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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

The Political Economy Of Wto Exceptions, Timothy Meyer Jan 2022

The Political Economy Of Wto Exceptions, Timothy Meyer

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In a bid to save the planet from rising temperatures, the European Union is introducing a carbon border adjustment mechanism-essentially a levy on imports from countries with weak climate rules. The United States, Canada, and Japan are all openly mulling similar proposals. The Biden Administration is adopting new Buy American rules, while countries around the world debate new supply chain regulations to address public health issues arising from COVID-19 and shortages in critical components like computer chips. These public policy initiatives-addressing the central environmental, public health, and economic issues of the day-all likely violate World Trade Organization (WTO) rules governing …


Reviewing Arbitration Awards For Competition Law Violations: A Playbook For Courts Implementing The New York Convention, William Schubert Aug 2015

Reviewing Arbitration Awards For Competition Law Violations: A Playbook For Courts Implementing The New York Convention, William Schubert

William Schubert

This article discusses the risk that international arbitration awards violating national competition laws will be enforced without having received reasonable scrutiny either during arbitration or in the national courts.

The risk that competition law violations may be authorized under the guise of enforceable arbitration awards is real, and it is a major policy problem. It is quite easy, for example, to use the international arbitration framework to enforce agreements that authorize anticompetitive activity among competitors in jurisdictions unrelated to the arbitral award (i.e., without power to review it). The problem is that competition law violations in jurisdictions unrelated to the …


Nuclear Chain Reaction: Why Economic Sanctions Are Not Worth The Public Costs, Nicholas C.W. Wolfe Sep 2014

Nuclear Chain Reaction: Why Economic Sanctions Are Not Worth The Public Costs, Nicholas C.W. Wolfe

Nicholas A Wolfe

International economic sanctions frequently violate human rights in targeted states and rarely achieve their objectives. However, many hail economic sanctions as an important nonviolent tool for coercing and persuading change. In November 2013, the Islamic Republic of Iran negotiated a temporary agreement with major world powers regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The United States’ media and politicians have repeatedly and incorrectly attributed Iran’s willingness to negotiate to the effectiveness of economic sanctions.

Politicians primarily focus on immediate domestic effects and enact sanctions without a thorough understanding of the long-term effects on the United States economy and the public within a targeted …


Public Policy In International Investment And Trade Law: Community Expectations And Functional Decision-Making, Diane A. Desierto Nov 2013

Public Policy In International Investment And Trade Law: Community Expectations And Functional Decision-Making, Diane A. Desierto

Diane A Desierto

This article uses a contextual policy-oriented approach to assess how the standing debate on a State's regulatory freedom has been treated within international investment law (e.g. case-by-case interpretation of variant treaty design in each case), in contrast with how the issue of domestic regulatory autonomy in international trade law has evolved towards coordination (e.g. attempted harmonization of the same set of instruments). The article submits a different view from many primarily trade law/investment law scholars (and other systemic integrationists who idealize a seamless shift from trade law to investment law), who have postulated that this fundamental issue of State regulatory …


A New Prescription To Balance Secrecy And Disclosure In Drug-Approval Processes, Gerrit M. Beckhaus Sep 2012

A New Prescription To Balance Secrecy And Disclosure In Drug-Approval Processes, Gerrit M. Beckhaus

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

To obtain approval to market a drug, a manufacturer must disclose significant amounts of research data to the government agency that oversees the approval process. The data often include information that could help advance scientific progress, and are therefore of great value. But current laws in both the United States and Europe give secrecy great weight. This Article proposes an obligatory sealed-bid auction of the sensitive information based on the experience with similar auctions in mergers and acquisitions, to balance manufacturers' interest in secrecy and the public interest in disclosure.


Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Balancing Patent & Antitrust Policy Through Institutional Choice, Timothy A. Cook Jan 2011

Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Balancing Patent & Antitrust Policy Through Institutional Choice, Timothy A. Cook

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Should a branded pharmaceutical company be allowed to pay a generic competitor to stay out of the market for a drug? Antitrust policy implies that such a deal should be prohibited, but the answer becomes less clear when the transaction is packaged as a patent-litigation settlement. Since Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, which encourages generic manufacturers to challenge pharmaceutical patent validity, settlements of this kind have been on the rise. Congress, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission have condemned these agreements as anticompetitive and costly to American consumers, but none of these bodies has been able to …


Assessing Theories Of Global Governance: A Case Study Of International Antitrust Regulation, Anu Bradford Jan 2003

Assessing Theories Of Global Governance: A Case Study Of International Antitrust Regulation, Anu Bradford

Faculty Scholarship

An effective, legitimate model of global governance must strike a delicate balance between national sovereignty and international cooperation. As such, governance on an international level is a constantly evolving discourse among multiple actors whose respective roles and influence vary across time and policy realms. The participation of multiple actors in global governance is widely recognized, but there is considerable disagreement as to the appropriate distribution of power among these participants and the optimal pattern for their interaction. We may never be able to construct an ideal global governance model. But the attempt to create such a model by examining the …


The Byrd Amendment Is Wto-Illegal: But We Must Kill The Byrd With The Right Stone, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Petros C. Mavroidis Jan 2003

The Byrd Amendment Is Wto-Illegal: But We Must Kill The Byrd With The Right Stone, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

On 16 January 2003, the WTO Appellate Body issued its report on United States – Continued Dumping And Subsidy Offset Act Of 2000 (WTO Doc. WT/DS217 and 234/AB/R). In this report, the Appellate Body condemned the so-called US Byrd Amendment by finding that it was inconsistent with the US obligations under the WTO Agreements on Antidumping (AD) and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).


Commercial Arbitration In The U.S.: The Arbitrability Of Disputes Arising From Statute-Based Claims, Sylvie Frankignoul Jan 1999

Commercial Arbitration In The U.S.: The Arbitrability Of Disputes Arising From Statute-Based Claims, Sylvie Frankignoul

LLM Theses and Essays

A leading contemporary expert in arbitration has explained: "The concept of arbitrability determines the point at which the experience of contractual freedom ends and the public mission of adjudication begins. In effect, it establishes a dividing line between the transactional pursuit of private rights and courts' role as custodians and interpreters of the public interest." 1 A major part of the arbitrability doctrine deals with the kind of claims that can fall within the scope of agreements for private dispute resolution. Arbitration clauses are an integral part of the parties' transactions. Nevertheless, the American judiciary historically has refused to enforce …


Competition Policy In America 1888-1992: History, Rhetoric, Law, Rudolph J.R. Peritz Jan 1996

Competition Policy In America 1888-1992: History, Rhetoric, Law, Rudolph J.R. Peritz

Books

Americans have long appealed to images of free competition in calling for free enterprise, freedom of contract, free labor, free trade, and free speech. This imagery has retained its appeal in myriad aspects of public policy--for example, Senator Sherman's Anti-Trust Act of 1890, Justice Holmes's metaphorical marketplace of ideas, and President Reagan's rhetoric of deregulation.

In Competition Policy in America, 1888-1992, Rudolph Peritz explores the durability of free competition imagery by tracing its influences on public policy. Looking at congressional debates and hearings, administrative agency activities, court opinions, arguments of counsel, and economic, legal, and political scholarship, he finds …


Bringing Down Private Trade Barriers- An Assessment Of The United States' Unilateral Options: Section 301 Of The 1974 Trade Act And Extraterritorial Applications Of U.S. Antitrust Law, Aubry D. Smith Jan 1994

Bringing Down Private Trade Barriers- An Assessment Of The United States' Unilateral Options: Section 301 Of The 1974 Trade Act And Extraterritorial Applications Of U.S. Antitrust Law, Aubry D. Smith

Michigan Journal of International Law

This note examines how the antitrust and trade law options operate, with the two-fold purpose of providing some idea of their potential effectiveness and also suggesting what limitations, if any, should be placed on their use. Parts I and II analyze the mechanics of applying the antitrust and Section 301 remedies to eliminate foreign trade-restrictive business practices. In light of this discussion of how the two processes work, Part III considers whether they are likely to get out of control and suggests how they ought to be restrained. Part III finds that Section 301 is subject to a number of …


Antitrust Policy After Chicago, Herbert Hovenkamp Nov 1985

Antitrust Policy After Chicago, Herbert Hovenkamp

Michigan Law Review

This article begins with the premise that nothing - not even an intellectual structure as imposing as the Chicago School - lasts forever. In fact, a certain amount of stagnation is already apparent. Most of the creative intellectual work of the Chicago School has already been done - done very well, to be sure. The new work too often reveals the signs of excessive self-acceptance, particularly of quiet acquiescence in premises that ought to be controversial.

Today the cutting edge of antitrust scholarship is coming, not from protagonists of the Chicago School, but rather from its critics. The critics began …


Determinants Of Foreign Plant Start-Ups In The United States: Lessons For Policymakers In The Southeast, Michael I. Luger, Sudhir Shetty Jan 1985

Determinants Of Foreign Plant Start-Ups In The United States: Lessons For Policymakers In The Southeast, Michael I. Luger, Sudhir Shetty

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This article examines the elasticity of DFI in relation to these promotional activities. It also analyzes the effect that agglomeration economies, urbanization economies, and labor market conditions have on DFI. Its specific focus is upon the effect that those four determinants had on new plant start-ups in three separate industries: drug manufacturing, industrial machinery, and motor vehicle production over the 1979-1983 period. (Those industries have been given standard industrial classification (SIC) numbers of 283, 355 + 356, and 371, respectively, by the U.S. Department of Commerce.) The industries are considered separately in order to test the hypothesis that the importance …


United Kingdom Regulation Of Transnational Corporate Concentration, J. Denys Gribbin Jan 1981

United Kingdom Regulation Of Transnational Corporate Concentration, J. Denys Gribbin

