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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Brief Of Administrative Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Opposition To Petitioners' Request For Reversal, Jeffrey Lubbers
Brief Of Administrative Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Opposition To Petitioners' Request For Reversal, Jeffrey Lubbers
Amicus Briefs
Amici curiae are administrative law scholars from universities around the United States.
They are: • William D. Araiza, Professor of Law and Dean of Brooklyn Law School; • Blake Emerson, Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law; • Jeffrey Lubbers, Professor of Practice in Administrative Law at American University Washington College of Law; • Todd Phillips, Assistant Professor of Business Law at Georgia State University J. Mack Robinson College of Business; and • Beau Baumann, Doctoral candidate at Yale Law School.
Amici have a strong interest in how the Court’s decision will affect the field of administrative law and …
Weaponizing Rhetoric To Legitimate Regulatory Failures, Kat Albrecht, Kaitlyn Filip
Weaponizing Rhetoric To Legitimate Regulatory Failures, Kat Albrecht, Kaitlyn Filip
FIU Law Review
Pyramid schemes are illegal. According to the courts, they are fraudulent because they must eventually collapse, disappointing or exploiting the members at the bottom. This illegality, largely governed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), is narrowly construed to encompass only very specific instances of activity. In particular, we argue that the specificity of the law allows multi-level marketing companies (MLMs) to argue that they are ‘not a pyramid scheme’ both legally and societally in order to obfuscate exploitative conditions within the company. We take LuLaRoe as a case study of the ways in …
Leaving Judicial Review With The Judiciary: The Misplaced Role Of Agency Deference In Tunney Act Public Interest Review, Alexandra P. Clark
Leaving Judicial Review With The Judiciary: The Misplaced Role Of Agency Deference In Tunney Act Public Interest Review, Alexandra P. Clark
Washington and Lee Law Review
This Note explores the Tunney Act’s mechanism for judicial review of consent decrees negotiated by the U.S. Department of Justice and merging parties to remedy alleged antitrust issues. The Tunney Act requires that the reviewing court only approve a consent decree if it is “in the public interest.” This Note argues, however, that courts have improperly circumscribed their review by affording too much deference to the Department of Justice when reviewing these consent decrees. This deference subverts Congress’s intent in imposing judicial review and allows the government and merging parties the opportunity to skirt meaningful judicial review. As such, this …
Procedural Fairness In Antitrust Enforcement: The U.S. Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo, Hendrik M. Wendland
Procedural Fairness In Antitrust Enforcement: The U.S. Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo, Hendrik M. Wendland
All Faculty Scholarship
Due process and fairness in enforcement procedures represent a critical aspect of the rule of law. Allowing greater participation by the parties and making enforcement procedures more transparent serve several functions, including better decisionmaking, greater respect for government, stronger economic growth, promotion of investment, limits corruption and politically motivated actions, regulation of bureaucratic ambition, and greater control of agency staff whose vision do not align with agency leadership or who are using an enforcement matter to advance their careers. That is why such distinguished actors as the International Competition Network (ICN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the …
Administrating Patent Litigation, Jacob S. Sherkow
Administrating Patent Litigation, Jacob S. Sherkow
Articles & Chapters
Recent patent litigation reform efforts have focused on every branch of govemment-Congress, the President, and the federal courts-save the fourth: administrative agencies. Agencies, however, possess a variety of functions in patent litigation: they serve as "gatekeepers" to litigation in federal court; they provide scientific and technical expertise to patent disputes; they review patent litigation to fulfill their own mandates; and they serve, in several instances, as entirely alternative fora to federal litigation.
Understanding administrative agencies' functions in managing or directing, i.e., "administrating," patent litigation sheds both descriptive and normative insight on several aspects of patent reform. These include several problems …
Nonprofit Solicitation Under The Telemarketing Sales Rule, Rita Marie Cain
Nonprofit Solicitation Under The Telemarketing Sales Rule, Rita Marie Cain
Federal Communications Law Journal
In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") revised its Telemarketing Sales Rule ("TSR") to establish a national Do-Not-Call Registry for commercial telemarketing. Congress directed the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to coordinate its telemarketing regulations under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") of 1991 to achieve maximum consistency between the two agencies' telemarketing restrictions. Nonprofit solicitation is exempt from the national Do-Not-Call Registry, but is covered by other provisions of the FTC rule. The TSR created a new in-house no-call list requirement and imposed additional restrictions not previously known for nonprofit solicitors. The separate nonprofit provisions of the TSR raise unique …
The Gasoline Price Wars: A Case Study Of The Shortcomings Of The Mandatory Processes
The Gasoline Price Wars: A Case Study Of The Shortcomings Of The Mandatory Processes
Indiana Law Journal
Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement
Voluntary Compliance: An Adjunct To The Mandatory Processes
Voluntary Compliance: An Adjunct To The Mandatory Processes
Indiana Law Journal
Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement
Enforcement, Voluntary Compliance, And The Federal Trade Commission, Daniel Jay Baum, Eugene R. Baker
Enforcement, Voluntary Compliance, And The Federal Trade Commission, Daniel Jay Baum, Eugene R. Baker
Indiana Law Journal
Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement
Effective Guidance Through Cease And Desist Orders: The T-V Commercial
Effective Guidance Through Cease And Desist Orders: The T-V Commercial
Indiana Law Journal
Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement
Interstate Dissemination Of Advertising: Jurisdiction Which Must Be Earned
Interstate Dissemination Of Advertising: Jurisdiction Which Must Be Earned
Indiana Law Journal
Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement