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Articles 31 - 60 of 259

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Liability Of Foreign Governments Under United States Antitrust Laws, James F. Ponsoldt, Jesse Stone Apr 2015

The Liability Of Foreign Governments Under United States Antitrust Laws, James F. Ponsoldt, Jesse Stone

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


International Implications Of The 1982 Merger Guidelines, Vincent Draa Apr 2015

International Implications Of The 1982 Merger Guidelines, Vincent Draa

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


Antitrust In Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, John M. Newman Jan 2015

Antitrust In Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, John M. Newman

Articles

"Zero-price markets," wherein firms set the price of their goods or services at so, have exploded in quantity and variety. Creative content, software, search functions, social media platforms, mobile applications, travel booking, navigation and mapping systems, and myriad other goods and services are now widely distributed at zero prices. But despite the exponential increase in the volume of zero-price products being consumed, antitrust institutions and analysts have failed to provide an adequate response to markets without prices.

Modern antitrust law is firmly grounded in neoclassical economics, which is in turn centered on price theory. Steeped in price theory, preeminent antitrust …


Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, And Economics, George A. Hay, Gregory J. Werden Dec 2014

Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, And Economics, George A. Hay, Gregory J. Werden

George A. Hay

The legality of a horizontal merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act turns on a reckoning of its social costs and benefits. This paper reviews what economics has to say about that reckoning and explores the relationship between economic learning and merger law and policy.


Lessons From At&T'S Flop: How To Grow In The Technology Industry While Avoiding Section 7 Antitrust Obstacles, John Soma Jan 2014

Lessons From At&T'S Flop: How To Grow In The Technology Industry While Avoiding Section 7 Antitrust Obstacles, John Soma

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.


Merger Review By The Federal Communications Commission: Comcast-Nbc Universal, Christopher S. Yoo Jan 2014

Merger Review By The Federal Communications Commission: Comcast-Nbc Universal, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

The Communications Act of 1934 created a dual review process in which mergers in the communications industry are reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as well as the antitrust authorities. Commentators have criticized dual review not only as costly and redundant, but also as subject to substantive and procedural abuse. The process of clearing the 2011 Comcast-NBC Universal merger provides a useful case study to examine whether such concerns are justified. A review of the empirical context reveals that the FCC intervened even though the relevant markets were not structured in a way that would ordinarily raise anticompetitive concerns. …


Competition At The Teller's Window?: Altered Antitrust Standards For Banks And Other Financial Institutions, Joseph P. Bauer, Earl W. Kintner Oct 2013

Competition At The Teller's Window?: Altered Antitrust Standards For Banks And Other Financial Institutions, Joseph P. Bauer, Earl W. Kintner

Joseph P. Bauer

Congressional and judicial attitudes towards the banking industry have reflected two, sometimes conflicting, goals-the maintenance of the solvency of financial institutions to protect the interests of depositors, other creditors and the economy at large; and the promotion of competition among these institutions and in the economy. The advancement of these goals has been reflected in the application of the antitrust laws to the industry. For the most part, the Sherman and Clayton Acts apply with the same force and scope to financial institutions as to other industries. In some cases, however, the goal of institutional protection is favored, and the …


A Simplified Approach To Tying Arrangements: A Legal And Economic Analysis, Joseph P. Bauer Oct 2013

A Simplified Approach To Tying Arrangements: A Legal And Economic Analysis, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

Few types of antitrust conduct have received as much treatment from the Supreme Court as tying arrangements. This practice, which is unlawful per se when certain prerequisites are met, may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one product [the tying product] but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier. Notwithstanding this extensive Supreme Court attention, there is as much heat as light in this area. The doctrine that has developed is often unpredictable and frequently …


Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 Of The Clayton Act: Today's Law And Tomorrow's Legislation, Joseph P. Bauer Oct 2013

Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 Of The Clayton Act: Today's Law And Tomorrow's Legislation, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

Federal antitrust enforcement has undergone a radical transformation in the past decade. The change in enforcement patterns has been most noticeable in the area of merger law. The magnitude of this shift, the confusion that has characterized the case law accompanying it, and the increasing prominence of conglomerate mergers as a means to corporate expansion form the basis for this article. The primary source for regulation of mergers under the antitrust laws is section 7 of the Clayton Act, which proscribes those corporate acquisitions “where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such …


A Sight For Sore Eyes: The Seventh Circuit Correctly Interprets Section 12 Of The Clayton Act, Ryan Moore Sep 2013

A Sight For Sore Eyes: The Seventh Circuit Correctly Interprets Section 12 Of The Clayton Act, Ryan Moore

Seventh Circuit Review

In order to hail a defendant into federal court, a plaintiff must establish personal jurisdiction and venue. Under general principles of federal law, personal jurisdiction is proper whenever the defendant would be amenable to suit under the laws of the state in which the federal court sits. And venue is proper in any district where the defendant "resides" (i.e., is subject to personal jurisdiction). Section 12 of the Clayton Act, however, supplements these general principles. It has a liberal service-of-process provision that allows personal jurisdiction in any federal district court in the nation. But venue is proper only in the …


Retaliatorily Discharged Employees’ Standing To Sue Under The Antitrust Laws, Gary Shaw May 2013

Retaliatorily Discharged Employees’ Standing To Sue Under The Antitrust Laws, Gary Shaw

Gary M. Shaw

No abstract provided.


Pfizer, Inc. V. India Foreign Sovereigns’ Standing To Sue For Treble Damages, Gary Shaw May 2013

Pfizer, Inc. V. India Foreign Sovereigns’ Standing To Sue For Treble Damages, Gary Shaw

Gary M. Shaw

No abstract provided.


A Response To Commissioner Wright's Proposed Policy Statement Regarding Unfair Methods Of Competition, Maurice Stucke Apr 2013

A Response To Commissioner Wright's Proposed Policy Statement Regarding Unfair Methods Of Competition, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

Federal Trade Commissioner Joshua Wright recently proposed a new legal standard to evaluate “unfair methods of competition” under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a) (2012).

This essay raises several concerns. First, Wright’s proposed legal standard does not go as far as Congress intended. Moreover it conflates unfair methods of competition with acts and practices that significantly harm consumer welfare. A second concern is that the proposed legal standard goes the other direction and permits conduct that is otherwise illegal under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Third, the proposed standard reduces accuracy, is hard to administer …


From Microsoft To Google: Intellectual Property, High Technology, And The Reorientation Of U.S. Competition Policy And Practice, William E. Kovacic Mar 2013

From Microsoft To Google: Intellectual Property, High Technology, And The Reorientation Of U.S. Competition Policy And Practice, William E. Kovacic

Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Pay-To-Play: The Impact Of Group Purchasing Organizations On Drug Shortages, Christian Deroo Jan 2013

Pay-To-Play: The Impact Of Group Purchasing Organizations On Drug Shortages, Christian Deroo

American University Business Law Review

No abstract provided.


Section 5 And The Innovation Curve, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2013

Section 5 And The Innovation Curve, Daniel A. Crane

Book Chapters

the ftc’s authority to use Section 5 of the FTC Act to reach anticompetitive conduct that would not be illegal under the Sherman or Clayton Acts has been much discussed in recent years, particularly in conjunction with the FTC’s enforcement action against Intel. As of this writing, a Section 5 action against Google seems imminent.


Antitrust Law And Economic Theory: Finding A Balance, Edward D. Cavanagh Jan 2013

Antitrust Law And Economic Theory: Finding A Balance, Edward D. Cavanagh

Faculty Publications

Over the past forty years, the federal courts have relied more and more on economic theory to inform their antitrust analyses. Economic theory has indeed provided guidance with respect to antitrust issues and assisted the courts in reaching rational outcomes. At the same time, infusion of economic evidence into antitrust cases has made these cases more complex, lengthier, more expensive to litigate, and less predictable.

