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Full-Text Articles in Bankruptcy Law

Lessons Learned: Robert Hoyt, Esq., Yasemin Esmen Apr 2021

Lessons Learned: Robert Hoyt, Esq., Yasemin Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Robert Hoyt was General Counsel at the U.S. Department of Treasury between 2006 and 2009. He oversaw legal aspects of policies implemented to manage the crisis, including the rescues of Bear Stearns, AIG, and the U.S. Auto industry, the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the failure of Lehman Brothers, as well as the creation and implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP.) This Lessons Learned is based on a phone interview with Mr. Hoyt.


The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module A: The Conservatorships, Daniel Thompson, Rosalind Z. Wiggins Apr 2021

The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module A: The Conservatorships, Daniel Thompson, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), dominated the secondary mortgage market during the US housing crisis, collectively holding or guaranteeing $5.3 trillion in mortgage assets by late 2007. As the crisis escalated, the two GSEs began to report substantial losses and their survival became uncertain. On September 6, 2008, the GSEs’ new regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), placed the firms into indefinite conservatorships, one step of a four-part government intervention to stabilize the enterprises. This case study evaluates the purpose and efficacy of the …


The Rescue Of American International Group Module F: The Aig Credit Facility Trust, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson Apr 2021

The Rescue Of American International Group Module F: The Aig Credit Facility Trust, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, American International Group, Inc. (AIG) experienced a liquidity crisis. To avoid the insurance giant’s bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) extended an $85 billion emergency secured credit facility to AIG. In connection with the credit facility, AIG issued 100,000 shares of preferred stock, with voting rights equal to and convertible into 79.9% of the outstanding shares of AIG common stock, to an independent trust (the Trust) set up by the FRBNY. Three trustees held the stock for the sole benefit of the US Treasury, exercised the rights, powers, authorities, discretions, and duties of the …


The Rescue Of American International Group Module A: The Revolving Credit Facility, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson Apr 2021

The Rescue Of American International Group Module A: The Revolving Credit Facility, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson

Journal of Financial Crises

On September 15, 2008, the big three rating agencies downgraded AIG’s credit ratings multiple levels, exacerbating liquidity strains that the company was experiencing due to increasing cash demands by securities borrowers and collateral calls by credit default swap (CDS) customers. To prevent AIG from filing for bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) announced on the following day that, pursuant to its emergency powers, it would provide the company with an $85 billion Revolving Credit Facility (RCF). The RCF was secured by AIG assets and interests in its subsidiaries and required AIG to grant the US Department of the Treasury a …


Solvency As A Fundamental Constraint On Lolr Policy For Independent Central Banks: Principles, History, Law, Sir Paul M. W. Tucker Jul 2020

Solvency As A Fundamental Constraint On Lolr Policy For Independent Central Banks: Principles, History, Law, Sir Paul M. W. Tucker

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper follows up earlier work advocating a principled modernization of doctrines for central bank lender-of-last-resort policies and operations. It argues for a new Fundamental Constraint on such authorities: namely, “the principle that central banks should not lend to firms that they know (or should know) to be fundamentally bust or broken.” Tucker supports this with commentary from various peers, a review of principles underlying bankruptcy law and resolution schemes, and by deconstructing other common counterarguments. Centrally, he argues that when central banks breach the Fundamental Constraint, they distribute resources to short-term creditors at the expense of longer-term creditors, …


Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick Apr 2020

Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

During 2008-09, the federal government extended multiple guarantee programs in an effort to restore the financial market and contain the panic and crisis in the market. For example, the Treasury provided a temporary guarantee program for the money market funds, the FDIC decided to stand behind certain debts and non-interest-bearing transaction accounts, and the Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve agreed to share losses in certain assets belonging to Citigroup. This case reviews these guarantee programs implemented during the global financial crisis by the government and explores the different rationale that shaped certain design features of each program.


Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises A: Haircuts And Resolutions, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick Apr 2020

Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises A: Haircuts And Resolutions, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

After the mortgage market meltdown in mid-2007 and during the financial crisis in 2008, major financial institutions around the world were on the verge of collapsing one after another. Faced with these troubles, the government had to respond quickly to contain the crisis as efficiently as possible. It was, however, limited in resources, time, and experience. To make matters worse, the complexity and opaqueness of the financial market and these institutions greatly affected the government’s ability to design an efficient and consistent method to contain the crisis. Shortly after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, American International …


Global Guide: Measures Adopted To Support Businesses Through The Covid-19 Crisis: Singapore, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez Apr 2020

Global Guide: Measures Adopted To Support Businesses Through The Covid-19 Crisis: Singapore, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

After the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19), the Singapore Government responded with a quick and comprehensive package of legal, economic and financial measures that sought to put the economy into hibernation and avoid the destruction of jobs and viable businesses, at least while companies were unable to generate revenues and cash-flows due to a variety of factors, including travel restrictions and lockdowns imposed in many countries around the world. To that end, the Government spent SGD$97.3 billion (that is, around 20% of the country’s GDP) to support businesses, households and employees. Most of this financial support was given in the …


Screened Out Of Housing: The Impact Of Misleading Tenant Screening Reports And The Potential For Criminal Expungement As A Model For Effectively Sealing Evictions, Katelyn Polk Apr 2020

Screened Out Of Housing: The Impact Of Misleading Tenant Screening Reports And The Potential For Criminal Expungement As A Model For Effectively Sealing Evictions, Katelyn Polk

Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy

Having an eviction record “blacklists” tenants from finding future housing. Even renters with mere eviction filings—not eviction orders—on their records face the harsh collateral consequences of eviction. This Note argues that eviction records should be sealed at filing and only released into the public record if a landlord prevails in court. Juvenile record expungement mechanisms in Illinois serve as a model for one way to protect people with eviction records. Recent updates to the Illinois juvenile expungement process provided for the automatic expungement of certain records and strengthened the confidentiality protections of juvenile records. Illinois protects juvenile records because it …


Distorted Choice In Corporate Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr. Jan 2020

Distorted Choice In Corporate Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

We ordinarily assume that a central objective of every voting process is ensuring an undistorted vote. Recent developments in corporate bankruptcy, which culminates with an elaborate vote, are quite puzzling from this perspective. Two strategies now routinely used in big cases are intended to distort, and clearly do distort, the voting process. Restructuring support agreements (RSAs) and “deathtrap” provisions remove creditors’ ability to vote for or against a proposed reorganization simply on the merits.

This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis of these new distortive techniques. One possible solution is simply to ban distortive techniques, as several scholars advocate with …


Christianity And Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr. Dec 2019

Christianity And Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

Although the term “bankruptcy” is nowhere to be found in the Bible, debt and the consequences of default are a major theme both in the Hebrew Bible and in the New Testament. In Israel, as in the ancient Near East generally, a debtor who defaulted on his obligations was often sold into slavery or servitude. Biblical law moderated the harshness of this system by prohibiting Israelites from charging interest on loans to one another, thus diminishing the risk of default, and by requiring the release of slaves after seven years of service. Jesus alluded to the lending laws at least …


European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution—Dexia Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution—Dexia Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, Dexia Group, SA, the world’s largest provider of public finance, experienced a sudden liquidity crisis. In response, the governments of Belgium, France, and Luxembourg provided the company a capital infusion and credit support. In February 2010, the company adopted a European Union (EU)-approved restructuring plan that required it to scale back its businesses and cease proprietary trading. In June 2011, Dexia withdrew from the government-sponsored credit support program before its expiration date, and in July, the company announced that it had passed an EU stress test. However, just three months later, Dexia wrote down its substantial position …


European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution–Fortis Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution–Fortis Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In August 2007, Fortis Group, Belgium’s largest bank, acquired the Dutch operations of ABN AMRO, becoming the fifth largest bank in Europe. Despite its size and its significant operations in the Benelux countries, Fortis struggled to integrate ABN AMRO. Fortis’s situation worsened with the crash of the US subprime market, which impacted its subprime mortgage portfolio. By July 2008, Fortis’s CEO had stepped down, its stock had lost 70% of its value, and it was on the verge of collapse due to a severe liquidity crisis. The governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands quickly came together and agreed to …


European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

The options available to European governments to respond to a multinational bank in financial trouble have been severely limited since each country has its own unique laws and authority applicable to banks operating within its borders. The Bank Recovery & Resolution Directive (BRRD), which was adopted in 2013 and scheduled to go into effect January 2015, harmonizes rules across EU countries for how to restructure and resolve failing banks. However, the directive would maintain the existing system of individual national resolution authorities and resolution funds. To better secure the Eurozone banks and to compliment the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which was …


European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

At the peak of the Global Financial Crisis in fall 2008, each of the 27 member states in the European Union (EU) set many of its own banking rules and had its own bank regulators and supervisors. The crisis made the shortcomings of this decentralized approach obvious, and since its formation in January 2011, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has been developing a “Single Rulebook” that will harmonize banking rules across the EU countries. In June 2012, European leaders went even further, committing to a banking union that would better coordinate supervision of banks in the then 18-country Eurozone. A …


The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy G: The Special Case Of Derivatives, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick Mar 2019

The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy G: The Special Case Of Derivatives, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

