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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Brief Of Administrative Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Opposition To Petitioners' Request For Reversal, Jeffrey Lubbers Aug 2023

Brief Of Administrative Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Opposition To Petitioners' Request For Reversal, Jeffrey Lubbers

Amicus Briefs

Amici curiae are administrative law scholars from universities around the United States.

They are: • William D. Araiza, Professor of Law and Dean of Brooklyn Law School; • Blake Emerson, Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law; • Jeffrey Lubbers, Professor of Practice in Administrative Law at American University Washington College of Law; • Todd Phillips, Assistant Professor of Business Law at Georgia State University J. Mack Robinson College of Business; and • Beau Baumann, Doctoral candidate at Yale Law School.

Amici have a strong interest in how the Court’s decision will affect the field of administrative law and …


Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey May 2023

Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey

Senior Honors Theses

Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit …


Comments On Federal Trade Commission Non-Compete Ban Proposed Rule, Matter No. P201200, Chaz D. Brooks Apr 2023

Comments On Federal Trade Commission Non-Compete Ban Proposed Rule, Matter No. P201200, Chaz D. Brooks

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Within signed law professors and law students submitted this letter to the Federal Trade Commission, writing in their individual capacities, not as agents of their affiliated institutions, in support of the Federal Trade Commission’s proposed rule to ban most non-compete clauses (the “Proposal”) as an unfair method of competition.

This letter offers comments in response to areas where the FTC has requested public comment. To make our views clear, this letter contains the following sections: I. Summary of the Proposal; II. The Commission Should Consider Expanding Its Definition of Non-Compete Clauses to Prevent Employers from Requiring Workers to Quit Before …


Stakeholderism Silo Busting, Aneil Kovvali Jan 2023

Stakeholderism Silo Busting, Aneil Kovvali

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The fields of antitrust, bankruptcy, corporate, and securities law are undergoing tumultuous debates. On one side in each field is the dominant view that each field should focus exclusively on a specific constituency—antitrust on consumers, bankruptcy on creditors, corporate law on shareholders, and securities regulation on financial investors. On the other side is a growing insurgency that seeks to broaden the focus to a larger set of stakeholders, including workers, the environment, and political communities. But these conversations have largely proceeded in parallel, with each debate unfolding within the framework and literature of a single field. Studying these debates together …


Weaponizing Rhetoric To Legitimate Regulatory Failures, Kat Albrecht, Kaitlyn Filip Jan 2023

Weaponizing Rhetoric To Legitimate Regulatory Failures, Kat Albrecht, Kaitlyn Filip

FIU Law Review

Pyramid schemes are illegal. According to the courts, they are fraudulent because they must eventually collapse, disappointing or exploiting the members at the bottom. This illegality, largely governed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), is narrowly construed to encompass only very specific instances of activity. In particular, we argue that the specificity of the law allows multi-level marketing companies (MLMs) to argue that they are ‘not a pyramid scheme’ both legally and societally in order to obfuscate exploitative conditions within the company. We take LuLaRoe as a case study of the ways in …