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Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Dodd-Frank’S Confict Minerals Rule: The Tin Ear Of Government-Business Regulation, Henry Lowenstein
Dodd-Frank’S Confict Minerals Rule: The Tin Ear Of Government-Business Regulation, Henry Lowenstein
Henry Lowenstein
This paper examines an unusual provision included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), Section 1502 known as the Conflict Minerals Rule. This provision, having nothing to do with the subject matter of the act itself, attempts to place a chilling effect on the trade of four identified minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The provision and its subsequent rule, surprisingly delegated to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (an agency lacking subject matter expertise in minrals) presents a case and object lession of almost every cost, procedural and legal error that can take place …
The Role Of Science In The Uruguay Round And Nafta Trade Disciplines, David A. Wirth
The Role Of Science In The Uruguay Round And Nafta Trade Disciplines, David A. Wirth
David A. Wirth
The central theme of this article is the necessity for deference to decision-making processes of national regulatory authorities in the application of these new trade disciplines and the need for trade-based reviews of national regulatory measures to operate within clearly defined limits. Accordingly, this article first examines and summarizes the relevant texts, including the original 1947 GATT, the Uruguay Round, and the NAFTA texts on standards. Next, the article considers the role of science in the standard-setting process with reference to the copious literature on this topic. Finally, the article takes up the difficult question of the application of the …
The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia
The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia
Frank J. Garcia
Global regulation of international business transactions presents a particular form of the moral hazard problem. Global firms use economic and political power to manipulate state and state-controlled multilateral regulation to preserve their opportunity to externalize the social costs of global economic activity with impunity. Unless other actors can effectively counter this at the national and global regulatory levels, globalization re-creates the conditions for under-regulated or “robber baron” capitalism at the global level. This model of economic activity has been rejected at the national level by the same modern democratic capitalist states which currently dominate globalization, creating a crisis of legitimacy …