When it filed for bankruptcy protection in September 2008, Lehman Brothers was an active participant in the derivatives market and was party to 906,000 derivative transactions of all types under 6,120 ISDA Master Agreements with an estimated notional value of $35 trillion. The majority of Lehman’s derivatives were bilateral agreements not traded on an exchange but in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. Because derivatives enjoyed an exemption from the automatic stay provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, parties to Lehman’s derivatives could seek resolution and self-protection without the guidance and restraint of the bankruptcy court. The rush of counterparties to novate …


The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction To The Isda Master Agreement, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick Mar 2019

The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction To The Isda Master Agreement, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

When Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (LBHI) sought Chapter 11 protection, the more than 6,000 counterparties with which its subsidiaries had entered into over 900,000 over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions faced the question of how best to respond to protect their interests. The existence of standardized documentation developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) for entering into such transactions meant that the counterparties likely thought that they were dealing with a well-defined and robust set of options in answering this question. Yet, in practice, the resolution of Lehman’s OTC derivatives portfolio ended up being less orderly than the existence of …


The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E: The Effects On Lehman’S U.S. Broker-Dealer, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick Mar 2019

The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E: The Effects On Lehman’S U.S. Broker-Dealer, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Lehman’s U.S. broker-dealer, Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI), was excluded from the parent company’s bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, because it was thought that the solvent subsidiary might be able to wind down its affairs in a normal fashion. However, the force of the parent’s demise proved too strong, and within days, LBI and dozens of Lehman subsidiaries around the world were also in liquidation. As a regulated broker-dealer, LBI was required to comply with the Securities and Exchange Commission financial-responsibility rules for broker-dealers, including maintaining customer assets separately. However, the corporate complexity and enterprise integration that characterized the Lehman …


The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick Mar 2019

The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., the fourth-largest U.S. investment bank, sought Chapter 11 protection, initiating the largest bankruptcy proceeding in U.S. history. The demise of the 164-year old firm was a seminal event in the global financial crisis. Under the direction of its long-time Chief Executive Officer Richard Fuld, Lehman had been very successful pursuing a high-leverage, high-risk business model that required it to daily raise billions of dollars to fund its operations. Beginning in 2006, Lehman began to invest aggressively in real-estate-related assets and soon had significant exposures to housing and subprime mortgages, just as these …


Venezuela Undermines Gold Miner Crystallex's Attempts To Recover On Its Icsid Award, Sam Wesson Feb 2019

Venezuela Undermines Gold Miner Crystallex's Attempts To Recover On Its Icsid Award, Sam Wesson

Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Empty Idea Of “Equality Of Creditors”, David A. Skeel Jr. Jan 2018

The Empty Idea Of “Equality Of Creditors”, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

For two hundred years, the equality of creditors norm—the idea that similarly situated creditors should be treated similarly—has been widely viewed as the most important principle in American bankruptcy law, rivaled only by our commitment to a fresh start for honest but unfortunate debtors. I argue in this Article that the accolades are misplaced. Although the equality norm once was a rough proxy for legitimate concerns, such as curbing self-dealing, it no longer plays this role. Nor does it serve any other beneficial purpose.

Part I of this Article traces the historical emergence and evolution of the equality norm, first …


Lessons From The Bankruptcy Of Hanjin Shipping, Yutong Pan Aug 2017

Lessons From The Bankruptcy Of Hanjin Shipping, Yutong Pan

World Maritime University Dissertations

No abstract provided.


A Two-Step Plan For Puerto Rico, Clayton P. Gillette, David A. Skeel Jr. Mar 2016

A Two-Step Plan For Puerto Rico, Clayton P. Gillette, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

Few still believe that Puerto Rico is capable of meeting all of its financial obligations and continuing to provide basic services. The territory is already in default, and conditions are rapidly deteriorating. Is there a way forward? We think there is. In this short article, we outline a two-part plan for correcting Puerto Rico’s most urgent fiscal and financial problems.

The first step is to create an independent financial control board that has authority over Puerto Rico’s budgets and related issues. Notwithstanding concerns that an externally imposed financial control board (FCB) may interfere with the decision making processes of democratically …


Everything’S Bigger In Texas: Except The Medmal Settlements, Tom Baker, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick Jan 2016

Everything’S Bigger In Texas: Except The Medmal Settlements, Tom Baker, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent work using Texas closed claim data finds that physicians are rarely required to use personal assets in medical malpractice settlements even when plaintiffs secure judgments above the physician's insurance limits. In equilibrium, this should lead physicians to purchase less insurance. Qualitative research on the behavior of plaintiffs suggests that there is a norm under which plaintiffs agree not to pursue personal assets as long as defendants are not grossly underinsured. This norm operates as a soft constraint on physicians. All other things equal, while physicians want to lower their coverage, they do not want to violate the norm and …


The Modern Administrative State: Why We Have ‘Big Government’ And How To Run And Reform Bureaucratic Organizations, Sean Y. Sakaguchi Jan 2016

The Modern Administrative State: Why We Have ‘Big Government’ And How To Run And Reform Bureaucratic Organizations, Sean Y. Sakaguchi

CMC Senior Theses

This work asserts that bureaucratic organization is not only an inevitable part of the modern administrative state, but that a high quality bureaucracy within a strongly empowered executive branch is an ideal mechanism for running government in the modern era. Beginning with a philosophical inquiry into the purpose of American government as we understand it today, this paper responds to criticisms of the role of expanded government and develops a framework for evaluating the quality of differing government structures. Following an evaluation of the current debate surrounding bureaucracies (from both proponents and critics), this thesis outlines the lessons and principles …


Governmental Intervention In An Economic Crisis, Robert K. Rasmussen, David A. Skeel Jr. Jan 2016

Governmental Intervention In An Economic Crisis, Robert K. Rasmussen, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper articulates a framework both for assessing the various government bailouts that took place at the onset of Great Recession and for guiding future rescue efforts when they become necessary. The goals for those engineering a bailout should be to be as transparent as possible, to articulate clearly the reason for the intervention, to respect existing priorities among investors, to exercise control only at the top level where such efforts can be seen by the public, and to exit as soon as possible. By these metrics, some of the recent bailouts should be applauded, while others fell short. We …


Governance Reform And The Judicial Role In Municipal Bankruptcy, Clayton P. Gillette, David A. Skeel Jr. Jan 2016

Governance Reform And The Judicial Role In Municipal Bankruptcy, Clayton P. Gillette, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent proceedings involving large municipalities such as Detroit, Stockton, and Vallejo illustrate both the utility and the limitations of using the Bankruptcy Code to adjust municipal debt. In this article, we contend that, to truly resolve the distress of a substantial city, municipal bankruptcy needs to do more than simply provide immediate debt relief. Debt adjustment alone does nothing to remedy the fragmented decision-making and incentives for expanding municipal budgets that underlie municipal distress. Unless bankruptcy also addresses governance dysfunction, the city may slide right back into financial crisis. Governance restructuring has long been an essential element of corporate bankruptcy. …


A No-Tribunal Sdrm And The Means Of Binding Creditors To The Terms Of A Restructuring Plan, Charles W. Mooney Jr. Jan 2016

A No-Tribunal Sdrm And The Means Of Binding Creditors To The Terms Of A Restructuring Plan, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

The paper addresses two discrete but related and essential attributes of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). It first considers the merits and feasibility of an SDRM that would provide a procedure for proposing and adopting a restructuring plan for a sovereign debtor’s debt which would not involve any tribunal or administrator (a No-Tribunal SDRM). The No-Tribunal SDRM would undertake the restructuring as if the sovereign debtor and its creditors were subject to the Model CAC regime. In addition to embodying a novel and interesting structure for an SDRM—and one that eliminates the difficult hurdle of identifying a satisfactory tribunal—adoption …


A Framework For A Formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: The Kiss Principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid) And Other Guiding Principles, Charles W. Mooney Jr. Oct 2015

A Framework For A Formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: The Kiss Principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid) And Other Guiding Principles, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

Given the ongoing work on a multilateral restructuring process for sovereign debt in the UN, consideration of the content and implementation of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is timely. The framework and content of the SDRM proposed here differs from earlier proposals in several important respects. For the classification and supermajority voting of claims in the approval a restructuring plan, it would mimic the structure and operation of the model collective action clauses (Model CACs) proposed by the International Capital Markets Association. Restructuring under a qualified sovereign debt restructuring law (QSDRL) would be guided by four principles: (i) observe …


The New Synthesis Of Bank Regulation And Bankruptcy In The Dodd-Frank Era, David A. Skeel Jr. May 2015

The New Synthesis Of Bank Regulation And Bankruptcy In The Dodd-Frank Era, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

Since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, U.S. bank regulation and bankruptcy have become far more closely intertwined. In this Article, I ask whether the new synthesis of bank regulation and bankruptcy is coherent, and whether it is likely to prove effective.

I begin by exploring some of the basic differences between bank resolution, which is a highly administrative process in the U.S., and bankruptcy, which relies more on courts and the parties themselves. I then focus on a series of remarkable new innovations designed to facilitate the rapid recapitalization of systemically important financial institutions: convertible contingent capital …