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Other Educational Administration and Supervision Commons™
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- Arrow Theorem (1)
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- Condorcet cycling (1)
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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Other Educational Administration and Supervision
In Favor Of Hospitality-Management Education, Michael J. Tews, Hubert B. Van Hoof
In Favor Of Hospitality-Management Education, Michael J. Tews, Hubert B. Van Hoof
Hospitality Review
Despite the almost one-hundred-year history of hospitality-management education; the hundreds of well-established two-year, four-year, and graduate programs worldwide; and the hundreds of thousands of graduates those programs have prepared for careers in the industry, hospitality-management education’s merit and place in higher education are still questioned at times, to the dismay of hospitality educators the world over. This article delineates several features of hospitality management that make these programs valuable and unique and provides compelling arguments in its favor. The arguments include: 1) courses tailored to the hospitality industry, the world’s largest industry; 2) focus on small-business management as well as …
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …