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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™
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- Keyword
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- Antitrust Law (7)
- Corporations (6)
- Trade Regulation (5)
- Antitrust (4)
- Economics (4)
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- Sherman Act (4)
- Commercial Law (3)
- Corporate governance (3)
- Financial crisis (3)
- General Practice (3)
- International Trade (3)
- Tying Arrangements (3)
- Antitrust and Trade Regulation (2)
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- Corporate law (2)
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- Firms (2)
- Government Contracts (2)
- Investment (2)
- Law and Economics (2)
- Monopolies (2)
- Monopolization (2)
- Natural Resources Law (2)
- Partnerships (2)
- Public Corporations (2)
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- Publication
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- Alan J. Meese (8)
- Robert B. Ahdieh (3)
- Tao LIANG (3)
- D. Daniel Sokol (2)
- David A. Wirth (2)
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- Fernando Leila (2)
- José Gabilondo (2)
- Benjamin Miller (1)
- Daniel H. Erskine (1)
- David García (1)
- Frank J. Garcia (1)
- Henry Lowenstein (1)
- Karen Woody (1)
- Mark P. McKenna (1)
- Michael Diathesopoulos (1)
- Mubashshir Sarshar (1)
- Robert Bartlett (1)
- Robert C. Hockett (1)
- Steven Davidoff Solomon (1)
- William H. Page (1)
Articles 1 - 30 of 35
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics: Farewell To The Chimera Of Forcing, Alan J. Meese
Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics: Farewell To The Chimera Of Forcing, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese
Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, Alan J. Meese
Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese
Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
Challenging traditional antitrust jurisprudence, Professor Alan J. Meese argues that the present structure of Rule of Reason analysis, applied pursuant to Standard Oil v. United States, has become outdated. The Rule of Reason as currently applied by the courts rests upon neoclassical price theory, an economic paradigm that assumes that legitimate competition consists of unbridled technological rivalry, unconstrained by nonstandard contracts. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to apply a competing paradigm- Transaction Cost Economics-when determining whether a contract is unreasonable "per se" or instead deserving of Rule of Reason scrutiny. Professor Meese argues that Transaction Cost Economics more …
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese
Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …
Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, Behzad Gohari, Karen E. Woody
The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, Behzad Gohari, Karen E. Woody
Karen Woody
This Article posits that the success of macroprudential regulation will depend on four factors. First, the economic philosophy of the central banker in charge of the domestic institution with jurisdiction over macroprudential regulation will prove crucial in the implementation of adopted regulation. If, like Chairman Greenspan, the banker is averse to the exercise of the Central Bank's regulatory oversight authority, then no amount or volume of policy or regulation will prevent or mitigate systemic risks and the accompanying shocks. Second, a sufficiently deep level of international cooperation is required to mitigate regulatory arbitrage, without being so broad that the ensuing …
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …
Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory Of Law In Market Transition, Robert B. Ahdieh
Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory Of Law In Market Transition, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Securities markets are commonly assumed to spring forth at the intersection of an adequate supply of, and a healthy demand for, investment capital. In recent years, however, seemingly failed market transitions - the failure of new markets to emerge and of existing markets to evolve - have called this assumption into question. From the developed economies of Germany and Japan to the developing countries of central and eastern Europe, securities markets have exhibited some inability to take root. The failure of U.S. securities markets, and particularly the New York Stock Exchange, to make greater use of computerized trading, communications, and …
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.
Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …
Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii
Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii
Robert Bartlett
In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company’s common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its common stockholders rather than for its preferred stockholders. This article interrogates this view of directors’ fiduciary duties from the perspective of incomplete contracting theory. Building on the seminal work of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, incomplete contracting theory examines the critical role of corporate control rights for addressing …
So Now Who Is Special?: Business Model Shifts Among Firms That Borrow To Lend, José Gabilondo
So Now Who Is Special?: Business Model Shifts Among Firms That Borrow To Lend, José Gabilondo
José Gabilondo
No abstract provided.
Financial Hospitals: Defending The Fed’S Role As A Market Maker Of Last Resort, José Gabilondo
Financial Hospitals: Defending The Fed’S Role As A Market Maker Of Last Resort, José Gabilondo
José Gabilondo
During the last financial crisis, what should the Federal Reserve (the Fed) have done when lenders stopped making loans, even to borrowers with sterling credit and strong collateral? Because the central bank is the last resort for funding, the conventional answer had been to lend freely at a penalty rate against good collateral, as Walter Bagehot suggested in 1873 about the Bank of England. Acting thus as a lender of last resort, the central bank will keep solvent banks liquid but let insolvent banks go out of business, as they should. The Fed tried this, but when the conventional wisdom …
Insource The Shareholding Of Outsourced Employees: A Global Stock Ownership Plan, Robert C. Hockett
Insource The Shareholding Of Outsourced Employees: A Global Stock Ownership Plan, Robert C. Hockett
Robert C. Hockett
With the American economy stalled and another federal election campaign season well underway, the “outsourcing” of American jobs is again on the public agenda. Latest figures indicate not only that claims for joblessness benefits are up, but also that the rate of American job-exportation has more than doubled since the last electoral cycle. This year’s political candidates have been quick to take note. In consequence, more than at any time since the early 1990s, continued American participation in the World Trade Organization, in the North American Free Trade Agreement, and in the processes of global economic integration more generally appear …
Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol
Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
The legal origins literature overlooks a key area of corporate governance-the governance of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). There are key theoretical differences between SOEs and publicly-traded corporations. In comparing the differences of both internal and external controls of SOEs, none of the existing legal origins allow for effective corporate governance monitoring. Because of the difficulties of undertaking a cross-country quantitative review of the governance of SOEs, this Article examines, through a series of case studies, SOE governance issues among postal providers. The examination of postal firms supports the larger theoretical claim about the weaknesses of SOE governance across legal origins. In …
The Lessons From Libor For Detection And Deterrence Of Cartel Wrongdoing, Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, D. Daniel Sokol
The Lessons From Libor For Detection And Deterrence Of Cartel Wrongdoing, Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
In late June 2012, Barclays entered into a $453 million settlement with UK and U.S. regulators due to its manipulation of Libor between 2005 and 2009. Among the agencies that investigated Barclays is the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (as well as other antitrust authorities and regulatory agencies from around the world). Participation in a price fixing conduct, by its very nature, requires the involvement of more than one firm. We are cautious to draw overly broad conclusions until more facts come out in the public domain. What we note at this time, based on public information, is that the …
Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page
Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page
William H. Page
The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil gave us embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 1 and the monopoly power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2. But a case filed later in 1911, United States v. United States Steel Corporation, shaped the understanding of Standard Oil’s standards of liability for decades. U.S. Steel, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1920, upheld the 1901 merger that created "the Corporation," as U.S. Steel was known. The majority found that the efforts of the Corporation and its rivals to control …
Antitrust Analysis After Actavis: Applying The Rule Of Reason To Reverse Payments, Benjamin Miller
Antitrust Analysis After Actavis: Applying The Rule Of Reason To Reverse Payments, Benjamin Miller
Benjamin Miller
Abstract In F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc. the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper evaluation of reverse payment settlements under federal antitrust law, holding that they must be evaluated under a rule of reason analysis. However, the Court simultaneously created significant uncertainty by declaring that the lower courts were responsible for structuring the analysis. While a few cases are currently in the pre-trial phase, the only decisions relating to reverse payments since Actavis have been rulings on pre-trial motions—there have been no decisions on the merits. Given the intricate intersection between antitrust and intellectual property principles in these …
Limits Of Disclosure, Steven M. Davidoff, Claire A. Hill
Limits Of Disclosure, Steven M. Davidoff, Claire A. Hill
Steven Davidoff Solomon
One big focus of attention, criticism, and proposals for reform in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has been securities disclosure. Many commentators have emphasized the complexity of the securities being sold, arguing that no one could understand the disclosure. Some observers have noted that disclosures were sometimes false or incomplete. What follows these issues, to some commentators, is that, whatever other lessons we may learn from the crisis, we need to improve disclosure. How should it be improved? Commentators often lament the frailties of human understanding, notably including those of everyday retail investors—people who do not understand or …
Back To The Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion In Trademark Cases, Mark P. Mckenna
Back To The Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion In Trademark Cases, Mark P. Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
Courts in recent years have increasingly made blunt use of their equitable powers in trademark cases. Rather than limiting the scope of injunctive relief so as to protect the interests of a mark owner while respecting the legitimate interests of third parties and of consumers, courts in most cases have viewed injunctive relief in binary terms. This is unfortunate, because greater willingness to tailor injunctive relief could go a long way to mitigating some of the most pernicious effects of trademark law’s modern expansion. This Essay urges courts to reverse this trend towards crude injunctive relief, and to re-embrace their …
Dodd-Frank’S Confict Minerals Rule: The Tin Ear Of Government-Business Regulation, Henry Lowenstein
Dodd-Frank’S Confict Minerals Rule: The Tin Ear Of Government-Business Regulation, Henry Lowenstein
Henry Lowenstein
This paper examines an unusual provision included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), Section 1502 known as the Conflict Minerals Rule. This provision, having nothing to do with the subject matter of the act itself, attempts to place a chilling effect on the trade of four identified minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The provision and its subsequent rule, surprisingly delegated to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (an agency lacking subject matter expertise in minrals) presents a case and object lession of almost every cost, procedural and legal error that can take place …
Legitimacy, Accountability, And Partnership: A Model For Advocacy On Third World Environmental Issues, David A. Wirth
Legitimacy, Accountability, And Partnership: A Model For Advocacy On Third World Environmental Issues, David A. Wirth
David A. Wirth
To date, there has been little effort to define the characteristics of responsible environmental reform efforts by private citizens and organizations in the United States on foreign environmental problems, such as the quality of foreign aid. Moreover, there have been virtually no attempts to identify a principled role for American lawyers in Third World environmental issues. This Essay will respond to these lacunae by articulating a new approach to advocacy based on a partnership model. In Part I, this Essay identifies the need for American public interest advocates to establish partnerships with directly affected groups on Third World environmental issues. …
The Role Of Science In The Uruguay Round And Nafta Trade Disciplines, David A. Wirth
The Role Of Science In The Uruguay Round And Nafta Trade Disciplines, David A. Wirth
David A. Wirth
The central theme of this article is the necessity for deference to decision-making processes of national regulatory authorities in the application of these new trade disciplines and the need for trade-based reviews of national regulatory measures to operate within clearly defined limits. Accordingly, this article first examines and summarizes the relevant texts, including the original 1947 GATT, the Uruguay Round, and the NAFTA texts on standards. Next, the article considers the role of science in the standard-setting process with reference to the copious literature on this topic. Finally, the article takes up the difficult question of the application of the …
The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia
The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia
Frank J. Garcia
Global regulation of international business transactions presents a particular form of the moral hazard problem. Global firms use economic and political power to manipulate state and state-controlled multilateral regulation to preserve their opportunity to externalize the social costs of global economic activity with impunity. Unless other actors can effectively counter this at the national and global regulatory levels, globalization re-creates the conditions for under-regulated or “robber baron” capitalism at the global level. This model of economic activity has been rejected at the national level by the same modern democratic capitalist states which currently dominate globalization, creating a crisis of legitimacy …
El Ejercicio Y La Prescripción De Las Acciones Cambiarias, David García
El Ejercicio Y La Prescripción De Las Acciones Cambiarias, David García
David García
No abstract provided.
Third Party Access And Refusal To Deal In European Energy Networks: How Sector Regulation And Competition Law Meet Each Other, Michael Diathesopoulos
Third Party Access And Refusal To Deal In European Energy Networks: How Sector Regulation And Competition Law Meet Each Other, Michael Diathesopoulos
Michael Diathesopoulos
In this paper, we will analyse the issue of concurrence between competition and sector rules and the relation between parallel concepts within the two different legal frameworks. We will firstly examine Third Party Access in relation to essential facilities doctrine and refusal of access and we will identify the common points and objectives of these concepts and the extent to which they provide a context to each other’s implementation. Second, we will focus on how Commission uses sector regulation and objectives as a context within the process of implementation of competition law in the energy sector and third, we will …
Compliance Requirements For Chinese Automobile Market Players, Tao Liang
Compliance Requirements For Chinese Automobile Market Players, Tao Liang
Tao LIANG
Foreign Investment Catalogues And Investment Environment In China, Tao Liang