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Emotions

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Full-Text Articles in Law

From Signal To Semantic: Uncovering The Emotional Dimension Of Negotiation, Daniel L. Shapiro Jan 2010

From Signal To Semantic: Uncovering The Emotional Dimension Of Negotiation, Daniel L. Shapiro

Nevada Law Journal

The author co-created the Core Concerns Framework as a pragmatic model to help people address the emotional dimension of negotiation. Dealing directly with the variety of emotions that arise in a negotiation can overwhelm our cognitive capacity, especially in a high-stakes context, where there are multiple layers of communication, processes, and substantive issues. The framework suggests that negotiators turn their attention to a subset of motives--what the authors call core concerns--to illuminate and navigate the emotional dimension of negotiation.

In the Nevada Law Journal symposium on mindfulness and the core concerns, Professor Clark Freshman calls into question how “core” the …


Mindfulness, Emotions, And Ethics: The Right Stuff?, Ellen Waldman Jan 2010

Mindfulness, Emotions, And Ethics: The Right Stuff?, Ellen Waldman

Nevada Law Journal

This essay celebrates Leonard Riskin's call to arms while suggesting some limits to what mindfulness can achieve in the ethical realm. I discuss recent developments in neuroethics that imply a prominent role for emotions in establishing ethical restraint. The Article also surveys a growing body of evidence that suggests the directive power of our emotions remains largely hidden from and impervious to the control of our “reasoning” selves. Lastly, the author examines what Riskin has, in an earlier work, described as the ethical hard case in light of recent explorations into the emotional wellsprings of deontological versus consequentialist thinking. Although …


Yes, And: Core Concerns, Internal Mindfulness, And External Mindfulness For Emotional Balance, Lie Detection, And Successful Negotiation, Clark Freshman Jan 2010

Yes, And: Core Concerns, Internal Mindfulness, And External Mindfulness For Emotional Balance, Lie Detection, And Successful Negotiation, Clark Freshman

Nevada Law Journal

This article suggests that both parts of Leonard Riskin's latest article and parts of the argument on “core concerns” by Roger Fisher and Dan Shapiro may, with certain individuals in certain circumstances, not work. Indeed, focusing on core concerns may even produce less functional emotions and therefore decrease the chances of an optimal outcome. This article addresses the limitations inherent within the core concerns approach and suggests “external mindfulness” as a complementary skill to check when core concerns help and when other tools, including both internal and external mindfulness, may help as well as--or better than--the core concerns approach. We …


Using Mindfulness Practice To Work With Emotions, Deborah Calloway Jan 2010

Using Mindfulness Practice To Work With Emotions, Deborah Calloway

Nevada Law Journal

The most important point to understand is that working with and understanding our own emotional reactions is an essential prerequisite to working skillfully with emotionally charged individuals in disputes. Training in “mediation techniques” designed to help us recognize and work with emotions in the mediation and negotiation context will not work unless we have practiced working with our own emotions consistently in our ordinary lives. Otherwise, in the heat of the moment during a negotiation or mediation, we are likely to forget every technique we have learned. Habitual patterns of behavior simply take hold.

This article seeks to provide some …


Adequate (Non)Provocation And Heat Of Passion As Excuse Not Justification, Reid Griffith Fontaine Oct 2009

Adequate (Non)Provocation And Heat Of Passion As Excuse Not Justification, Reid Griffith Fontaine

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

For a number of reasons, including the complicated psychological makeup of reactive homicide, the heat of passion defense has remained subject to various points of confusion. One persistent issue of disagreement has been the justificatory versus excusatory nature of the defense. In this Article, I highlight and categorize a series of varied American homicide cases in which the applicability of heat of passion was supported although adequate provocation (or significant provocation by the victim) was absent. The cases are organized to illustrate how common law heat of passion may apply in instances in which there is no actual provocation or …


The Values Of Interdisciplinarity In Homicide Law Reform, Robert Weisberg Oct 2009

The Values Of Interdisciplinarity In Homicide Law Reform, Robert Weisberg

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Professor Reid Fontaine's article, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not Justification, makes a convincing case for treating heat of passion wholly as an excuse not a justification, as the only sensible way to comprehend its various forms. In doing so, Professor Fontaine stimulates further thinking about heat of passion doctrine, along two dimensions.


