Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Regulating The Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises In Investment Arbitration, Mark Mclaughlin

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The renaissance of sovereign investment is one of the defining economic trends of the 21st century. While many states have benefitted, and continue to benefit, from an influx of state-backed foreign investment, this embrace is not without its hesitancies. Host states are particularly concerned that state-owned enterprises (SOE s) pursue non-commercial policy objectives, maintain lower levels of transparency than their private counterparts, and operate with inferior standards of responsible business conduct. In response, domestic regulators have enacted a series of countermeasures for SOE investment, including requirements that such enterprises must invest on a “commercial basis.” However, the regulation of foreign …

Are All Risks Created Equal? Rethinking The Distinction Between Legal And Business Risk In Corporate Law, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky

All Faculty Scholarship

Should corporate legal risk be treated similarly to corporate business risks? Currently, the law draws a clear-cut distinction between the two sources of risk, permitting the latter type of risk and banning the former. As a result, fiduciaries are shielded from personal liability in the case of business risk and are entirely exposed to civil and criminal liability that arises from legal risk-taking. As corporate law theorists have underscored, the differential treatment of business and legal risk is highly problematic from the perspective of firms and shareholders. To begin with, legal risk cannot be completely averted or eliminated. More importantly, …

Theranos: Case Study And Examination Of The Fraud Triangle, Abbey Jennings

Finance Undergraduate Honors Theses

Fraud is a serious issue which carries significant implications. Fraud committed by top level managers is particularly grievous, as it ripples through a firm, harming the company’s shareholders, employees, and credibility, while posing a threat to individuals and society (Zahra, et al.). A common framework in auditing, the fraud triangle, outlines three factors that if present, increase the risk or enable fraud to occur. The three factors are incentive, opportunity, and rationalization to commit fraud (Barlow).

In 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Elizabeth Holmes, founder and CEO of a supposedly groundbreaking health tech company, Theranos, with what …

Reversing The Fortunes Of Active Funds, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky

All Faculty Scholarship

In 2019, for the first time in the history of U.S. capital markets, passive funds surpassed active funds in terms of total assets under management. The continuous growth of passive funds at the expense of active funds is a genuine cause for concern. Active funds monitor the management and partake of decision-making in their portfolio companies. Furthermore, they improve price efficiency and managerial performance by engaging in informed trading. The buy/sell decisions of active funds provide other market participants reliable information about the quality of firms. The cost of active investing is significant and it is exclusively borne by active …

Caremark And Esg, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach To Implementing An Integrated, Efficient, And Effective Caremark And Eesg Strategy, Leo E. Strine Jr., Kirby M. Smith, Reilly S. Steel

All Faculty Scholarship

With increased calls from investors, legislators, and academics for corporations to consider employee, environmental, social, and governance factors (“EESG”) when making decisions, boards and managers are struggling to situate EESG within their existing reporting and organizational structures. Building on an emerging literature connecting EESG with corporate compliance, this Essay argues that EESG is best understood as an extension of the board’s duty to implement and monitor a compliance program under Caremark. If a company decides to do more than the legal minimum, it will simultaneously satisfy legitimate demands for strong EESG programs and promote compliance with the law. Building …

Cybersecurity Oversight Liability, Benjamin P. Edwards

Georgia State University Law Review

A changing cybersecurity environment now poses a significant corporate-governance challenge. Although some cybersecurity data breaches may be inevitable, courts now increasingly consider when a corporation’s officers and directors may be held liable on theories that they acted in bad faith and failed to adequately oversee the corporation’s affairs. This short essay reviews recent derivative decisions and encourages corporate boards to recognize that in an environment filled with increasing threats, a reasonable response will require devoting real resources and attention to cybersecurity issues.

From Value Protection To Value Creation: Rethinking Corporate Governance Standards For Firm Innovation, Roger M. Barker, Iris H-Y Chiu

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

A company’s pro-innovation needs are often met by the exploitation of its resources, widely defined. The resource-based theory of the firm provides immense empirical insights into how a firm’s corporate governance factors can contribute to promoting innovation. However, these implications may conflict with the prevailing standards of corporate governance imposed on many securities markets for listed companies, which have developed based on theoretical models supporting a shareholder-centered and agency-based theory of the firm. Although prevailing corporate governance standards can to an extent support firm innovation, tensions are created in some circumstances where companies pit their corporate governance compliance against resource-based …

Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz

William & Mary Law Review

This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.

Corporate Governance In An Era Of Compliance, Sean J. Griffith

William & Mary Law Review

Compliance is the new corporate governance. The compliance function is the means by which firms adapt behavior to legal, regulatory, and social norms. Formerly, this might have been conceived as a typical governance matter to be handled at the discretion of the board of directors. Compliance, however, does not fit traditional models of corporate governance. It does not come from the board of directors, state corporate law, or federal securities law. Compliance amounts instead to an internal governance structure imposed upon the firm from the outside by enforcement agents. This insight has important implications, both practical and theoretical, for corporate …

The Duty Of Corporate Directors To Tie Executive Compensation To The Long-Term Sustainability Of The Firm, Alberto Salazar, Muthana Mohamed

Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series

Executive compensation is said to be for performance and, in liberal market economies, the board of directors along with compensation committees have largely been in charge of safeguarding pay for performance. This executive compensation system is legally protected by the business judgment rule (a strong judicial deference) and has recently been supplemented with shareholders’ ‘say on pay’. Further legal or government intervention has been deemed unnecessary. However, such system has resulted in extremely excessive executive compensation, outrageous pay disparities between executives and workers, poor or short-term performance, recurrent corporate failures and economic recession. This paper explores the need for a …

Iniciativas Legais Para O Desenvolvimento Da Governança Corporativa No Mercado Financeiro E De Capitais Brasileiro, Felipe Chagas Villasuso Lago

Felipe Chagas Villasuso Lago Mr.

The study of Corporate Governance is of utmost importance for the development of transparency and ethics in the conduct of public and private institutions activities. Corporate governance has been important for the development of relations between the shareholder and the senior management of companies, employees, suppliers, customers, banks and other lenders, Regulators and the community as a whole. The study of such practice goes beyond legal issues and also involves economic analysis and policy for discussing the best strategy to ensure the return on investment or consideration, in the case of public service. The Financial and Capital Market are industries …

Framing A Purpose For Corporate Law, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

This article seeks to frame a short statement of purpose for corporate law on which all reasonable observers can agree. The statement, in order to succeed at its intended purpose, must satisfy two strict conditions: first, it must have enough content to be meaningful; second, it must be completely uncontroversial, both descriptively and normatively. The exercise, thus described, involves avoiding the issues that occupy center stage in discussions about corporate law while at the same time highlighting the discussants’ generally held presuppositions. Three closely interconnected issues arise. First, whether the statement of the purpose of corporate law should speak in …

Corporate Culture And Erm, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

The attitudes and actions of those viewed as leaders within a company (commonly referred to as “tone at the top”) help to define corporate culture and are critical to implementing a successful enterprise risk management (ERM) program. This paper explores the challenges and benefits of creating a risk-aware corporate culture, including the potential legal implications for boards of directors.

A Conflict Primacy Model Of The Public Board, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

e board of directors is the theoretical fulcrum of the corporate form: Statutes task the board with managing the corporation. Yet in the twentieth century, CEOs and other executives came to dominate the real-world control of the corporation. In light of this transformation, in the 1970s Melvin E. Eisenberg proposed reconceiving the board as an independent monitor. Eisenberg’s monitoring board is now the dominant regulatory model of the board. Recently two different visions of the board of directors have emerged. Stephen Bainbridge’s “director primacy” model calls directors “Platonic guardians,” and Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s “team production model” characterizes them …

Threats Escalate: Corporate Information Technology Governance Under Fire, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

In a previous publication The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology Governance, (with Kara Altenbaumer-Price) we examined: The IT Governance Institute’s Executive Summary and Framework for Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 4.1 (COBIT®); reviewed the Weill and Ross Corporate and Key Asset Governance Framework; and observed “that in a survey of audit executives and board members, 58 percent believed that their corporate employees had little to no understanding of how to assess risk.” We further described the new SEC rules on risk management; Congressional action on cyber security; legal basis for director’s duties and responsibilities relative to IT governance; …

Pathways For Women To Senior Management Positions And Board Seats: An A-Z List, Douglas M. Branson

Articles

In April, Michigan State University School of Law held a symposium entitled “Pathways to Power.” For the most part, symposium speakers confined themselves to speaking about women’s progress along partner tracks in law firms, into positions as prosecutors and judges, and elections to political office. The author of this article has published two books (No Seat at the Table - How Governance and Law Keep Women Out of the Boardroom and The Last Male Bastion - Gender and the CEO Suite) and several articles on pathways for women to corporate management positions and to board seats. This article …

Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones

Renee Jones

This book chapter on Corporate Governance and Accountability is a contribution to the book CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE (Wiley, forthcoming 2010), edited by Ronald Anderson and H. Kent Baker. This chapter describes the sources of corporate governance standards for American corporations and analyzes the accountability mechanisms designed to ensure that corporate officials act faithfully in their management of corporate affairs. The chapter focuses on the financial reporting system under the U.S. securities laws which forms the foundation of the accountability system, and discusses structures and rules designed to ensure the integrity of financial reporting. The …

Llcs And Corporations: A Fork In The Road In Delaware?, Joshua P. Fershee

Joshua P Fershee

As Vice Chancellor Laster explained in CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2010): '[T]here is nothing absurd about different legal principles applying to corporations and LLCs.'" This short paper argues that courts should respect the LLC as a business form distinct from corporations and that Delaware courts have taken the first step toward doing just that.

Where legislatures have decided that distinctly corporate concepts should apply to LLCs—such as allowing piercing the veil or derivative lawsuits—those wishes (obviously) should be honored by the courts. But where state LLC laws are silent, courts should carefully …

The Future Of Shareholder Democracy, Lisa Fairfax

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article seeks to ascertain the impact of the Securities and Exchange Commission's rejection in 2007 of a proxy access rule, a rule that would have required corporations to include shareholder-nominated candidates on the ballot. On the one hand, the SEC's rejection appears to be a stunning blow to the shareholders' rights campaign because many shareholders' rights advocates have long considered access to the corporate ballot as the "holy grail" of their campaign for increased shareholder power. On the other hand, some corporate experts maintain that characterizing proxy access as the indispensable ingredient for sufficient shareholder influence fails to appreciate …

On Beyond Calpers: Survey Evidence On The Developing Role Of Public Pension Funds In Corporate Governance, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Role Of Government In Corporate Governance, Cary Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael, Thomas J. Healey

All Faculty Scholarship

Numerous corporate scandals in the past several years have fueled widespread debate over proposals for government action. The central challenge for government is how to restore corporate integrity and market confidence without overreacting and stifling the dynamism that underlies a strong economy. To examine this challenge, the Center for Business and Government's Regulatory Policy Program organized a conference in May 2004 on The Role of Government in Corporate Governance. The conference brought together government officials, business leaders, and academic researchers to discuss three fundamental public policy issues raised by recent corporate abuses. First, who should regulate corporate management - government …

The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile

All Faculty Scholarship

The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.

Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Taking Boards Seriously, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Questioning Philanthropy From A Corporate Governance Perspective, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.