Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Beyond Trade Secrecy: Confidentiality Agreements That Act Like Noncompetes, Camilla A. Hrdy, Christopher B. Seaman

Scholarly Articles

There is a substantial literature on noncompete agreements and their adverse impact on employee mobility and innovation. But a far more common restraint in employment contracts has been underexplored: confidentiality agreements, sometimes called nondisclosure agreements (NDAs). A confidentiality agreement is not a blanket prohibition on competition. Rather, it is simply a promise not to use or disclose specific information. Confidentiality agreements encompass trade secrets, as defined by state and federal laws, but confidentiality agreements almost always go beyond trade secrecy, encompassing any information the employer imparted to the employee in confidence.

Despite widespread use, confidentiality agreements have received little attention. …

Changing The Game: The Emergence Of Nil Contracts In Collegiate Athletics And The Continued Efficacy Of Title Ix, Leeden Rukstalis

Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice

On June 30, 2021, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) suspended a 115-year prohibition on college athletes’ ability to profit from the use of their names, images, and likenesses (“NIL”). Historically, NCAA eligibility was determined by an athlete’s amateur status. Student athletes forewent compensation to preserve a line between professional and college sports. Today, the NCAA’s novel NIL policy recognizes an athlete’s right to publicity and allows them to share in the billions of dollars it generates every year. According to estimates, college athletes earned $917 million in the first year of NIL activity. By 2023, the NIL market is …

Blood, Sweat, Tears: A Re-Examination Of The Exploitation Of College Athletes, Keely Grey Fresh

Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice

2021 Louise Halper Award Winner for Best Student Note

The unrest revolving around compensation for college athletes is not a new concept. However, public attitudes are shifting. With spirited arguments on both sides, and the recent Supreme Court decision of National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston regarding antitrust exemptions, the issue has been placed in a spotlight. This Note examines the buildup of discontentment through the history of the NCAA and amateurism, specifically how the term “student-athlete” became coined. It will then move to litigation efforts by athletes in an attempt to gain employment status, and an alternative route of …

Assessing Amateurism In College Sports, Casey E. Faucon

Washington and Lee Law Review

College sports generate approximately $8 billion each year for the National C[artel] Athletic Association and its member institutions. Most of this revenue flows from lucrative television broadcasting deals, which often incorporate the right to commercialize and sell the names, images, and likenesses of college athletes. Under its current revenue scheme, student-athletes—85 percent of whom live below the poverty line—receive a share of zero. For over a century, we’ve justified this exploitative distribution scheme under a cloak of student-athlete “amateurism.” Antitrust challenges to the NCAA’s amateurism rules clash with the assumption that “amateurism” is a revered tradition and an important tenet …

The Necessity In Antitrust Law, Gregory Day

Washington and Lee Law Review

Antitrust rarely, if ever, gives primacy to a dispute’s subject matter. For instance, exclusionary conduct that raises the price of a lifesaving drug receives the same analysis as a restraint of baseball cards. Since antitrust’s purpose is to promote consumer welfare, the equal treatment of important and mundane goods might appear perplexing. After all, competition to produce affordable foods, medicines, and other necessities would seem to foster consumer welfare more than inane products do.

In fact, defendants generally win antitrust lawsuits even when monopolizing necessities because the primary method of antitrust review is notably deferential to defendants. To explain this …

Leaving Judicial Review With The Judiciary: The Misplaced Role Of Agency Deference In Tunney Act Public Interest Review, Alexandra P. Clark

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Note explores the Tunney Act’s mechanism for judicial review of consent decrees negotiated by the U.S. Department of Justice and merging parties to remedy alleged antitrust issues. The Tunney Act requires that the reviewing court only approve a consent decree if it is “in the public interest.” This Note argues, however, that courts have improperly circumscribed their review by affording too much deference to the Department of Justice when reviewing these consent decrees. This deference subverts Congress’s intent in imposing judicial review and allows the government and merging parties the opportunity to skirt meaningful judicial review. As such, this …

A Tale Of Two Regulators: Antitrust Implications Of Progressive Decentralization In Blockchain Platforms, Evan Miller

Washington and Lee Law Review Online

Competition regulators have identified the potential for blockchain technology to disrupt traditional sponsor-led platforms, like app stores, that have received increased antitrust scrutiny. Enforcement actions by securities regulators, however, have forced blockchain-based platforms to adopt a strategy of progressive decentralization, delaying decentralization objectives in favor of the centralized model that competition regulators hope they will disrupt. This regulatory tension, and the implications for blockchain’s procompetitive potential, have yet to be explored. This Article first identifies the origin of this tension and its consequences through a competition law lens, and then recommends that competition regulators account for this tension in monitoring …

Corporate Family Matters, Carliss N. Chatman

Scholarly Articles

Corporate groups dominate the American economy. Known publicly by a single name—Chevron, Apple, McDonald’s, or Google—these companies are a web of affiliated entities, each with its own separate legal identity. Yet, corporate laws have failed to develop a statutory scheme that acknowledges these relationships among entities. While corporate personhood, separateness, and the accompanying liability protection are the primary reasons for using the corporate form, or business entities in general, form can be exploited by bad actors who seek to take advantage of the natural legal silos that define each legal entity in a corporate group as a stand-alone person. These …

Unifying Antitrust Enforcement For The Digital Age, John O. Mcginnis, Linda Sun

Washington and Lee Law Review

As the digital revolution continues to transform competition among businesses, U.S. antitrust enforcement has struggled to remain effective. The U.S. has long depended on a system of dual antitrust enforcement through both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Modern technology has greatly exacerbated existing structural deficiencies of the two-headed approach, at times resulting in deadlock. The two agencies approach new antitrust issues generated by computational technologies differently and fight over who should lead key investigations, leading to economic uncertainty in the most important business sectors. These enforcement disagreements can also hobble the government’s response to …

No Injury? No Class: Proof Of Injury In Federal Antitrust Class Actions Post-Wal-Mart, Rami Abdallah Elias Rashmawi

Washington and Lee Law Review

Over the past twenty years the Supreme Court of the United States has systematically limited the scope of federal class actions brought under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Importantly, in two landmark decisions, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, the Supreme Court cemented a heightened level of inquiry demanded by Rule 23, a stringent, “rigorous analysis.”

This Note analyses the effects of this heightened inquiry on federal antitrust class actions, particularly in situations where the plaintiffs’ method of proving antitrust injury fails to do so for some of the putative class …

“No More No-Poach”: An Antitrust Plaintiff’S Guide, Amanda Triplett

Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice

It may seem that agreements between employers not to hire or solicit employees from each other would be illegal under the Sherman Act’s prohibition of conspiracies to fix prices or allocate markets. However, the complexity of this issue pushes the boundaries of antitrust law. But the core principals of antitrust law are tailored to reject them. In a market of employers, where firms are competitors, no-poach restraints have horizontal elements subject to a harsher standard of antitrust review. Firms that enter into these arrangements bypass legal methods to protect against the harms of employee loss, such as a non-compete agreement. …

Peeling Back The Student Privacy Pledge, Alexi Pfeffer-Gillett

Scholarly Articles

Education software is a multi-billion dollar industry that is rapidly growing. The federal government has encouraged this growth through a series of initiatives that reward schools for tracking and aggregating student data. Amid this increasingly digitized education landscape, parents and educators have begun to raise concerns about the scope and security of student data collection.

Industry players, rather than policymakers, have so far led efforts to protect student data. Central to these efforts is the Student Privacy Pledge, a set of standards that providers of digital education services have voluntarily adopted. By many accounts, the Pledge has been a success. …

The Meaning Of "Direct" Effect On Domestic Commerce Under The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, John J. Miles

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Recalling First Principles: The Importance Of Comity In Avoiding Antitrust Imperialism, J. Franck Hogue

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

In Need Of Direction: An Evaluation Of The "Direct Effect" Requirement Under Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Claire L. Leonard

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

In Defense Of Sports Antitrust Law: A Response To Law Review Articles Calling For The Administrative Regulation Of Commercial Sports, Marc Edelman

Washington and Lee Law Review Online

In recent years, two law review articles have proposed that the United States regulate commercial sports through a direct federal commission, rather than through traditional antitrust remedies. Nevertheless, the practical realities of commercial sports’ power to influence government policy offset the many theoretical advantages to creating a specialized regulatory body to oversee commercial sports. The commercial sports industry already possesses an extraordinarily strong lobbying arm that has successfully lobbied for special legislation, such as the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 and the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992. If commercial sports ever were to become administratively regulated, sports …

Is It Time To Give Up On Antitrust Law For Pro Sports?, Geoffrey Rapp

Washington and Lee Law Review Online

Professor Nathaniel Grow has produced a creative, thoroughly researched piece arguing that antitrust has failed in the context of professional sports and calling for the creation of a national-level federal regulatory agency to address anticompetitive conduct by the major leagues. I respond to his diagnosis of antitrust’s failings and to his prescription.

Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, Nathaniel Grow

Washington and Lee Law Review

Four monopoly sports leagues currently dominate the U.S. professional sports industry. Although federal antitrust law—the primary source of regulation governing the industry—would normally be expected to provide a significant check on anticompetitive, monopolistic behavior, it has failed to effectively govern the leagues due to both their well-entrenched monopoly status and the unique level of coordination necessary among their respective teams. Consequently, the four leagues today each, in many respects, enjoy unregulated monopoly status in what is estimated to be a $67 billion industry.

As one might expect, these leagues use their largely unchecked monopoly power to injure the public in …

The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, Behzad Gohari, Karen E. Woody

Scholarly Articles

This Article posits that the success of macroprudential regulation will depend on four factors. First, the economic philosophy of the central banker in charge of the domestic institution with jurisdiction over macroprudential regulation will prove crucial in the implementation of adopted regulation. If, like Chairman Greenspan, the banker is averse to the exercise of the Central Bank's regulatory oversight authority, then no amount or volume of policy or regulation will prevent or mitigate systemic risks and the accompanying shocks. Second, a sufficiently deep level of international cooperation is required to mitigate regulatory arbitrage, without being so broad that the ensuing …

Predatory Bundling And The Exclusionary Standard, J. Shahar Dillbary

Washington and Lee Law Review

Recent decisions-all relying on a stylized example first provided by the Ortho court-hold that a multi-product seller that uses a bundled discount in a way that excludes an equally or more efficient competitor engages in predatory bundling. According to these decisions, a bundle can be considered 'predatory" even when the price of the bundle exceeds its cost. This Article shows that the Ortho court's stylized example and its monopoly leveraging theory are erroneous. This Article further demonstrates that even when a bundle's price excludes more efficient competitors and even when a component in the bundle is priced below cost, and …

State Regulation Of Resale Price Maintenance On The Internet: The Constitutional Problems With The 2009 Amendment To The Maryland Antitrust Act, Katherine M. Brockmeyer

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Rules Versus Standards In Antitrust Adjudication, Daniel A. Crane

Washington and Lee Law Review

Antitrust law is moving away from rules (ex ante, limited factor liability determinants) and toward standards (ex post, multi-factor liability determinants). This movement has important consequencesfor the structure of antitrust adjudication, including shifting ultimate decision-making down the legal hierarchy (in the direction ofjuries, trial courts sitting as factfinders, and administrative agencies) and increasing the importance of economic experts. The efficiency consequences of this trend are often negative. Specifying liability determinants as open-ended, unpredictable standards increases litigation costs, chills socially beneficial industrial practices, allocates decisionmaking on microeconomic policy to unqualified juries, andfacilitates strategic misuse of antitrust litigation by rent-seeking competitors. Instead …

The Predatory Pricing Puzzle: Piecing Together A Unitary Standard, Kimberly L. Herb

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

No Penalty On The Play: Why The Bowl Championship Series Stays In-Bounds Of The Sherman Act, M. Todd Carroll

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust As An Obstacle To Marine Resource Conservation, Jonathan H. Adler

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust And The Information Age: Section 2 Monopolization Analyses In The New Economy, A. Benjamin Spencer

Scholarly Articles

None available.

The Implications Of Daubert For Economic Evidence In Antitrust Cases, Roger D. Blair, Jill Boylston Herndon

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Defining Reliable Forensic Economics In The Post-Daubert/Kumho Tire Era: Case Studies From Antitrust, Andrew I. Gavil

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Restitution On Behalf Of Indirect Purchasers: Opening The Backdoor To Illinois Brick, Ivy Johnson

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Interference On Both Sides: The Case Against The Nfl-Nflpa Contract, Robert A. Mccormick

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.