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Full-Text Articles in Labor Relations

Unions And The Labor Market For Managers, John Dinardo, Kevin F. Hallock, Jörn-Steffen Pischke Jun 2017

Unions And The Labor Market For Managers, John Dinardo, Kevin F. Hallock, Jörn-Steffen Pischke

Kevin F Hallock

We examine the relationship between the employment and compensation of managers and CEOs and the presence of a unionized workforce. We develop a simple efficiency wage model, with a tradeoff between higher wages for workers and more monitoring, which requires more managers. The model also assumes rent sharing between workers, managers and the owners of the firm. Unions, by redistributing rents towards the workers, lead to lower employment and lower pay for managers. Using a variety of data sets, we examine the implications of the model for the relationship between the employment and wages of managers and unionization. We find …


The Value Of Stock Options To Non-Executive Employees, Kevin F. Hallock, Craig A. Olson Jun 2017

The Value Of Stock Options To Non-Executive Employees, Kevin F. Hallock, Craig A. Olson

Kevin F Hallock

This study empirically investigates the value employees place on stock options using information from the option exercise behavior of individuals. Employees hold options for another period if the value from holding them and reserving the right to exercise them later is higher than the value of exercising them immediately and collecting a profit equal to the stock price minus the exercise price. This simple model implies the hazard describing employee exercise behavior reveals information about the value to employees of holding options another time period. We show the parameters of this model are identified with data on multiple option grants …


Nonprofit Pay In A Competitive Market: Wage Penalty Or Premium?, Christian King, Gregory B. Lewis Jan 2017

Nonprofit Pay In A Competitive Market: Wage Penalty Or Premium?, Christian King, Gregory B. Lewis

Department of Nutrition and Health Sciences: Faculty Publications

Two competing theories argue that the nonprofit sector pays differently: Nonprofit employees may accept lower pay to be able to do meaningful work for a good cause, or they may earn higher pay due to nonprofit organizations’ tax exemptions and weaker incentives to hold down wages. To test these opposing expectations, we use the 2005-2013 American Community Surveys to examine pay differences among registered nurses working for nonprofit, for-profit, and public hospitals. We also test hypotheses that public and nonprofit hospitals have smaller pay disparities by gender, race, and relationship status. We find that pay is highest in nonprofit hospitals, …