Unjustified: The Practical Irrelevance Of The Justification/Excuse Distinction, Gabriel J. Chin Oct 2009

Unjustified: The Practical Irrelevance Of The Justification/Excuse Distinction, Gabriel J. Chin

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In recent decades, the distinction between justification and excuse defenses has been a favorite topic of theorists of philosophy and criminal law. Notwithstanding the impressive intellectual efforts devoted to the task, no single scholar or viewpoint appears to be on the verge of generating practical consensus about the concepts of justification and excuse, categorization of the defenses, or categorization of difficult individual cases. This Essay suggests that none of these goals can be usefully advanced through the justification/excuse distinction.


Misunderstanding Provocation, Samuel H. Pillsbury Oct 2009

Misunderstanding Provocation, Samuel H. Pillsbury

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Provocation is and always has been a compromise rule whose success depends on its ability to appeal to all ideological constituencies, and therefore will always-as long as it lasts-resist the final categorization that this question seeks. As long as provocation involves an inquiry into reasonableness, it will include considerations of justification. As long as it provides for mitigation of punishment based on the difficulty of resisting temptations to violence inspired by strong emotion, it will speak to considerations of excuse.


How Not To Argue That Reasonable Provocation Is Not An Excuse, Peter K. Westen Oct 2009

How Not To Argue That Reasonable Provocation Is Not An Excuse, Peter K. Westen

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Reid Fontaine draws two conclusions regarding the partial defense to murder of reasonable provocation-one regarding its substantive content, the other regarding its formal classification…. I agree with both of Fontaine's two conclusions, and, indeed, I have previously written to that effect. Unfortunately, while I agree with Fontaine's conclusions, I do not think he adequately supports them.


On Passion's Potential To Undermine Rationality: A Reply, Reid Griffith Fontaine Oct 2009

On Passion's Potential To Undermine Rationality: A Reply, Reid Griffith Fontaine

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Reply is organized into several sections. Following the Introduction, I respond to my six distinguished commentators. In Section II, I consider Professor Chin's concern that the distinction between justification and excuse bears no practical relevance for the criminal law. In Section III, I respond to Professor Baron's argument that reasonable mistake of fact is consistent with justification-a view, she observes, that is generally reflected in the criminal law. Building on the discussion of whether mistake and justification are compatible, Section IV addresses Professor Pillsbury's treatment of heat of passion as a hybrid defense that uniquely incorporates components of both …


The Provocation Defense And The Nature Of Justification, Marcia Baron Oct 2009

The Provocation Defense And The Nature Of Justification, Marcia Baron

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In this Essay, I evaluate the evidence of "adequate nonprovocation” that Fontaine puts forward to show that the heat of passion defense is decidedly an excuse (more precisely, a partial excuse). I will be focusing my remarks on the traditional heat of passion defense.


The Irreducibly Normative Nature Of Provocation/Passion, Stephen J. Morse Oct 2009

The Irreducibly Normative Nature Of Provocation/Passion, Stephen J. Morse

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

I agree with Professor Fontaine that provocation/passion is best interpreted as a partial excuse, but the ground for my conclusion is normative and not analytic. Indeed, I fear that he has not made the analytic case in large part because he begs a question about failed justifications that has only a normative and not an analytic answer. This Essay first briefly provides my own understanding of provocation/ passion. In the course of doing so, I address Professor Fontaine's argument that provocation/passion should also be applied to people with provocation interpretational bias. I then turn to why Fontaine's case for …


Victims, “Closure,” And The Sociology Of Emotion, Susan A. Bandes Apr 2009

Victims, “Closure,” And The Sociology Of Emotion, Susan A. Bandes

Law and Contemporary Problems

Bandes discusses the polarizing function of victim impact statements used in the context of the death penalty. The use of victim impact statements is justified in order to promote closure for the victim, but it's unclear what psychological closure can be accomplished from the formal litigation process. Even if victim impact statements do help their authors, in the context of the death penalty the authors are family members of the victim, not the direct victim, and Bandes questions whether it's important to further their interests at the expense of the interests of the defendant. The only recourse for the jury …


Polarization: The Role Of Emotions In Reconciliation Efforts, Meghan Clarke Apr 2009