Michigan Journal of International Law

This article begins by describing the United Kingdom's policy toward outward and inward direct investment and then sets out the essentials of the competition laws that are among the major, nondiscriminatory regulatory mechanisms that affect corporate behavior and planning. The article also analyzes the development of competition policy as a microeconomic instrument along with its application to monopoly, oligopoly, and cartels involving transnational corporations. Competition policy, except for cartels, is shown to be relatively benign toward mergers until recently, and with respect to monopoly and oligopoly has sought remedies in regulation of prices and behavior rather than through structural change. …


Antitrust Law, Competition, And The Macroeconomy, Peter C. Carstensen Jan 1981

Antitrust Law, Competition, And The Macroeconomy, Peter C. Carstensen

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This article examines the links between antitrust law-one possible tool for dealing with economic ills-and macroeconomic structure. It analyzes the current policy and economic assumptions underlying the importance of antitrust enforcement in reaching a healthy, competitive economy and concludes that such enforcement does contribute to the increased effectiveness of macroeconomic tools.

Part I explores the current macroeconomic theories and their policy implications. Part II discusses the related concepts of market power and competition and concludes that dissipation of market power is preferable, but that the regulation of market power may yield significant social and economic benefits in the short run, …


Canadian Merger Policy And Its International Implications, Eric K. Gressman Jan 1981

Canadian Merger Policy And Its International Implications, Eric K. Gressman

Michigan Journal of International Law

The implications of Canadian merger policy are of deep concern to U.S. and other foreign investors who have invested or are considering investing in Canada. U.S. interests own 60 percent of Canada's manufacturing industry. In 1978, approximately 250 mergers in Canada involved a foreign-owned or foreign-controlled buyer (usually U.S.). Therefore, it is not surprising that Canada's merger policy is no less important to the decisions of foreign investors in Canada than the Justice Department's policies are to domestic investors in the United States. At the same time, the Canadian government and public are concerned with their merger policy as a …


Regulation Of Concentration Through Merger Control: Germany's Continuing Efforts, Kurt Stockmann Jan 1981

Regulation Of Concentration Through Merger Control: Germany's Continuing Efforts, Kurt Stockmann

Michigan Journal of International Law

The Federal Republic of Germany's Law Against Restraints on Competition (the ARC), establishes an extensive regime for regulating market-dominating enterprises. Therefore, large corporations, both national and multinational, are the subject of particular scrutiny in the Federal Republic. Rather than identify and address all the provisions pertinent to corporate concentration (a task whose tedium would be matched only by its enormity), this analysis will undertake three tasks: (1) briefly describe the general scope of West German merger law, (2) discuss the application of the law to cases of transnational concentration, and (3) explain the proposed Fourth Amendment to the ARC as …


Regulating Multinational Corporate Concentration-The European Economic Community, John Temple Lang Jan 1981

Regulating Multinational Corporate Concentration-The European Economic Community, John Temple Lang

Michigan Journal of International Law

It is the purpose of this article to discuss the policies and goals of the efforts of the European Communities to regulate multinational corporate concentration. For reasons that will become clear in the course of the article, it is necessary to start by outlining the means available to the European Communities, both presently and potentially, to promote these policies. It is not possible to see what those policies might be or how they are likely to develop without understanding the practical implications of the various legal rules on which the Community might rely in the future. This article does not …


Decision To Prosecute: Organization And Public Policy In The Antitrust Division, C. Paul Rogers, Iii Oct 1979

Decision To Prosecute: Organization And Public Policy In The Antitrust Division, C. Paul Rogers, Iii

Vanderbilt Law Review

Professor Suzanne Weaver's first book, Decision To Prosecute: Organization and Public Policy in the Antitrust Division, is a study of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, its institutional behavior and its mechanisms for public policy formation.Although Professor Weaver's audience is not limited to the legal community, Decision To Prosecute will stimulate in two ways the interest of antitrust students, scholars, and practitioners. On one level, the reader will learn something about the internal operations of the Antitrust Division, and may reconsider his preformed judgments about that influential, trenchant branch of the Justice Department.


For H.R. Ii And S. Ii To Strengthen The Robinson-Patman Act And Amend The Antitrust Law Prohibiting Price Discrimination, Wright Patman M.C. Mar 1958

For H.R. Ii And S. Ii To Strengthen The Robinson-Patman Act And Amend The Antitrust Law Prohibiting Price Discrimination, Wright Patman M.C.

Vanderbilt Law Review

H. R. 11 and S. 11 are modest and simple legislative proposals.'They provide for no change in our antitrust laws prohibiting price discrimination except to limit somewhat the use of the "good faith" defense. The extent of this limitation goes no further than to assist the Act by providing that the "good faith" defense shall not operate as an absolute and complete bar to a proceeding by the Government against the practices of destructive price discrimination: In other words, those discriminations which would have the effect of substantially lessening competition and tending to create a monopoly may not be defended …