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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Bankruptcy Law
Business Insolvency And The Irish Debt Crisis, Paul B. Lewis
Business Insolvency And The Irish Debt Crisis, Paul B. Lewis
Paul Lewis
No abstract provided.
Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz
Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This article examines how a U.S. debt default might occur, how it could be avoided, its potential consequences if not avoided, and how those consequences could be mitigated. To that end, the article differentiates defaults caused by insolvency from defaults caused by illiquidity. The latter, which are potentiated by rollover risk (the risk that the government will be temporarily unable to borrow sufficient funds to repay its maturing debt), are not only plausible but have occurred in the past. Moreover, the ongoing controversy over the federal debt ceiling and the rise of the shadow-banking system make these types of defaults …
The Role Of The Imf In Future Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Report Of The Annenberg House Expert Group, Douglas G. Baird, Nicole Bollen, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, Anne O. Krueger, Fridrik Mar Balursson, Robert K. Rasmussen, David A. Skeel Jr., Sergei Storchak, Jeromin Settelmeyer
The Role Of The Imf In Future Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Report Of The Annenberg House Expert Group, Douglas G. Baird, Nicole Bollen, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, Anne O. Krueger, Fridrik Mar Balursson, Robert K. Rasmussen, David A. Skeel Jr., Sergei Storchak, Jeromin Settelmeyer
Faculty Scholarship
A meeting of international finance and insolvency experts was held on November 2, 2013 at the Annenberg House in Santa Monica, California. The meeting was co-hosted by the USC Law School and the Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands. The goal was to solicit the views of experts on the implications of the IMF’s April 26, 2013 paper captioned “Sovereign Debt Restructuring -- Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework”. The April 26 paper may signal a shift in IMF policies in the area of sovereign debt workouts. Although the Expert Group discussed a number of the ideas …
Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy, Lee C. Buchheit, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza, Beatrice Weder Di Mauro, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy, Lee C. Buchheit, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza, Beatrice Weder Di Mauro, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Faculty Scholarship
Sovereign debt crises occur regularly and often violently. Yet there is no legally and politically recognized procedure for restructuring the debt of bankrupt sovereigns. Procedures of this type have been periodically debated, but so far been rejected, for two main reasons. First, countries have been reluctant to give up power to supranational rules or institutions, and creditors and debtors have felt that there were sufficient instruments for addressing debt crises at hoc. Second, fears that making debt easier to restructure would raise the costs and reduce the amounts of sovereign borrowing in many countries. This was perceived to be against …
Business Insolvency And The Irish Debt Crisis, Paul B. Lewis
Business Insolvency And The Irish Debt Crisis, Paul B. Lewis
Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business
No abstract provided.
A Politically Viable Approach To Sovereign Debt Restructuring, A. Mechele Dickerson
A Politically Viable Approach To Sovereign Debt Restructuring, A. Mechele Dickerson
Faculty Publications
The failure to enact a statutory system to restructure sovereign debt suggests that the international community is still unwilling to adopt a unified global response to insolvency issues. Since nations refused to enact uniform legislation to facilitate more orderly business insolvencies within a sovereign, it is not surprising that recent attempts to create uniform legislation that addresses the insolvency of sovereigns themselves have been unsuccessful. While a comprehensive statutory approach can predictably and efficiently restructure all of a sovereign's debts, the failed experience with uniform cross-border insolvency legislation suggests that sovereigns will not accept an inflexible statutory scheme that contains …
Sovereign Debt Reform And The Best Interest Of Creditors, William W. Bratton, G. Mitu Gulati
Sovereign Debt Reform And The Best Interest Of Creditors, William W. Bratton, G. Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
In April 2002 the International Monetary Fund introduced a sovereign bankruptcy proposal only to be rebuffed by the United States Treasury. Where the IMF wanted a mandatory bankruptcy regime, the Treasury wanted to solve distress problems with contractual devices. Sovereign bondholders and sovereign issuers themselves flatly rejected both proposals, even though they were nominally the beneficiaries of both proponents. This Article addresses and explains this bondholder reaction. In so doing, it takes a highly skeptical view of the IMF's proposal even as it shows that the incentive structure surrounding sovereign lending renders untenable the Treasury's contractarian proposal. The Article's analysis …