Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Monopolizing Digital Commerce, Herbert Hovenkamp

William & Mary Law Review

Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize,” or “combine or conspire” to monopolize—all without explanation. Section 2 is the antitrust law’s only provision that reaches entirely unilateral conduct, although it has often been used to reach collaborative conduct as well. In general, § 2 requires greater amounts of individually held market power than do the other antitrust statutes, but it is less categorical about conduct. With one exception, however, the statute reads so broadly that criticisms of the nature that it is outdated cannot be based on faithful readings of the text.

The one …

Impediments To Renewed And Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement, Edward D. Cavanagh

William & Mary Business Law Review

Antitrust Division head Jonathan Kanter recently proclaimed that “the era of lax enforcement is over, and the new era of vigorous and effective antitrust law enforcement has begun.” Federal enforcers have indeed been active; the DOJ has sued Google in two separate actions, and the FTC has brought an action against Facebook.

While bringing these cases is an important first step to achieving a more robust antitrust enforcement regime, a significant obstacle to an antitrust renaissance remains—overcoming the strong gravitational pull of Chicago School theory that has dominated antitrust thought for the past half-century. Chicago School principles have not kept …

A Chair With No Legs? Legal Constraints On The Competition Rule-Making Authority Of Lina Khan's Ftc, Jennifer Cascone Fauver

William & Mary Business Law Review

Upon her appointment to the chair position of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Lina Khan wasted little time asserting that the Agency possesses the regulatory authority to promulgate rules related to unfair methods of competition. And the President has supported the Chair’s proffered authority, requesting that the Agency use that authority to address competition concerns across the U.S. economy. Chair Khan’s interpretation of the FTC Act relies on a single case decided by the Supreme Court in 1973—National Petroleum Refiners—and judicial deference under Chevron. However, while simplistic in its logic, Chair Khan’s support for the FTC’s competition …

The Factor/Element Distinction In Antitrust Litigation, Christopher R. Leslie

William & Mary Law Review

Most price-fixing litigation turns on whether the plaintiffs can present sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendants did, in fact, conspire to raise prices. This generally entails the proffering of plus factors, a type of evidence that suggests parallel conduct by the defendants was the product of collusion, not independent decisions. As their name suggests, plus factors are just that—factors. Proving a collection of factors may be necessary for a plaintiff’s case, but no individual factor is ever required. If it were, it wouldn’t be a factor; it would be an element.

Several federal …

Critiquing The Sec's Ongoing Efforts To Regulate Crypto Exchanges, Carol R. Goforth

William & Mary Business Law Review

Despite the so-called “Crypto Winter” in the spring of 2022, which saw a deep plunge in global crypto markets, interest in the appropriate way to develop, use, and regulate cryptoassets and crypto-based businesses continues to be high. In the United States, a Presidential Executive Order and multiple bills that seek to tackle various issues of crypto regulation are regularly highlighted in the news, suggesting the appropriate treatment of crypto is a growing national priority. Despite these discussions, which tend to focus on finding a balanced way to regulate those within the industry without stifling the technology, the Securities and Exchange …