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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Other Educational Administration and Supervision
The Legal Impact Of Emerging Governance Models On Public Education And Its Office Holders, Robert A. Garda Jr., David Doty
The Legal Impact Of Emerging Governance Models On Public Education And Its Office Holders, Robert A. Garda Jr., David Doty
Robert A. Garda
The idea that changing the formal structure of governance can lead to better schools is rooted in American political and intellectual history. Politicians, career educators, parents, business leaders, and investors continue to wrangle over the control of public schools all across the country. With these battles for control have come more lawsuits, more laws, and more administrative regulations dictating the governance structures of educational institutions. Indeed, one could argue that, in recent years, debates over how schools and school districts should be governed have subsumed the curriculum debates over how and what children should be taught. Leadership matters, and therefore …
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …