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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™
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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs
Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs
William & Mary Law Review
Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophisticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed, economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. competition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limitations of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnerable to error. The fear of …
Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …