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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™
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- Discipline
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- Antitrust Law (3)
- Sherman Act (2)
- Acquisitions and Mergers (1)
- Antitrust (1)
- Antitrust and Trade Regulation (1)
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- Antttrust Law (1)
- Ashcroft v. Igbal (129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)) (1)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (550 U.S. 544 (2007)) (1)
- Cartels (1)
- Clayton Act (1)
- Discovery (1)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P. 27) (1)
- Gold Industry (1)
- Law and Economics (1)
- Live Nation Inc. (1)
- Monopolies (1)
- Natural Resources Law (1)
- Non-Technological Transaction Costs (1)
- Pleadings (1)
- Purchasing Power (1)
- Rule of Reason (1)
- Technological Transaction Costs (1)
- Publication
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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Competition And Regulation In The Gold Industry: An American Perspective, Jared A. Wilkerson
Competition And Regulation In The Gold Industry: An American Perspective, Jared A. Wilkerson
W&M Law Student Publications
When taken from a domestic viewpoint, the primary gold market appears to be noncompetitive and marred by concentration. However, when seen at the global scale, it is clear that the primary gold market is competitive and diluted. Further, even if the primary market were noncompetitive and concentrated at the global level, that market probably could not readily affect the price of gold. Regardless of competitiveness, gold mines in the United States and elsewhere are subject to environmental and safety regulations that increase the cost of production; Regulations are stringently enforced in the United States as compared to competitor countries, potentially …
Reframing Antitrust In Light Of Scientific Revolution: Accounting For Transaction Costs In Rule Of Reason Analysis, Alan J. Meese
Reframing Antitrust In Light Of Scientific Revolution: Accounting For Transaction Costs In Rule Of Reason Analysis, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
This Article contends that modern rule of reason analysis, informed by workable competition’s partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm, is suitable for evaluating only a subset of agreements that may reduce transaction costs. The Article distinguishes between “technological” and “non-technological” transaction costs. Technological transaction costs entail the bargaining and information costs first emphasized by Ronald Coase, while non-technological transaction costs result from more fundamental departures from perfect competition, departures creating a risk of opportunism that accompanies relationship-specific investments. Modern law does accurately assess restraints that may reduce technological transaction costs—costs that are analogous to the sort of production costs recognized by the …
Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs
Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs
William & Mary Law Review
Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophisticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed, economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. competition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limitations of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnerable to error. The fear of …
Federal Pleading And State Presuit Discovery, Scott Dodson
Federal Pleading And State Presuit Discovery, Scott Dodson
Faculty Publications
This Article explores the role that state presuit discovery could play in rectifying the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal - when a plaintiff in federal court requires information in the hands (or minds) of defendants or third parties in order to properly plead her claim, but such information is not discoverable unless the claim can survive a motion to dismiss. First, this Article provides an account of the development of federal pleading standards from before Twombly through their current post-Iqbal state. Second, this Article describes the effects of the post-Iqbal federal pleading standards and highlights the harsh results …
The New Doj: Lessons Learned From The Ticketmaster Live Nation Decision, Alan J. Meese, Barak Richman
The New Doj: Lessons Learned From The Ticketmaster Live Nation Decision, Alan J. Meese, Barak Richman
Popular Media
No abstract provided.
Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitve Realities, And Antitrust Policy, Peter C. Carstensen
Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitve Realities, And Antitrust Policy, Peter C. Carstensen
William & Mary Business Law Review
The existence and exploitation of buyer power is emerging as an important concern for antitrust as the public enforcement of antitrust law itself is re-emerging as part of the renewed recognition that markets require rules in order to operate efficiently and in socially desirable ways. Buyer cartels are per se illegal but buying groups are subject to the "rule of reason" in antitrust law; yet, the two types of activity are hard to distinguish in a variety of circumstances. Moreover, neither courts nor commentators have provided very satisfactory explanations and justifications for the "per se'" and "rule of reason" results. …
Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …