Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Can Taxes Mitigate Corporate Governance Inefficiencies?, Noam Noked

William & Mary Business Law Review

Policymakers have long viewed tax policy as an instrument to influence and change corporate governance practices. Certain tax rules were enacted to discourage pyramidal business structures and large golden parachutes, and to encourage performance-based compensation. Other proposals, such as imposing higher taxes on excessive executive compensation, have also attracted increasing attention.

Contrary to this view, this Article contends that the ability to effectively mitigate corporate governance inefficiencies through the use of corrective taxes is very limited, and that these taxes may cause more harm than benefit. There are a few reasons for the limited effectiveness of corrective taxes. Importantly, the …

Distributed Governance, Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin, Ben Edwards

William & Mary Law Review Online

Distributed ledger technology disrupts traditional business organizations by introducing new business entities without the directors and officers of traditional corporate entities. Although these emerging entities offer intriguing possibilities, distributed entities may suffer significant collective action problems and expose investors to catastrophic regulatory and governance risks. Our Article examines key considerations for stakeholders and argues that distributed entities must be carefully structured to function effectively. This Article breaks new ground by critically examining distributed entities. We argue that a distributed model is most appropriate when distributed ledger technology solves a unique corporate governance problem. We caution against ignoring the lessons painstakingly …

Is There Hope For Change? The Evolution Of Conceptions Of Good Corporate Governance, Lynne L. Dallas

San Diego Law Review

To provide a useful perspective on corporate governance today, this Article examines the evolution of conceptions of “good” corporate governance that have successively revolutionized the corporate landscape. By the use of “evolution,” I do not mean some natural evolution, but changes in the beliefs of managers concerning how to run their businesses effectively. “Good” corporate governance refers to what is perceived as good from the point of view of firm managers and may or may not translate into what is good for society. This Article shows that corporate decision making was influenced over the years by successive, rationalized ideals of …

The Role Of Corporate Governance In Curbing Foreign Corrupt Business Practices, Poonam Puri, Andrew Nichol

Poonam Puri

The role of corporate and securities laws in addressing foreign corrupt business practices have, to date, received limited consideration. Departing from the substantial literature on the criminal and public law response to international corruption, the authors analyze Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act in comparison with British and American legislation and conclude that the Canadian regime relies too heavily on the use of criminal sanctions and fails to contemplate the role of behaviour modification in its legislative structure. Recognizing that multinational corporations are well placed to identify, expose, and prevent corrupt business practices, the authors propose a private law-based …

Triumph Or Tragedy? The Curious Path Of Corporate Disclosure Reform In The U.K., Cynthia A. Williams, John M. Conley

Cynthia A. Williams

No abstract provided.

Balancing The Governance Of Financial Institutions, David Min

Seattle University Law Review

Part I briefly describes the traditional agency–cost approach to corporate governance and the rationale that is offered for elevating the agency–cost concerns of shareholders over those of other stakeholders (especially creditors). But as Part I goes on to argue, even if this justification for shareholder primacy is convincing in corporate governance generally (and there are many who do not find it so), several unique characteristics of banks obviate the reasoning behind shareholder primacy. Banks are highly leveraged, which exacerbates creditor–shareholder agency conflicts and places greater importance on the interests of creditors. Banks enjoy government guarantees, and thus their corporate governance …

Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz

William & Mary Law Review

This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.

Selling Stock And Selling Legal Claims: Alienability As A Constraint On Managerial Opportunism, Charles R. Korsmo

Faculty Publications

Scholars have long recognized the importance of market forces as a tool for disciplining the management of public corporations and reducing agency costs. If managers loot or otherwise mismanage the firm, the firm’s stock price will suffer, raising its cost of capital and leaving managers exposed to the threat of a hostile takeover. In recent decades, changing patterns of stock ownership have threatened the viability of this market check on mismanagement. Institutional investors, and particularly index funds, own an increasing portion of publicly traded firms, and face substantial liquidity and other barriers to simply selling their positions. To the extent …

Distributed Governance, Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin, Bejamin Edwards

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Distributed ledger technology enables disruption of traditional business organizations by introducing new business entities without the directors and officers of traditional corporate entities. Although these emerging entities offer intriguing possibilities, distributed entities may suffer significant collective action problems and expose investors to catastrophic regulatory and governance risks. Our essay examines key considerations for stakeholders and argues that distributed entities must be carefully structured to function effectively.

This essay breaks new ground by critically examining distributed entities. We argue that a distributed model is most appropriate when DLT solves a unique corporate governance problem. We caution against ignoring the lessons painstakingly …

The Agency Costs Of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, And The Public Morality, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Few doubt that hedge fund activism has radically changed corporate governance in the United States – for better or for worse. Proponents see activists as desirable agents of change who intentionally invest in underperforming companies to organize more passive shareholders to support their proposals to change the target’s business model and/or management. So viewed, the process is fundamentally democratic, with institutional shareholders determining whether or not to support the activist’s proposals.

Skeptics respond that things do not work this simply. Actual proxy contests are few, and most activist engagements are resolved through private settlement negotiations between the activists, who rarely …