Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Beyond Trade Secrecy: Confidentiality Agreements That Act Like Noncompetes, Camilla A. Hrdy, Christopher B. Seaman

Scholarly Articles

There is a substantial literature on noncompete agreements and their adverse impact on employee mobility and innovation. But a far more common restraint in employment contracts has been underexplored: confidentiality agreements, sometimes called nondisclosure agreements (NDAs). A confidentiality agreement is not a blanket prohibition on competition. Rather, it is simply a promise not to use or disclose specific information. Confidentiality agreements encompass trade secrets, as defined by state and federal laws, but confidentiality agreements almost always go beyond trade secrecy, encompassing any information the employer imparted to the employee in confidence.

Despite widespread use, confidentiality agreements have received little attention. …

Brief Of Administrative Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Opposition To Petitioners' Request For Reversal, Jeffrey Lubbers

Amicus Briefs

Amici curiae are administrative law scholars from universities around the United States.

They are: • William D. Araiza, Professor of Law and Dean of Brooklyn Law School; • Blake Emerson, Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law; • Jeffrey Lubbers, Professor of Practice in Administrative Law at American University Washington College of Law; • Todd Phillips, Assistant Professor of Business Law at Georgia State University J. Mack Robinson College of Business; and • Beau Baumann, Doctoral candidate at Yale Law School.

Amici have a strong interest in how the Court’s decision will affect the field of administrative law and …

Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey

Senior Honors Theses

Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit …

Comments On Federal Trade Commission Non-Compete Ban Proposed Rule, Matter No. P201200, Chaz D. Brooks

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Within signed law professors and law students submitted this letter to the Federal Trade Commission, writing in their individual capacities, not as agents of their affiliated institutions, in support of the Federal Trade Commission’s proposed rule to ban most non-compete clauses (the “Proposal”) as an unfair method of competition.

This letter offers comments in response to areas where the FTC has requested public comment. To make our views clear, this letter contains the following sections: I. Summary of the Proposal; II. The Commission Should Consider Expanding Its Definition of Non-Compete Clauses to Prevent Employers from Requiring Workers to Quit Before …

Stakeholderism Silo Busting, Aneil Kovvali

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The fields of antitrust, bankruptcy, corporate, and securities law are undergoing tumultuous debates. On one side in each field is the dominant view that each field should focus exclusively on a specific constituency—antitrust on consumers, bankruptcy on creditors, corporate law on shareholders, and securities regulation on financial investors. On the other side is a growing insurgency that seeks to broaden the focus to a larger set of stakeholders, including workers, the environment, and political communities. But these conversations have largely proceeded in parallel, with each debate unfolding within the framework and literature of a single field. Studying these debates together …

Weaponizing Rhetoric To Legitimate Regulatory Failures, Kat Albrecht, Kaitlyn Filip

FIU Law Review

Pyramid schemes are illegal. According to the courts, they are fraudulent because they must eventually collapse, disappointing or exploiting the members at the bottom. This illegality, largely governed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), is narrowly construed to encompass only very specific instances of activity. In particular, we argue that the specificity of the law allows multi-level marketing companies (MLMs) to argue that they are ‘not a pyramid scheme’ both legally and societally in order to obfuscate exploitative conditions within the company. We take LuLaRoe as a case study of the ways in …

Cookies, Pop-Ups And Commercials: How Tech Companies' Privacy Promises Are Preserving Their Data Dominance, Cailley Lapara

Capstones

As antitrust sentiment focused on Big Tech from regulators and consumers grows, companies like Google and Apple and more have announced plans to move away from the behavioral ad business model that brought the companies to the size they are today. This trend is marketed to customers as a way to address their growing concerns over privacy and data collection. It also comes as the companies face sweeping antitrust litigation and legislation that would break up the firms. But the companies' claims of moving towards privacy are sketchy at best, and appear to serve as a way for the companies …

Ftc V. Qualcomm And The Need To Reboot Antitrust Goals, Beatriz Del Chiaro Da Rosa

University of Miami Business Law Review

The antitrust community is facing a demanding question: Is antitrust enforcement ultimately about protecting consumers, competition, or both? This question has sparked debates about the ultimate goals of antitrust law. On one side of the debate, supporters of the consumer welfare standard; and on the other side, supporters of the Neo-Brandeisian standard of enforcement. At this crucial time in the debate of overarching antitrust goals, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated, one of the most important antitrust cases in the twenty-first century, poses many issues for the consumer welfare standard and antitrust enforcement in the …

Developments In The Laws Affecting Electronic Payments And Financial Services, Sarah Jane Hughes, Stephen T. Middlebrook, Tom Kierner

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The past year proved to be a busy period for the regulation of electronic payments and financial services. In this year’s survey, we discuss rulemakings, enforcement actions, and other litigation that has significantly impacted the law governing payments and financial services. Part II addresses the ongoing fight between federal and state authorities over which should properly regulate Fin- Tech entities and describes some new steps the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) has taken to assert its authority in this area. Part III details an enforcement action that California regulators took against a FinTech company they determined had …

A Suggested Revision Of The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (July 2021), Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The DOJ/ FTC Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) were adopted by the FTC in June 2020 by a party-line 3-2 party line over the dissent of the Acting Chair. One might expect that the VMGs will be withdrawn and/or revised, now that there is a Democratic majority. Revision is appropriate because the VMGs are both incomplete and overly permissible. This Suggested Revision can aid that process.

