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Business Organizations Law Commons

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Articles 1 - 7 of 7

Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law

The Manager's Share, David I. Walker Nov 2005

The Manager's Share, David I. Walker

William & Mary Law Review

It is sometimes argued in the corporate governance literature that the total share of corporate value that can be extracted by a manager is fixed and independent of the avenues through which value is extracted. Shareholders need not worry about an activity such as insider trading, the story goes, because any profits achieved by a manager through insider trading will simply offset conventional compensation. This Article challenges that idea and argues that whether one views the manager's share as being capped by external market forces, set by an optimal principal/agent contract, or limited by saliency and outrage in accordance with …


A Devil Disguised As A Corporate Angel?: Questioning Corporate Charitable Contributions To "Independent" Directors' Organizations, Benjamin E. Ladd Apr 2005

A Devil Disguised As A Corporate Angel?: Questioning Corporate Charitable Contributions To "Independent" Directors' Organizations, Benjamin E. Ladd

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith Mar 2005

Unleashing A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith

All Faculty Scholarship

This Essay explores the connection between corporate governance and D&O insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, D&O insurance premiums provide the insurer’s assessment of a firm’s governance quality. Most basically, firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher D&O premiums. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent. Corporations lack the incentive to produce this disclosure themselves, and U.S. securities regulators do …


Breach Of Fiduciary Duty As Securities Fraud: Sec V. Chancellor Corp., Carl W. Mills Jan 2005

Breach Of Fiduciary Duty As Securities Fraud: Sec V. Chancellor Corp., Carl W. Mills

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix In Sight, George W. Dent Jan 2005

Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix In Sight, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

Dissatisfaction with the governance of public companies is as old as the public company itself, but public concern about corporate governance is spasmodic. Prior reforms did not cure the ills of corporate governance, and there is little reason to think that the recent spate of reforms will be any more effective. The fundamental problem of corporate governance remains what it has always been: the separation of ownership and control. No reform can succeed unless it overcomes this contradiction. Corporate executives determined to preserve their privileges and a number of scholars deny this claim; in effect, these Panglosses consider the status …


Historical Quirks, Political Opportunism, And The Anti-Loan Provision Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Jayne W. Barnard Jan 2005

Historical Quirks, Political Opportunism, And The Anti-Loan Provision Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Rule 10b-5 And The "Unfitness" Question, Jayne W. Barnard Jan 2005

Rule 10b-5 And The "Unfitness" Question, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.