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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™

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2010

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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

American Antitrust Jurisprudence Applied To European Commission V. Intel, Paul Jones Dec 2010

American Antitrust Jurisprudence Applied To European Commission V. Intel, Paul Jones

Brigham Young University International Law & Management Review

No abstract provided.

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Revisiting The Regulatory Status Of Broadband Internet Access: A Policy Framework For Net Neutrality And An Open Competitive Internet, Lee L. Selwyn, Helen E. Golding Dec 2010

Revisiting The Regulatory Status Of Broadband Internet Access: A Policy Framework For Net Neutrality And An Open Competitive Internet, Lee L. Selwyn, Helen E. Golding

Federal Communications Law Journal

A decade of broadband access deregulation has landed the FCC at a legal deadend. After the D.C. Circuit's Comcast decision, the FCC finds itself unable to enforce its "net neutrality" goals. To reassert its jurisdiction over "net neutrality," the FCC proposes to reclassify broadband Internet access as a Title II "telecommunications service" while continuing to forbear from most other facets of common carrier regulation. The FCC's current dilemma results from an unfortunate combination of unverified predictive judgments associating deregulation with investment; overly optimistic assessments of competition in the consumer broadband market; the abandonment of the "bright line" between transmission and …

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Pacifica Reconsidered: Implications For The Current Controversy Over Broadcast Indecency, Angela J. Campbell Dec 2010

Pacifica Reconsidered: Implications For The Current Controversy Over Broadcast Indecency, Angela J. Campbell

Federal Communications Law Journal

In 2009, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's finding in Fox TV Stations v. Federal Communications Commission that the broadcast of "fleeting expletives" violated a federal law prohibiting the broadcast of indecency, but remanded the case for consideration of the broadcast networks' claims that the FCC action violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Second Circuit found that the FCC's prohibition against "fleeting expletives" was unconstitutionally vague. It is widely expected that the Supreme Court will review this decision and that the networks will ask the Court to reconsider its 1978 decision in Pacifica Foundation v. Federal Communications Commission. This …

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Deliberative Democracy On The Air: Reinvigorate Localism-Resuscitate Radio's Subversive Past, Akilah N. Folami Dec 2010

Deliberative Democracy On The Air: Reinvigorate Localism-Resuscitate Radio's Subversive Past, Akilah N. Folami

Federal Communications Law Journal

There has been considerable scholarship exploring the need to breathe deliberative life back into the localism standard by requiring broadcasters to include more meaningful local news and public affairs programming, pursuant to the public interest obligations imposed on radio licensees. There has been little scholarly attention, if any, however given to broadening understandings of localism to include music and popular cultural expression for the purpose of furthering deliberative discourse in particular, rather than solely for entertainment purposes. This Article focuses on a particular moment in radio and America's cultural history that was rife with struggles over constructions of identity, and …

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Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs Oct 2010

Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs

William & Mary Law Review

Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophisticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed, economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. competition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limitations of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnerable to error. The fear of …

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Antitrust Law, Ronald J. Shingler Sep 2010

Antitrust Law, Ronald J. Shingler

Golden Gate University Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Antitrust Law, Jeffrey L. Henze Sep 2010

Antitrust Law, Jeffrey L. Henze

Golden Gate University Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Antitrust Law, Bartholomew Lee, Marlis Mcallister Sep 2010

Antitrust Law, Bartholomew Lee, Marlis Mcallister

Golden Gate University Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Antitrust Law, Phyllis Mariam Cantor Sep 2010

Antitrust Law, Phyllis Mariam Cantor

Golden Gate University Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Antitrust Law, Kevin Mcconnell Sep 2010

Antitrust Law, Kevin Mcconnell

Golden Gate University Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Extraterritorial Application Of The Antitrust Laws And Retaliatory Legislation By Foreign Countries, Donald J. Curotto Sep 2010

Extraterritorial Application Of The Antitrust Laws And Retaliatory Legislation By Foreign Countries, Donald J. Curotto

Golden Gate University Law Review

This Comment will review the United States approach to subject matter jurisdiction determinations in foreign antitrust suits, articulate the provisions of the retaliatory legislation, and finally, evaluate the impact of such legislation on United States antitrust enforcement.

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Predatory Bundling And The Exclusionary Standard, J. Shahar Dillbary Sep 2010

Predatory Bundling And The Exclusionary Standard, J. Shahar Dillbary

Washington and Lee Law Review

Recent decisions-all relying on a stylized example first provided by the Ortho court-hold that a multi-product seller that uses a bundled discount in a way that excludes an equally or more efficient competitor engages in predatory bundling. According to these decisions, a bundle can be considered 'predatory" even when the price of the bundle exceeds its cost. This Article shows that the Ortho court's stylized example and its monopoly leveraging theory are erroneous. This Article further demonstrates that even when a bundle's price excludes more efficient competitors and even when a component in the bundle is priced below cost, and …

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The Role Of Antitrust Policy In The Development Of Australian-New Zealand Free Trade, Rex J. Ahdar Aug 2010

The Role Of Antitrust Policy In The Development Of Australian-New Zealand Free Trade, Rex J. Ahdar

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law

This paper examines some antitrust aspects of the Australia-New Zealand free trade accord. The first section will trace the development of trans-Tasman free trade. Efforts to liberalize trade between the two countries have a long history. The next part analyzes the role antitrust law played in the movement to free trade. The final two sections raise a number of outstanding issues and problems yet to be resolved by Australian and New Zealand policy makers.

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Antitrust, Samuel F. Barnum Aug 2010

Antitrust, Samuel F. Barnum

Golden Gate University Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Antitrust, Douglas Wyman Taylor Aug 2010

Antitrust, Douglas Wyman Taylor

Golden Gate University Law Review

No abstract provided.

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American Precedent, Australian Legislation—Are The Rules Of Golf In Violation Of Antitrust Law, Lynden Griggs, Leela Cejnar Jun 2010

American Precedent, Australian Legislation—Are The Rules Of Golf In Violation Of Antitrust Law, Lynden Griggs, Leela Cejnar

Brigham Young University International Law & Management Review

No abstract provided.

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Vertical Separation Of Telecommunications Networks: Evidence From Five Countries, Robert W. Crandall, Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Robert E. Litan Jun 2010

Vertical Separation Of Telecommunications Networks: Evidence From Five Countries, Robert W. Crandall, Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Robert E. Litan

Federal Communications Law Journal

The widespread adoption of mandatory unbundling in telecommunications markets has led to growing interest in mandatory "functional separation," i.e., separation of upstream network operations from downstream retail operations. Since 2002, vertical separation has been implemented in five OECD countries: Australia, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In 2008, the International Telecommunications Union noted "a tremendous amount of interest" in functional separation around the world; and, in April 2009, the European Parliament held its second reading on a new regulatory framework that embraces functional separation as an "exceptional measure." While the U.S. does not currently require unbundling of broadband …

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State Regulation Of Resale Price Maintenance On The Internet: The Constitutional Problems With The 2009 Amendment To The Maryland Antitrust Act, Katherine M. Brockmeyer Jun 2010

State Regulation Of Resale Price Maintenance On The Internet: The Constitutional Problems With The 2009 Amendment To The Maryland Antitrust Act, Katherine M. Brockmeyer

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Ashcroft In A Defendant's Wonderland: Redefined Pleading Standards In Ashcroft V. Iqbal, Cassidy M. Flake May 2010

Ashcroft In A Defendant's Wonderland: Redefined Pleading Standards In Ashcroft V. Iqbal, Cassidy M. Flake

Mercer Law Review

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal is the Court's awaited clarification of its earlier decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. In the wake of Twombly, courts and commentators debated its application to cases other than antitrust disputes. The Court announced in Iqbal that the Twombly complaint requirement of facial plausibility applies to all civil actions filed in federal court, not just antitrust cases. Accordingly, Iqbal currently governs the standards by which all plaintiffs in federal court must draft complaints to state a legally sufficient claim for relief and survive a defendant's motion to …

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Internet Governance And Democratic Legitimacy, Oliver Sylvain Apr 2010

Internet Governance And Democratic Legitimacy, Oliver Sylvain

Federal Communications Law Journal

Even as the Internet goes pop, federal policymakers continue to surrender their statutory obligation to regulate communications in the first instance to extralegal nongovernmental organizations comprised of technical experts. The FCC's adjudication of a dispute concerning a major broadband service provider's network management practices is a case in point. There, in the absence of any enforceable legislative or regulatory rule, the FCC turned principally to the transmission principles of the Internet Engineering Taskforce, the preeminent nongovernmental Internet engineering standard-setting organization. This impulse to defer as a matter of course to such an organization without any legal mechanism requiring as much …

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2009 International Trade Law Decisions Of The Federal Circuit, Patrick A. Fitch Apr 2010

2009 International Trade Law Decisions Of The Federal Circuit, Patrick A. Fitch

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane Apr 2010

Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane

Vanderbilt Law Review

Private litigation is the predominant means of antitrust enforcement in the United States. Other jurisdictions around the world are increasingly implementing private enforcement models. Private enforcement is usually justified on either compensation or deterrence grounds. While the choice between these two goals matters, private litigation is not very effective at advancing either one. Compensation fails because the true economic victims of most antitrust violations are usually downstream consumers who are too numerous and remote to locate and compensate. Deterrence is ineffective because the time lag between the planning of the violation and the legal judgment day is usually so long …

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Analyzing Refusal-To-Deal Cases Under Brooke Group’S Predatory Pricing Test: The Tenth Circuit Misses The Mark In Christy Sports, Llc V. Deer Valley Resort Co. , Paul Jones Mar 2010

Analyzing Refusal-To-Deal Cases Under Brooke Group’S Predatory Pricing Test: The Tenth Circuit Misses The Mark In Christy Sports, Llc V. Deer Valley Resort Co. , Paul Jones

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Insider Trading And Soft Information: U.S. V. Nacchio, Andrew Law Mar 2010

Insider Trading And Soft Information: U.S. V. Nacchio, Andrew Law

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitve Realities, And Antitrust Policy, Peter C. Carstensen Feb 2010

Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitve Realities, And Antitrust Policy, Peter C. Carstensen

William & Mary Business Law Review

The existence and exploitation of buyer power is emerging as an important concern for antitrust as the public enforcement of antitrust law itself is re-emerging as part of the renewed recognition that markets require rules in order to operate efficiently and in socially desirable ways. Buyer cartels are per se illegal but buying groups are subject to the "rule of reason" in antitrust law; yet, the two types of activity are hard to distinguish in a variety of circumstances. Moreover, neither courts nor commentators have provided very satisfactory explanations and justifications for the "per se'" and "rule of reason" results. …

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Lorain, Aspen, And The Future Of Section 2 Enforcement, Xiao Jeff Liu Jan 2010

Lorain, Aspen, And The Future Of Section 2 Enforcement, Xiao Jeff Liu

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

The Sherman Antitrust Act § 2 makes monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a particular trade or aspects of a trade a federal felony. More specifically, Section 2 of the Act addresses a firm's unilateral conduct. Under the administration of former President George W. Bush, a comprehensive guideline titled Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act ("Bush Guidelines") was adopted in September of 2008 for enforcing Section 2 violations. Under President Barack Obama's administration, however, the enforcement of antitrust laws is expected to undergo a radical transformation. On May 11, 2009, Christine A. Varney, the Assistant …

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Stranger In A Strange Land: An Outsider's View Of Antitrust And The Courts, Neil Komesar Jan 2010

Stranger In A Strange Land: An Outsider's View Of Antitrust And The Courts, Neil Komesar

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

No abstract provided.

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Antitrust And Institutions: Design And Change, Eleanor M. Fox Jan 2010

Antitrust And Institutions: Design And Change, Eleanor M. Fox

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

No abstract provided.

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Strange Bedfellows: How The Ncaa And Ea Sports May Have Violated Antitrust And Right Of Publicity Laws To Make A Profit At The Exploitation Of Intercollegiate Amateurism, Andrew B. Carrabis Jan 2010

Strange Bedfellows: How The Ncaa And Ea Sports May Have Violated Antitrust And Right Of Publicity Laws To Make A Profit At The Exploitation Of Intercollegiate Amateurism, Andrew B. Carrabis

Barry Law Review

No abstract provided.

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Should We Learn To Love Insider Trading?, Timothy Reeb Jan 2010

Should We Learn To Love Insider Trading?, Timothy Reeb

Public Interest Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

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