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Constitutional Law

Series

2003

Institution
Keyword
Publication

Articles 181 - 192 of 192

Full-Text Articles in Law

Remarks Of Seth P. Waxman At The Memorial Observance For Justice Byron R. White, United States Supreme Court, Seth P. Waxman Jan 2003

Remarks Of Seth P. Waxman At The Memorial Observance For Justice Byron R. White, United States Supreme Court, Seth P. Waxman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Members of the Court, members of the family, and friends of Justice White- Alone among today's speakers, I met Justice White only late in his life. Growing up in the law, my relationship with him was the one many kids today have with Michael Jordan - I wanted to be "like White" -like the kind of man he was. I still have that aspiration. Like Byron White, I served in the Department of Justice and was altered forever by that honorable institution. And - like Justice White, in my own lesser way, I strove within the walls of this institution …


Non-Judicial Review, Mark V. Tushnet Jan 2003

Non-Judicial Review, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Professor Mark Tushnet challenges the view that democratic constitutionalism requires courts to dominate constitutional review. He provides three diverse examples of non-judicial institutions involved in constitutional review and examines the institutional incentives to get the analysis" right." Through these examples, Professor Tushnet argues that non-judicial actors may perform constitutional review that is accurate, effective, and capable of gaining public acceptance. Professor Tushnet recommends that scholars conduct further research into non-judicial review to determine whether ultimately more or less judicial review is necessary in constitutional democracies.


New Forms Of Judicial Review And The Persistence Of Rights - And Democracy-Based Worries, Mark V. Tushnet Jan 2003

New Forms Of Judicial Review And The Persistence Of Rights - And Democracy-Based Worries, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Recent developments in judicial review have raised the possibility that the debate over judicial supremacy versus legislative supremacy might be transformed into one about differing institutions to implement judicial review. Rather than posing judicial review against legislative supremacy, the terms of the debate might be over having institutions designed to exercise forms of judicial review that accommodate both legislative supremacy and judicial implementation of constitutional limits. After examining some of these institutional developments in Canada, South Africa, and Great Britain, this Article asks whether these accommodations, which attempt to pursue a middle course, have characteristic instabilities that will in the …


Self-Historicism, Mark V. Tushnet Jan 2003

Self-Historicism, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Among the contributors to this symposium, I may be the person with the longest acquaintance with Sandy Levinson. I want to begin, therefore, with a recollection of the period of my earliest contacts with Sandy - a recollection that, as I hope to show, has some bearing on some of the aspects of Sandy's work that most interest me . . . I use these examples to introduce an argument connected to Sandy's longstanding interest in historical memory. The casebook of which he is a co-author is organized historically-relentlessly so, I would put it, to the point where I personally …


Their Liberties, Our Security: Democracy And Double Standards, David Cole Jan 2003

Their Liberties, Our Security: Democracy And Double Standards, David Cole

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Some maintain that a "double standard" for citizens and noncitizens is perfectly justified. The attacks of September 11 were perpetrated by nineteen Arab noncitizens, and we have reason to believe that other Arab noncitizens are associated with the attackers and will seek to attack again. Citizens, it is said, are presumptively loyal; noncitizens are not. Thus, it is not irrational to focus on Arab noncitizens. Moreover, on a normative level, if citizens and noncitizens were treated identically, citizenship itself might be rendered meaningless. The very essence of war involves the drawing of lines in the sand between citizens of our …


The Federal Court System: A Principal-Agent Perspective, Tracey E. George, Albert H. Yoon Jan 2003

The Federal Court System: A Principal-Agent Perspective, Tracey E. George, Albert H. Yoon

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Professor Merrill ably demonstrates that Supreme Court decisions should be examined as the product of an inherently political institution. Observers who assert that Justices are best understood as prophets of the law are practicing an intellectual sleight of hand that allows them to ignore the non­ doctrinal factors that affect judicial behavior. Such an effort is understandable. The Court is a much more complicated subject if its rulings reflect nonlegal factors as well as legal ones. The desire, however, to ignore the true character of the Court produces accounts of its behavior that are inadequate, incorrect, or wholly without content. …


