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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs
Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs
William & Mary Law Review
Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophisticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed, economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. competition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limitations of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnerable to error. The fear of …
Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitve Realities, And Antitrust Policy, Peter C. Carstensen
Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitve Realities, And Antitrust Policy, Peter C. Carstensen
William & Mary Business Law Review
The existence and exploitation of buyer power is emerging as an important concern for antitrust as the public enforcement of antitrust law itself is re-emerging as part of the renewed recognition that markets require rules in order to operate efficiently and in socially desirable ways. Buyer cartels are per se illegal but buying groups are subject to the "rule of reason" in antitrust law; yet, the two types of activity are hard to distinguish in a variety of circumstances. Moreover, neither courts nor commentators have provided very satisfactory explanations and justifications for the "per se'" and "rule of reason" results. …