This Article argues that courts need to restore the balance between facts and economic theory in undertaking antitrust analysis. The problem is not that judges and juries cannot reach good outcomes in antitrust cases, but …


Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, Maurice Stucke Mar 2012

Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

Antitrust policy today is an anomaly. On the one hand, antitrust is thriving internationally. On the other hand, antitrust’s influence has diminished domestically. Over the past thirty years, there have been fewer antitrust investigations and private actions. Today the Supreme Court complains about antitrust suits, and places greater faith in the antitrust function being subsumed in a regulatory framework. So what happened to the antitrust movement in the United States?

Two import factors contributed to antitrust policy’s domestic decline. The first is salience, especially the salience of the U.S. antitrust goals. In the past thirty years, enforcers and courts abandoned …


Antitrust Law And Virtual Worlds, Marques Tracy Jan 2012

Antitrust Law And Virtual Worlds, Marques Tracy

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Much has been written about the law in virtual worlds, though the focus has been on the more obviously applicable areas of the law, namely property, copyright, and crime. Indeed, in the few instances when disputes involving virtual worlds have reached a federal court, the focus has usually been on contract or copyright claims. It is the purpose of this paper to argue for the use of the antitrust laws as set forth in sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and possibly the Clayton Act, to forestall the anticompetitive behavior of virtual world developers. First, this paper will …


Antitrust Review Of The At&T/T-Mobile Transaction, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes Dec 2011

Antitrust Review Of The At&T/T-Mobile Transaction, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

Scholarly Works

In this Essay, we review AT&T Inc.’s proposed $39 billion acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc., under federal merger law, under the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and with a focus on possible remedies. We find, under a rule of law approach, that the proposed acquisition is presumptively anticompetitive, and the merging parties in their public disclosures have failed to overcome this presumption. Next we find that under the Merger Guidelines, there is reason to believe that the transaction may result in higher prices to consumers under several different plausible theories. Finally, we turn …


Crony Capitalism And Antitrust, Maurice Stucke Oct 2011

Crony Capitalism And Antitrust, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

In August 2011, the United States brought a landmark antitrust lawsuit to prevent the merger of two of the nation’s four largest mobile wireless telecommunications services providers, AT&T Inc. and T‑Mobile USA, Inc. But why are so many elected officials asking the Obama administration to intercede in the Department of Justice’s lawsuit to force a settlement? Why are they approving a merger that would likely lead to higher prices, fewer jobs, less innovation, and higher taxes for their constituents? Does it have anything to do with the money they are receiving from AT&T and T-Mobile?

This Essay examines the recent …


Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, Maurice E. Stucke Sep 2011

Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, Maurice E. Stucke

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust policy today is an anomaly. On the one hand, antitrust is thriving internationally. On the other hand, antitrust’s influence has diminished domestically. Over the past thirty years, there have been fewer antitrust investigations and private actions. Today the Supreme Court complains about antitrust suits, and places greater faith in the antitrust function being subsumed in a regulatory framework. So what happened to the antitrust movement in the United States?

Two import factors contributed to antitrust policy’s domestic decline. The first is salience, especially the salience of the U.S. antitrust goals. In the past thirty years, enforcers and courts abandoned …


Mixed Agendas And Government Regulation Of Business: Can We Clean Up The Mess?, Thomas M. Arnold, Jerry L. Stevens May 2011

Mixed Agendas And Government Regulation Of Business: Can We Clean Up The Mess?, Thomas M. Arnold, Jerry L. Stevens

University of Richmond Law Review

The purpose of this article is first to navigate through variousperspectives on government regulation in an effort to develop areasonable and consistent view for regulatory proposals. Parts II and III of this article provide a brief outline of our current regulatory environment and its evolution. Part IV presents arguments for an efficient regulation of business by using market based regulation with a separation of efficiency and equity issues, where feasible. Examples of this regulatory approach appear throughout the article along with suggested reforms.