Beyond Accountability, Lisa Schultz Bressman Jan 2003

Beyond Accountability, Lisa Schultz Bressman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that efforts to square the administrative state with the constitutional structure have become too fixated on the concern for political accountability. As a result, those efforts have overlooked an important obstacle to agency legitimacy: the concern for administrative arbitrariness. Such thinking is evident in the prevailing model of the administrative state, which seeks to legitimate agencies by placing their policy decisions firmly under the control of the one elected official responsive to the entire nation-the President. This Article contends that the "presidential control" model cannot legitimate agencies because the model rests on a mistaken assumption about the …


Eldred And Lochner: Copyright Term Extension And Intellectual Property As Constitutional Property, Paul M. Schwartz, William Michael Treanor Jan 2003

Eldred And Lochner: Copyright Term Extension And Intellectual Property As Constitutional Property, Paul M. Schwartz, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Since the ratification of the constitution, intellectual property law in the United States has always been, in part, constitutional law. Among the enumerated powers that Article I of the Constitution vests in Congress is the power to create certain intellectual property rights. To a remarkable extent, scholars who have examined the Constitution's Copyright Clause have reached a common position. With striking unanimity, these scholars have called for aggressive judicial review of the constitutionality of congressional legislation in this area. The champions of this position--we refer to them as the IP Restrictors--represent a remarkable array of constitutional and intellectual property scholars. …


Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence V. Texas, Randy E. Barnett Jan 2003

Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence V. Texas, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This brief article explains why Lawrence v. Texas could be a revolutionary case if the Supreme Court follows Justice Kennedy's reasoning in the future. As in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justice Kennedy finds a statute to be unconstitutional, not because it infringes a right to privacy (which is mentioned but once), but because it infringes "liberty" (a word he uses at least twenty-five times). In addition, Justice Kennedy's opinion protects liberty without any finding that the liberty being restricted is a "fundamental right." Instead, having identified the conduct prohibited as liberty, he turns to the purported justification for the …


The Environmental Commerce Clause, Christine A. Klein Jan 2003

The Environmental Commerce Clause, Christine A. Klein

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article studies every commerce clause decision of the modem Supreme Court that involves the scope of governmental authority to regulate the use of natural resources. These decisions comprise what I will call the environmental commerce clause -- the Court's interpretation of the limits mandated by the commerce clause upon federal and state legislation protecting natural resources. Overall, the Court has been limiting the scope of the affirmative commerce clause while simultaneously expanding the reach of the dormant commerce clause. As a result, both federal and state efforts to protect the natural environment have been rendered constitutionally suspect.

This study …


Constitutional Legitimacy, Randy E. Barnett Jan 2003

Constitutional Legitimacy, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The problem of constitutional legitimacy is to establish why anyone should obey the command of a constitutionally-valid law. A lawmaking system is legitimate if there is a prima facie duty to obey the laws it makes. Neither "consent of the governed" nor "benefits received" justifies obedience. Rather, a prima facie duty of obedience exists either (a) if there is actual unanimous consent to the jurisdiction of the lawmaker or, in the absence of consent, (b) f laws are made by procedures which assure that they are not unjust. In the absence of unanimous consent, a written constitution should be assessed …


The National Security Presidency In Constitutional Context: Reflections On Terrorism And The Presidency From The Last Ten Years, James E. Baker Jan 2003

The National Security Presidency In Constitutional Context: Reflections On Terrorism And The Presidency From The Last Ten Years, James E. Baker

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this time of terrorist threat, there is no more important institution to study than the national security presidency. That is because the president is singularly situated to command the instruments to counter terrorism. He is also singularly situated to ensure that such instruments are used effectively, lawfully, and in a manner consistent with constitutional values. I believe I have a duty, based on where I have been, to help others observe and understand the institution of the presidency. I do so because I want the national security presidency to succeed in providing for our physical security and in upholding …