Polarization: The Role Of Emotions In Reconciliation Efforts, Meghan Clarke

Law and Contemporary Problems

Clarke points out some strategies that have been used in the Collaborative Change Approach to group-conflict resolution that are designed to help depolarize the competing sides' stances toward one another. In order to try to break down the hostility between the groups, Clarke brings together each identity or stakeholder group in order to share with one another why each group cares passionately about the issue. Clarke provides the example of a groundfishery conflict that involved recreational fishermen, commercial fishermen, environmentalists, researchers, and government officials. The interests of each of these groups conflicted, but no group had morally problematic motivations or …


Emotional State And Localized Norms: A Reply, Clare Huntington Jan 2009

Emotional State And Localized Norms: A Reply, Clare Huntington

Faculty Scholarship

This piece is a response to Emory Law professor Martha Albertson Fineman's comments on Professor Huntington's Article "Familial Norms and Morality, 59 Emory L.J 1103 (2010).


Emotional Common Sense As Constitutional Law, Terry A. Maroney Jan 2009

Emotional Common Sense As Constitutional Law, Terry A. Maroney

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In Gonzales v. Carhart the Supreme Court invoked post-abortion regret to justify a ban on a particular abortion procedure. The Court was proudly folk-psychological, representing its observations about women's emotional experiences as "self-evident." That such observations could drive critical legal determinations was, apparently, even more self-evident, as it received no mention at all. Far from being sui generis, Carhart reflects a previously unidentified norm permeating constitutional jurisprudence: reliance on what this Article coins "emotional common sense." Emotional common sense is what one unreflectively thinks she knows about the emotions. A species of common sense, it seems obvious and universal to …


Marking The Path Of The Law, Stephen Ellmann Jan 2009

Marking The Path Of The Law, Stephen Ellmann

Articles & Chapters

This article, published in South Africa's Constitutional Court Review, focuses on the Constitutional Court of South Africa in order to discuss the nature of constitutional judging more generally. Looking to Brown v. Board of Education as an example, it argues that technical skill – though obviously important – is not the highest virtue of the constitutional judge, and that a central attribute of constitutional judging is commitment to the values of the constitution. But commitment to values is more than a matter of rational assent. As everyday experience and neurological evidence teach us, commitment naturally and unavoidably involves the judge’s …


Lawyer As Emotional Laborer, Sofia Yakren Oct 2008

Lawyer As Emotional Laborer, Sofia Yakren

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Prevailing norms of legal practice teach lawyers to detach their independent moral judgments from their professional performance-to advocate zealously for their clients while remaining morally unaccountable agents of those clients' causes. Although these norms have been subjected to prominent critiques by legal ethicists, this Article analyzes them instead through the lens of "emotional labor," a sociological theory positing that workers required to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance mandated by organizational rules face substantial psychological risks. By subordinating their personal feelings and values to displays of zealous advocacy on behalf of others, lawyers, too, may …


Engaging Capital Emotions, Douglas A. Berman, Stephanos Bibas Jan 2008

Engaging Capital Emotions, Douglas A. Berman, Stephanos Bibas

All Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, is about to decide whether the Eighth Amendment forbids capital punishment for child rape. Commentators are aghast, viewing this as a vengeful recrudescence of emotion clouding sober, rational criminal justice policy. To their minds, emotion is distracting. To ours, however, emotion is central to understand the death penalty. Descriptively, emotions help to explain many features of our death-penalty jurisprudence. Normatively, emotions are central to why we punish, and denying or squelching them risks prompting vigilantism and other unhealthy outlets for this normal human reaction. The emotional case for the death penalty for child …


Diverse Conceptions Of Emotions In Risk Regulation, Peter H. Huang Jan 2008

Diverse Conceptions Of Emotions In Risk Regulation, Peter H. Huang

Publications

No abstract provided.


The Emotional Juror, Todd E. Pettys Dec 2007

The Emotional Juror, Todd E. Pettys

Todd E. Pettys

Addressing the dichotomy often drawn between emotions and rationality, I argue that, while emotions sometimes exert undesirable influences in the courtroom, there are a variety of ways in which emotions aid rational decision-making by jurors.


The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology In Legal Deliberation And Negotiation, Erin Ryan Jan 2005

The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology In Legal Deliberation And Negotiation, Erin Ryan

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Risk Realization, Emotion, And Policy Making, Chris Guthrie Jan 2004

Risk Realization, Emotion, And Policy Making, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In their study of terrorism and SARS, Professor Feigenson and his colleagues report "significant positive correlations between people's risk perceptions and their negative affect." In their review of the judgment and decision-making literature, Professor Slovic and his colleagues document the interplay between reason and emotion in assessing risk. And in the context of a soldier's concerns for himself and his family, Professor Moran provides a powerful narrative of fear. But what happens when such threats are actually realized? Do we accurately predict the emotional impact of such events? Or are there meaningful and predictable differences between the feelings we forecast …


Shedding A Tear, William I. Miller Jan 2004

Shedding A Tear, William I. Miller

Articles

The tale that follows is also one of great gender anxiety, and it is true.


What's Love Got To Do With It?, Susan Bandes Oct 2001

What's Love Got To Do With It?, Susan Bandes

William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice

No abstract provided.


Law, Self-Pollution, And The Management Of Social Anxiety, Geoffrey P. Miller Jan 2001

Law, Self-Pollution, And The Management Of Social Anxiety, Geoffrey P. Miller

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

This article considers the anxieties about masturbation and spermatorrhoea from the standpoint of cultural-legal analysis. Seen from this perspective, the worries about masturbation provided an object onto which social anxieties could be displaced and thereby managed. Norm entrepreneurs who played on public fears manipulated basic cultural polarities in order to present masturbation and spermatorrhoea as objects of horror and disgust-things that needed to be expelled, if possible, from the body social.


Not Interaction But Melding - The "Russian Dressing" Theory Of Emotions: An Explanation Of The Phenomenology Of Emotions And Rationality With Suggested Related Maxims For Judges And Other Legal Decision Makers, Peter Brandon Bayer Jan 2001

Not Interaction But Melding - The "Russian Dressing" Theory Of Emotions: An Explanation Of The Phenomenology Of Emotions And Rationality With Suggested Related Maxims For Judges And Other Legal Decision Makers, Peter Brandon Bayer

Scholarly Works

Even after centuries of contrary philosophy and psychology, many commentators, jurisprudes, and law makers insist that emotions have no legitimate place in most legal decision making. This recalcitrance, of course, is misplaced in light of the powerful body of theory explaining that without emotions, decisions, including matters of law and policy, simply cannot be made. Judges, along with all societal actors, must disabuse themselves of the fallacious belief that emotions obstruct or obscure reason in all endeavors, particularly morality, law, and justice.

The project of truly apprehending emotions, however, requires more than appreciating that they play a crucial role in …


Sentimental Stereotypes: Emotional Expectations For High-And Low-Status Group Members, Larissa Z. Tiedens, Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Batja Mesquita Jan 2000

Sentimental Stereotypes: Emotional Expectations For High-And Low-Status Group Members, Larissa Z. Tiedens, Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Batja Mesquita

Articles

Three vignette studies examined stereotypes of the emotions associated with high- and low-status group members. In Study 1a, participants believed that in negative situations, high-status people feel more angry than sad or guilty and that low-status people feel more sad and guilty than angry. Study 1b showed that in response to positive outcomes, high-status people are expected to feel more pride and low-status people are expected to feel more appreciation. Study 2 showed that people also infer status from emotions: Angry and proud people are thought of as high status, whereas sad, guilty, and appreciative people are considered low status. …


Reasons Within Passions: Emotions And Intentions In Property Rights Bargaining, Peter H. Huang Jan 2000

Reasons Within Passions: Emotions And Intentions In Property Rights Bargaining, Peter H. Huang

Publications

This article discusses the role of emotions (or feelings or affects) in property rights bargaining. Real world people choose bargaining strategies based upon not only rational calculations, but also their gut feelings. This article considers the impact of anger and shame on bargaining over property rights and the Coase theorem. Such emotions may depend on beliefs (expectations or assessments) about whether particular strategic decisions should or will occur. Such beliefs can be viewed as attributions over the intentions of others.


Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory Of Litigation Behavior, Chris Guthrie Jan 1999

Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory Of Litigation Behavior, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Legal scholars have developed two dominant theories of litigation behavior: the Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement,which is based on expected utility theory, and the Framing Theory of Litigation, which is based on prospect theory. While Professor Guthrie acknowledges the explanatory power of these theories, he argues that they are flawed because they portray litigants solely as calculating creatures. These theories disregard any role emotion might play in litigation decision making. Guthrie proposes a mplementary theory-the Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior-that views litigants as both calculating and emotional creatures. With roots in economics, cognitive psychology, and social psychology, the …