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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Monopolizing Digital Commerce, Herbert Hovenkamp
Monopolizing Digital Commerce, Herbert Hovenkamp
William & Mary Law Review
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize,” or “combine or conspire” to monopolize—all without explanation. Section 2 is the antitrust law’s only provision that reaches entirely unilateral conduct, although it has often been used to reach collaborative conduct as well. In general, § 2 requires greater amounts of individually held market power than do the other antitrust statutes, but it is less categorical about conduct. With one exception, however, the statute reads so broadly that criticisms of the nature that it is outdated cannot be based on faithful readings of the text.
The one …
Impediments To Renewed And Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement, Edward D. Cavanagh
Impediments To Renewed And Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement, Edward D. Cavanagh
William & Mary Business Law Review
Antitrust Division head Jonathan Kanter recently proclaimed that “the era of lax enforcement is over, and the new era of vigorous and effective antitrust law enforcement has begun.” Federal enforcers have indeed been active; the DOJ has sued Google in two separate actions, and the FTC has brought an action against Facebook.
While bringing these cases is an important first step to achieving a more robust antitrust enforcement regime, a significant obstacle to an antitrust renaissance remains—overcoming the strong gravitational pull of Chicago School theory that has dominated antitrust thought for the past half-century. Chicago School principles have not kept …
The Factor/Element Distinction In Antitrust Litigation, Christopher R. Leslie
The Factor/Element Distinction In Antitrust Litigation, Christopher R. Leslie
William & Mary Law Review
Most price-fixing litigation turns on whether the plaintiffs can present sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendants did, in fact, conspire to raise prices. This generally entails the proffering of plus factors, a type of evidence that suggests parallel conduct by the defendants was the product of collusion, not independent decisions. As their name suggests, plus factors are just that—factors. Proving a collection of factors may be necessary for a plaintiff’s case, but no individual factor is ever required. If it were, it wouldn’t be a factor; it would be an element.
Several federal …