Leaving Judicial Review With The Judiciary: The Misplaced Role Of Agency Deference In Tunney Act Public Interest Review, Alexandra P. Clark

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Note explores the Tunney Act’s mechanism for judicial review of consent decrees negotiated by the U.S. Department of Justice and merging parties to remedy alleged antitrust issues. The Tunney Act requires that the reviewing court only approve a consent decree if it is “in the public interest.” This Note argues, however, that courts have improperly circumscribed their review by affording too much deference to the Department of Justice when reviewing these consent decrees. This deference subverts Congress’s intent in imposing judicial review and allows the government and merging parties the opportunity to skirt meaningful judicial review. As such, this …

The Limits Of Antitrust In The 21st Century, Thomas A. Lambert

Faculty Publications

Antitrust is having a moment. Commentators and policymakers, both progressive and conservative, are calling for increased antitrust enforcement to address all manner of social ills. From technology platforms' power over speech and encroachments on user privacy to wage stagnation in more concentrated labor markets, to competition softening from ever-larger index funds, to growing income inequality, reduced innovation, and threats to democracy itself - the list of maladies for which antitrust has been proposed as a remedy goes on and on.

This Article revisits The Limits of Antitrust in light of the current antitrust moment. Part I describes the central components …

Analyzing Vertical Mergers To Avoid False Negatives: Three Recent Case Studies, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article analyzes three recent vertical mergers: a private antitrust case attacking the consummated merger of Jeld-Wen and Craftmaster Manufacturing Inc. (“CMI”) that was cleared by the DOJ in 2012 but subsequently litigated and won by the plaintiff, Steves & Sons in 2018; and two recent vertical merger matters investigated and cleared (with limited remedies) by 3-2 votes by the Federal Trade Commission in early 2019 -- Staples/Essendant and Fresenius/NxStage. There are some factual parallels among these three matters that make it interesting to analyze them together. First, the DOJ’s decision to clear Jeld-Wen/CMI merger appears to be a clear …

Procedural Fairness In Antitrust Enforcement: The U.S. Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo, Hendrik M. Wendland

All Faculty Scholarship

Due process and fairness in enforcement procedures represent a critical aspect of the rule of law. Allowing greater participation by the parties and making enforcement procedures more transparent serve several functions, including better decisionmaking, greater respect for government, stronger economic growth, promotion of investment, limits corruption and politically motivated actions, regulation of bureaucratic ambition, and greater control of agency staff whose vision do not align with agency leadership or who are using an enforcement matter to advance their careers. That is why such distinguished actors as the International Competition Network (ICN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the …

Books And Olive Oil: Why Antitrust Must Deal With Consolidated Corporate Power, Carl Bogus

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Has The Us Economy Become More Concentrated And Less Competitive: A Review Of The Data, Jonathan Baker, Steven Berry, Fiona Scott Morton, Joshua Wright, Gregory Werden

Congressional and Other Testimony

FTC Chairman Joe Simons presented opening remarks, followed by a day of discussion by a distinguished set of panelists who discussed the following topics (some of which will be discussed on the rescheduled date):the current landscape of competition and consumer protection law and policy;whether the U.S. economy has become more concentrated and less competitive;the regulation of consumer data;antitrust law and the consumer welfare standard; andthe analysis of vertical mergers.This hearing was initially scheduled for September 13-14, 2018, but the second day sessions were rescheduled to November 1 due to inclement weather.

Hipster Antitrust: New Bottles, Same Old W(H)Ine?, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

Although the debate over hipster antitrust is often portrayed as something new, experienced observers recognize it as a replay of an old argument that was resolved by the global consensus that antitrust should focus on consumer welfare rather than on the size of firms, the levels of industry concentration, and other considerations. Moreover, the history of the Federal Trade Commission’s Section 5 authority to prevent unfair methods of competition stands as a reminder of the dangers of allowing enforcement policy to be guided by vague and uncertain standards.

Healthcare Mergers And Acquisitions In An Era Of Consolidation: A Review And A Call For Agency Collaboration In Antitrust Enforcement, Anna Molinari

Pepperdine Law Review

Healthcare companies are consolidating at an alarming rate. From hospitals, to providers’ offices, to insurance companies, there are increasingly fewer consumer choices and more monopolies, which calls for heightened antitrust enforcement. Interestingly, antitrust enforcement authority in the healthcare industry is shared between the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which presides over hospital and provider mergers, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), which presides over health insurance mergers. Although the FTC has challenged many hospital and provider mergers, the DOJ has only challenged six health insurance mergers. Furthermore, last year, the DOJ ultimately approved all health insurance mergers. In 2017, in United …

The Erie/Sears/Compco Squeeze: Erie’S Effects On Unfair Competition And Trade Secret Law, Sharon Sandeen

Faculty Scholarship

On the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the Supreme Court's famous decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, this article explores the consequences of that decision on the development of unfair competition law in the United States. It details efforts by lawyers and legislators to grapple with those consequences and provides an overview of the evolution of unfair competition law in the U.S. since Erie, with a particular focus on trade secret law.