Antitrust Review Of The At&T/T-Mobile Transaction, Maurice E. Stucke, Allen Grunes Jan 2011

Antitrust Review Of The At&T/T-Mobile Transaction, Maurice E. Stucke, Allen Grunes

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, we review AT&T Inc.’s proposed $39 billion acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc., under federal merger law, under the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and with a focus on possible remedies. We find, under a rule of law approach, that the proposed acquisition is presumptively anticompetitive, and the merging parties in their public disclosures have failed to overcome this presumption. Next we find that under the Merger Guidelines, there is reason to believe that the transaction may result in higher prices to consumers under several different plausible theories. Finally, we turn …


Toward A Unified Theory Of Exclusionary Vertical Restraints, Daniel A. Crane, Graciela Miralles Jan 2011

Toward A Unified Theory Of Exclusionary Vertical Restraints, Daniel A. Crane, Graciela Miralles

Articles

The law of exclusionary vertical restraints-contractual or other business relationships between vertically related firms-is deeply confused and inconsistent in both the United States and the European Union. A variety of vertical practices, including predatory pricing, tying, exclusive dealing, price discrimination, and bundling, are treated very differently based on formalistic distinctions that bear no relationship to the practices' exclusionary potential. We propose a comprehensive, unified test for all exclusionary vertical restraints that centers on two factors: foreclosure and substantiality. We then assign economic content to these factors. A restraint forecloses if it denies equally efficient rivals a reasonable opportunity to make …


The New United States Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Devolution, Evolution, Or Counterrevolution?, Thomas J. Horton Dec 2010

The New United States Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Devolution, Evolution, Or Counterrevolution?, Thomas J. Horton

Thomas J. Horton

No abstract provided.


The Behavior Of Justice Douglas In Federal Tax Cases, Marjorie A. Silver, Bernard Wolfman, Jonathan L. F. Silver Dec 2010

The Behavior Of Justice Douglas In Federal Tax Cases, Marjorie A. Silver, Bernard Wolfman, Jonathan L. F. Silver

Marjorie A. Silver

No abstract provided.


Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs Oct 2010

Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs

William & Mary Law Review

Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophisticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed, economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. competition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limitations of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnerable to error. The fear of …


Toward A Better Competition Policy For The Media: The Challenge Of Developing Antitrust Policies That Support The Media Sector's Unique Role In Our Democracy, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes Nov 2009

Toward A Better Competition Policy For The Media: The Challenge Of Developing Antitrust Policies That Support The Media Sector's Unique Role In Our Democracy, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

Scholarly Works

It is difficult to formulate meaningful competition policy when there is a fierce debate over the current competitiveness of the media industry. After addressing the importance of the marketplace of ideas in our democracy, our article examines the current state of the media industry, including the response of traditional media to audience declines, the growth of new media, the impact of media consolidation (including its impact on minority and women ownership), and the role of the Internet. In response to recent calls for liberalizing cross-ownership rules to protect traditional media, our article outlines why conventional antitrust policy is difficult to …


Concentrated Media Is Something We Can't Ignore: A Response To Speaker Pelosi, Maurice Stucke Mar 2009

Concentrated Media Is Something We Can't Ignore: A Response To Speaker Pelosi, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

This essay briefly responds to a request that the U.S. Department of Justice should give San Francisco Bay Area newspapers more leeway under the federal antitrust laws to merge or consolidate their business operations. The essay agrees with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's concerns that a strong, free, and independent press is vital to our democracy and in informing our citizens, especially news organizations that devote resources to gathering news. As the essay explains, the antidote is not to weaken the antitrust laws to enable large media conglomerates to become even bigger. Instead, the health of the marketplace of ideas depends …