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Articles 1 - 11 of 11

Full-Text Articles in Law

The (Un)Favorable Judgment Of History: Deportation Hearings, The Palmer Raids, And The Meaning Of History, Harlan G. Cohen Oct 2003

The (Un)Favorable Judgment Of History: Deportation Hearings, The Palmer Raids, And The Meaning Of History, Harlan G. Cohen

Scholarly Works

As Americans respond to the events of September 11, 2001, they are being forced to contemplate their place in American history-past, present, and future. This has become particularly stark in the fight over secret deportation hearings. Following September 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that the deportation hearings of "special interest" aliens would be closed to the public. Applying Richmond Newspapers's two-pronged logic-and-experience test, the Third and Sixth Circuits subsequently split over the constitutionality of the blanket closure. At the heart of their disagreement was the scarce history of deportation hearings and whether such hearings had been closed in the …


Speaking Outdoors, Lewis H. Larue Jul 2003

Speaking Outdoors, Lewis H. Larue

Scholarly Articles

Not available.


Marshall V Madison: The Supreme Court And Original Intent, 1803-1835, Gordon Lloyd Jul 2003

Marshall V Madison: The Supreme Court And Original Intent, 1803-1835, Gordon Lloyd

School of Public Policy Working Papers

Should the justices of the Supreme Court rely on “original intent” as the foundation for constitutional interpretation? Or should they be free to interpret the Constitution in light of hermeneutical approaches created by current philosophies of law? This essay examines the Marshall Court to determine whether its opinions take their bearings from the American Founding or instead rely on a philosophy of jurisprudence that can be separated from the Founding. The purposes of this essay are fourfold: 1) to provide a comprehensive account of the use of the Framers by the Marshall Court, 2) address the normative question of the …


Interpretative Equality As A Structural Imperative (Or 'Pucker Up And Settle This!'), Gary S. Lawson Jul 2003

Interpretative Equality As A Structural Imperative (Or 'Pucker Up And Settle This!'), Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

To serious students of the Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall's discussion of judicial review in Marbury v. Madisont was about judicial equality-the power of the courts, co-equal to the similar powers of the legislative and executive departments, to construe and apply the Constitution in the course of their duties. To less serious students of the Constitution, Marbury was about judicial supremacy-the supposedly paramount power of courts to interpret and apply the Constitution in a fashion that binds other legal actors, including the legislative and executive departments and state officials.


The Office Of The Oath, Patrick O. Gudridge Jan 2003

The Office Of The Oath, Patrick O. Gudridge

Articles

No abstract provided.


Constitutional Borrowing And Nonborrowing, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight Jan 2003

Constitutional Borrowing And Nonborrowing, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Constitutional Existence Conditions And Judicial Review, Matthew D. Adler, Michael C. Dorf Jan 2003

Constitutional Existence Conditions And Judicial Review, Matthew D. Adler, Michael C. Dorf

Faculty Scholarship

Although critics of judicial review sometimes call for making the entire Constitution nonjusticiable, many familiar norms of constitutional law state what we call "existence conditions" that are necessarily enforced by judicial actors charged with the responsibility of applying, and thus as a preliminary step, identifying, propositions of sub-constitutional law such as statutes. Article I, Section 7, which sets forth the procedures by which a bill becomes a law, is an example: a putative law that did not go through the Article I, Section 7 process and does not satisfy an alternative test for legal validity (such as the treaty-making provision …


Race Conscious Affirmative Action By Tax Exempt 501(C)(3) Corporations After Grutter And Gratz, David A. Brennen Jan 2003

Race Conscious Affirmative Action By Tax Exempt 501(C)(3) Corporations After Grutter And Gratz, David A. Brennen

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally acts as a legal limit on the permissible bounds of government action. Accordingly, public universities and other government entities are constitutionally prohibited from engaging in acts that violate equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court recently reinforced this point when it ruled, in two related cases, that public universities may consider the race of applicants when making admissions decisions, so long as an applicant's race does not amount to a deciding factor when granting admission. By its very terms, the constitutional limitation imposed by the Equal Protection Clause only directly …


Six Opinions By Mr. Justice Stevens: A New Methodology For Constitutional Cases?, Robert F. Nagel Jan 2003

Six Opinions By Mr. Justice Stevens: A New Methodology For Constitutional Cases?, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.


Are Foreign Nationals Entitled To The Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens?, David Cole Jan 2003

Are Foreign Nationals Entitled To The Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens?, David Cole

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Are foreign nationals entitled only to reduced rights and freedoms? The difficulty of the question is reflected in the deeply ambivalent approach of the Supreme Court, an ambivalence matched only by the alternately xenophobic and xenophilic attitude of the American public toward immigrants. On the one hand, the Court has insisted for more than a century that foreign nationals living among us are "persons" within the meaning of the Constitution, and are protected by those rights that the Constitution does not expressly reserve to citizens. Because the Constitution expressly limits to citizens only the rights to vote and to run …


Constitutional Legitimacy, Randy E. Barnett Jan 2003

Constitutional Legitimacy, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The problem of constitutional legitimacy is to establish why anyone should obey the command of a constitutionally-valid law. A lawmaking system is legitimate if there is a prima facie duty to obey the laws it makes. Neither "consent of the governed" nor "benefits received" justifies obedience. Rather, a prima facie duty of obedience exists either (a) if there is actual unanimous consent to the jurisdiction of the lawmaker or, in the absence of consent, (b) f laws are made by procedures which assure that they are not unjust. In the absence of unanimous consent, a written constitution should be assessed …