The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.This paper is an effort to assist courts and …

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”This article is an effort to help courts and counsel …

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to confirm …

Let The State Decide: The Efficient Antitrust Enforcer And The Avoidance Of Anticompetitive Remedies, Andrew J. Fuller

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

If the antitrust remedy a private party pursues would likely have anticompetitive consequences, would only the government constitute an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws? Imagine that a plaintiff sues for a remedy so large that the award of the remedy would meaningfully increase market concentration by sending the defendants into bankruptcy. Is such a plaintiff an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws? Should courts hold that in this situation only the government should be able to challenge the alleged conduct? These questions have gone unaddressed in academic literature because litigation rarely raises the specter of the anticompetitive remedy. Recently, …

Peeling Back The Student Privacy Pledge, Alexi Pfeffer-Gillett

Scholarly Articles

Education software is a multi-billion dollar industry that is rapidly growing. The federal government has encouraged this growth through a series of initiatives that reward schools for tracking and aggregating student data. Amid this increasingly digitized education landscape, parents and educators have begun to raise concerns about the scope and security of student data collection.

Industry players, rather than policymakers, have so far led efforts to protect student data. Central to these efforts is the Student Privacy Pledge, a set of standards that providers of digital education services have voluntarily adopted. By many accounts, the Pledge has been a success. …

Merger And Acquisition Due Diligence Part Ii- The Devil In The Details, James A. Sherer, Taylor M. Hoffman, Kevin M. Wallace, Eugenio E. Ortiz, Trevor J. Satnick

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Our prior scholarship examined the legal and technical challenges involved in modern Merger & Acquisition ("M&A") due diligence practices associated with transactions ("Deals"), given recent but steady advances in technology and related increases in sophistication seen in Deal participants-primarily the organizations or assets targeted (the "Targets") as part of the Deal, and the organizations that pursued and/or resulted from the Deal (the "Acquirers"). We then proposed a framework addressing five particular verticals of interest and concern: data privacy ("DP"), information security ("IS"), e-Discovery, information governance ("IG"), and the due diligence and record keeping associated with the Deal itself ("Deal Information") …

Josh Wright’S “Chicago School Papers”: An Overview, William H. Page

William H. Page

In what follows, I consider three of FTC Commissioner Josh Wright's “Chicago School Papers.” In these papers, Commissioner Wright considers the past, present, and future role of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis in the shaping of law and policy, offering along the way some interesting insights into what his priorities at the FTC are likely to be. The papers discussed have common themes: the mischaracterization of the “Chicago School,” the scientific advantage of dispensing altogether with “School” labels, and a focus on empirical findings in shaping antitrust analysis.

The Ftc's Procedural Advantage In Discovering Concerted Action, William H. Page

William H. Page

Scholars have long argued that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act can or should be interpreted to reach more conduct than Section 1 of Sherman Act - whether, in other words, there are gaps in the coverage of Section 1 that allow certain forms of anticompetitive conduct that Section 5 should condemn. Perhaps the most important issue in the interpretation of Section 1 concerns how courts should distinguish conscious parallelism from unlawful concerted action. In this paper, I argue that there is no substantive gap between the two antitrust statutes on this issue-both statutes prohibit (and permit) the …

Regulating Unfair Practices Under The Ftc Act: The Need For A Legal Standard Of Unfairness, Teresa M. Schwartz

Akron Law Review

This article will examine the Commission's past and proposed use of the unfairness theory to justify these trade regulation rules. It is the thesis of this article that the Commission has not defined adequately the parameters of the amorphous statutory term "unfair... acts or practices" nor analyzed the term sufficiently or consistently in its application to trade regulation rules. By purposefully leaving the unfairness theory vague, the Commission invites judicial reversals of its regulations and legislative limitations on its authority.

Refusals To Deal By Monopolists - Recent Decisions, Thomas J. Collin

Akron Law Review

This article will review and evaluate these recent principal cases, both judicial and administrative, in which single-firm refusals to deal by monopolists have been challenged under section 2 of the Sherman Act or, by analogy, under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. It will demonstrate that there is no reason to depart from conventional monopolization analysis in deciding these cases.

Recognizing The Limits Of Antitrust: The Roberts Court Versus The Enforcement Agencies, Thomas A. Lambert, Alden F. Abbott

Thomas A. Lambert

As Judge Frank Easterbrook famously explained three decades ago, antitrust is an inherently limited body of law. In crafting and enforcing liability rules to combat market power and encourage competition, courts and regulators may err in two directions: they may wrongly forbid output-enhancing behavior or wrongly fail to condemn output-reducing conduct. The social losses from false convictions and false acquittals, taken together, comprise antitrust’s “error costs.” While it may be possible to reduce error costs by making liability rules more nuanced, added complexity raises the “decision costs” incurred by business planners (ex ante) and adjudicators (ex post …