at this time. First, inadequate judicial salaries pose a threat to the quality and independence of the judiciary. Judges' real pay has declined substantially over the past generation, even as the compensation of other callings within the legal profession has risen dramatically. This growing disparity in pay has prompted an increasing number of …

Airline Liability For Loss, Damage, Or Delay Of Passenger Baggage, M. R. Franks

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Ethics: Inherent In Islamic Finance Through Shari'a Law; Resisted In American Business Despite Sarbanes-Oxley, Christine Walsh

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Software Development As An Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The Enforcement Of The Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement , William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

An important provision in each of the final judgments in the government's Microsoft antitrust case requires Microsoft to "make available" to software developers the communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate "natively" (that is, without adding software) with Microsoft server operating systems in corporate networks or over the Internet. The short-term goal of the provision is to allow developers, as licensees of the protocols, to write applications for non-Microsoft server operating systems that interoperate with Windows client computers in the same ways that applications written for Microsoft's server operating systems interoperate with Windows clients. The long-term goal …

On Leaving Corporate Executives "Naked, Homeless And Without Wheels": Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, And The Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

There is a lively debate about the relative merits of entity versus individual liability in cases involving securities fraud. After reviewing this debate in the context of both private securities litigation and SEC enforcement, this paper considers whether the legal tools available against individual executives are adequate, and if not, what changes might be made. The main focus is on equitable remedies, especially rescission and restitution, under both state and federal law. As to the former, Vice Chancellor Strine’s opinion in In re Healthsouth offers an interesting template, although there are limits on the usefulness of derivative suits to police …

What Default Rules Teach Us About Corporations; What Understanding Corporations Teaches Us About Default Rules, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article addresses corporate law's default rules, which allow corporations to waive their directors' liability for damages based on a breach of their fiduciary duty of care. Most large publicly held corporations have adopted such a waiver in their articles of association. This Article suggests that courts should limit the range of the waivers to the circumstances that existed when the voters voted and to the information they received before they voted. This Article distinguishes between public contracts (legislation) and private contracts (commercial transactions) and the default rules that apply to each. The Article shows that courts view corporations and …

The Irrational Auditor And Irrational Liability, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

This Article argues that less liability for auditors in certain areas might encourage more accurate and useful financial statements, or at least equally accurate statements at a lower cost. Audit quality is promoted by three incentives: reputation, regulation, and litigation. When we take reputation and regulation into account, exposing auditors to potentially massive liability may undermine the effectiveness of reputation and regulation, thereby diminishing integrity of audited financial statements. The relation of litigation to the other incentives that promote audit quality has become more important in light of the sea change that occurred in the regulation of the auditing profession …

Spare The Rod, Spoil The Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, Lisa M. Fairfax

Faculty Scholarship

It appears that our society has tacitly agreed to spare corporate directors any significant legal liability—which includes both financial and incarceration—for failing to perform their duties as board members. Thus, over the last twenty years, there has been a virtual elimination of legal liability—particularly in the form of financial penalties—for directors who breach their fiduciary duty of care. This is true despite the fact that we entrust directors with the awesome responsibility of monitoring all of America's corporations as well as the officers and agents within those corporations. More surprisingly, this tacit agreement against legal liability for directors has persisted …

Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith

All Faculty Scholarship

This Essay explores the connection between corporate governance and D&O insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, D&O insurance premiums provide the insurer’s assessment of a firm’s governance quality. Most basically, firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher D&O premiums. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent. Corporations lack the incentive to produce this disclosure themselves, and U.S. securities regulators do …

Changing Paradigms: The Liability Of Corporate Groups In Germany, René Reich-Graefe

Faculty Scholarship

The German law on affiliated companies and groups of companies ("Konzernrecht"), as embodied in the German Stock Corporation Act of 1965, as amended ("Aktiengesetz"), has often been credited for its innovative approach to the dichotomy of liability strategies relevant to corporate groups-viz., the traditional concept of entity liability based on the fundamental doctrine of the legal separateness of the corporate entity and, accordingly, resulting in a limitation of investor liability as the rule, and discrete and rare occurrences of what is almost poetically designated the "piercing of the corporate veil" ("DurchgriffshaJtung") as narrow and reluctantly crafted exceptions, and the more …

The Alien Tort Claims Act: Temporary Stopgap Measure Or Permanent Remedy, Borchien Lai

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

As the world has become smaller through technological advances in travel and communication, the international marketplace has grown larger. The United Nations ("U.N.") estimates that the number of multinational corporations tripled between 1988 and 1997 to 60,000. As these corporations increase their investments abroad, they also face proportionately increasing pressure from investors to run successful operations and increase profits. The result of this dynamic is well-documented. Multinational corporations invest heavily in underdeveloped countries where natural resources are abundant and labor is cheap. To facilitate operations in the country, the corporations must establish a rapport with the host governments-and often, in …

Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores the connection between corporate governance and directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, in a well-working insurance market, D&O insurance premiums would convey the insurer's assessment of a firm's governance quality. Simply stated, firms with better corporate governance would pay relatively low D&O premiums, while firms with worse corporate governance would pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the …

A Tangled Web: Compliance Director Liability Under The Securities Laws, Anthony Pirraglia

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Financial Account Aggregation: The Liability Perspective, Ann S. Spiotto

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

A Jurisdictional Approach To Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, Peter B. Oh

Articles

This article challenges our persistent path dependence on defunct distinctions between corporations and certain limited unincorporated associations. Recent federal tax regulations have inspired proposals for consolidated treatment of all limited business organizations through uniformly based or universally applicable statutes. I contend these proposals are preoccupied with how hybrid organizations such as the limited liability company and the limited liability partnership amalgamate, and thus implicitly preserve, traditional dichotomies between corporations and partnership categorizations as well as entities and aggregate theories. The continued use of these schemes compromises the legal basis for such proposals.

By critically examining certain jurisdictional principles, this article …

Litigator's Thumbnail Guide To The Warn Act, David A. Santacroce

Articles

When large companies choose to lay off workers or close down plants without prior notice, they can be subject to extensive liability under the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), including 60 days backpay to all affected workers, daily fines to local government, and attorney fees generated during the suit. In the following article, the author presents the bare bones basics of WARN in order for employees and their advocates to understand how and when WARN applies.

A Control-Based Approach To Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Some commentators defend limited shareholder liability for torts and statutory violations as efficient, even though it encourages corporations to overinvest in and to externalize the costs of risky activity. Others propose pro rata unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts. Both approaches, however, fail to account fully for qualitative differences among shareholders. Controlling shareholders, in particular, may have lower information costs, greater influence over managerial decisionmaking, and greater ability to benefit from corporate activity. This Article develops a control-based approach to shareholder liability. It first explores several differences among shareholders. For example, a controlling shareholder can more easily curb managerial risk …