Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Institution
- Publication
- Publication Type
- File Type
Articles 1 - 18 of 18
Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law
Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle Harner
Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle Harner
Michelle M. Harner
“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”** This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America. These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make implementing a meaningful risk culture and thereby mitigating the impact of future economic downturns a challenging proposition. The …
Procuring "Justice"?: Citizens United, Caperton V. Massey, And Partisan Judicial Elections, André Douglas Pond Cummings
Procuring "Justice"?: Citizens United, Caperton V. Massey, And Partisan Judicial Elections, André Douglas Pond Cummings
andré douglas pond cummings
In recent years, two inextricably connected issues have received a great deal of attention in both United States political discourse and in the legal academic literature. One issue of intense legal debate and frustration has been that of judicial recusal, including an examination of the appropriate standards that should necessarily apply to judges that seem conflicted or biased in their role as neutral arbiter. A second issue that has spawned heated commentary and great dispute over the past decade is that of campaign finance law, including examination of the role that powerful and wealthy benefactors play in American electioneering. Both …
Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Towards Board Primacy, Grant Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Towards Board Primacy, Grant Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
William & Mary Law Review
Corporate law is consumed with a debate over shareholder democracy. The conventional wisdom counsels that shareholders should have more voice in corporate governance, in order to reduce agency costs and provide democratic legitimacy. A second set of theorists, described as “board primacists,” advocates against greater shareholder democracy and in favor of increased board discretion. These theorists argue that shareholders need to delegate their authority in order to provide the board with the proper authority to manage the enterprise and avoid short-term decision making. In the last few years, the classical economic underpinnings of corporate law have been destabilized by a …
Corporate Governance In The Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, Jessica Erickson
Corporate Governance In The Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, Jessica Erickson
William & Mary Law Review
Conventional wisdom is that shareholder derivative suits are dead. Yet this death knell is decidedly premature. The current conception of shareholder derivative suits is based on an empirical record limited to suits filed in Delaware or on behalf of Delaware corporations, leaving suits outside this sphere in the shadows of corporate law scholarship. This Article aims to fill this gap by presenting the first empirical examination of shareholder derivative suits in the federal courts. Using an original, hand-collected data set, my study reveals that shareholder derivative suits are far from dead. Shareholders file more shareholder derivative suits than securities class …
Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle Harner
Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle Harner
Michelle M. Harner
Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …
Ignoring The Writing On The Wall: The Role Of Enterprise Risk Management In The Economic Crisis, Michelle M. Harner
Ignoring The Writing On The Wall: The Role Of Enterprise Risk Management In The Economic Crisis, Michelle M. Harner
Michelle M. Harner
Enterprise risk management (ERM) targets overall corporate strategy and, when implemented correctly, can manage a corporation’s risk appetite and exposure. When ignored or underutilized, it can contribute to a corporation’s demise. In fact, many commentators point to ERM failures as contributing to the severity of the 2008 economic crisis. This essay examines the different approaches to ERM adopted by financial institutions affected by the 2008 economic crisis and how ERM contributed to the survival or failure of those firms. It then considers ERM in the broader context of corporate governance generally. This discussion reflects on ERM techniques for corporate boards …
The Search For An Unbiased Fiduciary In Corporate Reorganizations, Michelle M. Harner
The Search For An Unbiased Fiduciary In Corporate Reorganizations, Michelle M. Harner
Michelle M. Harner
When a company experiences financial distress, a control contest often follows. Management fights to remain in control of the company, and shareholders, creditors and others try to influence management’s exercise of that control—or wrest it away. This is not a new phenomenon. The degree of influence now exerted by corporate stakeholders in the distressed context, however, is strikingly different than in the past. Recent headlines highlight that stakeholder control issues are at the forefront of financially-distressed situations large and small. The U.S. government, as creditor, dictated the terms of Chrysler’s and General Motors’ bankruptcies. It also demanded and received preferred …
Bonding Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee
Bonding Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee
William & Mary Law Review
Limited liability is considered a “birthright” of corporations. The concept is entrenched in legal theory, and it is a fixed reality of the political economy. But it remains controversial. Scholarly debate has been engaged in absolute terms of defending the rule or advocating its abrogation. Though compelling, these polar positions, often expressed in abstract arguments, are associated with disquieting effects. Without limited liability, efficiency may be severely compromised. With it, involuntary tort creditors bear some of the cost of an enterprise. Most other proposals for reforming limited liability have been incremental, such as modifying veil-piercing. However, neither absolutism nor marginalism …
Re-Enchanting The Corporation, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Re-Enchanting The Corporation, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
William & Mary Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague
Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague
William & Mary Business Law Review
This Article explores whether the modern corporate governance model is sustainable. For many corporations, particularly large ones, there is a separation between ownership and management, with a management emphasis on short-term gains at the expense of long-term sustainability. This Article explores the role of corporate directors, particularly vis-a-vis shareholders, from an interdisciplinary perspective, analyzing legal case law as well as legal, management, and finance literature. This Article explores emerging trends in expanding notions of corporate governance that incorporate concerns beyond just shareholders, recognizing the interrelationship between business and society. It is suggested that in order to remain viable and competitive, …
Choice, Progressive Values, And Corporate Law: A Reply To Greenfield, Harry G. Hutchison
Choice, Progressive Values, And Corporate Law: A Reply To Greenfield, Harry G. Hutchison
Harry G. Hutchison
In his recent book chapter, CORPORATE LAW AND THE RHETORIC OF CHOICE, Professor Kent Greenfield rejects contractarian justifications for existing corporate governance arrangements. Greenfield advances this critique on two grounds. First, relying on behavioralist scholars, he accepts the demise of the rational actor model and, accordingly, opposes the contemporary use of choice as a construct that legitimates current corporate governance approaches. Second, Greenfield refracts his analysis through the prism of Progressive thought and values.
Greenfield’s approach is disturbing for two reasons. First, he fails to notice that behavioralist scholars often rely on experimental data, while law and economics scholars rely …
The Credence Characteristics Of Corporate Reform, Omari S. Simmons
The Credence Characteristics Of Corporate Reform, Omari S. Simmons
Omari Scott Simmons
No abstract provided.
Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
Corporate law is consumed with a debate over shareholder democracy. The conventional wisdom counsels that shareholders should have more voice in corporate governance, in order to reduce agency costs and provide democratic legitimacy. A second set of theorists, described as “board primacists,” advocates against greater shareholder democracy and in favor of increased board discretion. These theorists argue that shareholders need to delegate their authority in order to provide the board with the proper authority to manage the enterprise and avoid short-term decision making.
In the last few years, the classical economic underpinnings of corporate law have been destabilized by a …
The Case For Employee Referenda On Transformative Transactions As Shareholder Proposals, Matthew T. Bodie
The Case For Employee Referenda On Transformative Transactions As Shareholder Proposals, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
This Comment describes and advocates for employee referenda as implemented through a SEC Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal. The proposal provides for a nonbinding referendum amongst all employees whenever the corporation's shareholders must vote to approve a merger, acquisition, sale of substantially all assets, or other transformative transaction. The purpose of the referendum is to provide employees with a voice in the transaction and to provide shareholders with a mechanism for tapping into employee sentiment. Because the referendum would be nonbinding, it is best viewed as an informational tool for shareholders and employees to use in policing management's transactions. Given the …
Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
Corporate law is consumed with a debate over shareholder democracy. The conventional wisdom counsels that shareholders should have more voice in corporate governance, in order to reduce agency costs and provide democratic legitimacy. A second set of theorists, described as “board primacists,” advocates against greater shareholder democracy and in favor of increased board discretion. These theorists argue that shareholders need to delegate their authority in order to provide the board with the proper authority to manage the enterprise and avoid short-term decision making.
In the last few years, the classical economic underpinnings of corporate law have been destabilized by a …
For Optional Federal Incorporation, George W. Dent
For Optional Federal Incorporation, George W. Dent
Faculty Publications
The American economy suffers from the domination of corporations by chief executive officers who exercise control for their own benefit, at considerable cost to shareholders and to efficiency. The costs of this defect are rising as capital flees the United States for a growing number of countries that treat investors better. America’s corporate governance problem began and persists because corporations are franchised by the states, and it is in the economic interest of the states (especially Delaware) to cater to CEOS because they control the choice of state of incorporation. To break this destructive arrangement I propose optional federal incorporation …
Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague
Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague
Robert Sprague
This paper explores whether the modern corporate governance model is sustainable. For many, particularly large, corporations, there is a separation between ownership and management, with an emphasis by management on short-term gains at the expense of long-term sustainability. This paper explores the role of corporate directors, particularly vis-à-vis shareholders, from an interdisciplinary perspective, analyzing legal case law as well as legal, management, and finance literature. This paper then explores emerging trends in expanding notions of corporate governance that incorporate concerns beyond just shareholders, recognizing the interrelationship between business and society. It is suggested that in order to remain viable and …
Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle
Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle
Robert Sprague
There is a fundamental flaw in the law’s approach to corporate governance. While shareholder primacy is a well-established norm within U.S. corporate law, the business judgment rule essentially holds directors blameless when they fail to maximize shareholder wealth. During the past century, control of the corporation has passed from shareholders to managers. As a result, shareholders have little practical say in who runs the corporation, even though they cannot usually hold managers legally liable when those managers destroy shareholder wealth through incompetence. Despite a number of arguments asserting that shareholders do not deserve any additional management powers, this article concludes …