Finance and Financial Management Commons^™

Executive Compensation And Firm Performance In New Zealand: The Role Of Employee Stock Option Plans, David K. Ding, Ya Eem Chea

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We examine the role of employee stock option plans (ESOPs) in mitigating agency problems in New Zealand firms. We find that ESOPs have a significant and positive effect on firm performance relative to their non-ESOP counterparts. This relation appears within a year from the first ESOP announcement, and for two to four years after the announcement. Our results show that ESOPs improve corporate performance by 10 times the cost of the ESOPs’ adoption in the first year of issue. The improvement persists for four years after the first issuance. These findings confirm the effectiveness of employee stock option plans for …

Corporate Social Responsibility And Ceo Risk-Taking Incentives, Zhichuan Li

Business Publications

We examine how firms adjust CEO risk-taking incentives in response to risk environments associated with their corporate social responsibility (CSR) standing. We find strong evidence that as a firm's CSR status improves (declines), increasing (decreasing) its risk-taking capacity, the firm responds by adjusting compensation contracts to increase (decrease) CEO risk-taking incentives (Vega). One channel of the adjustment is through stock option grants. Further analyses indicate that the positive CSR-Vega association is stronger in firms with better corporate governance and in industries where riskiness is more important. Our evidence indicates that firms are not passive in response to changes in CSR …

The Effects Of Ceo Dismissal Risk And Skills On Risky Corporate Decisions And Ceo Compensation, Son T. Dang

Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration

This dissertation consists of three distinct essays on the effects of CEO dismissal risk on M&A megadeal decisions, the association between CEO compensation and generalist managerial ability in the presence of CEO dismissal risk, and the alignment of the initial compensation of new CEOs following CEO dismissals with their managerial ability.

In Essay 1, I study the link between CEO dismissal risk and risky M&A decisions and find that higher-dismissal-risk CEOs engage in more M&A megadeals than their counterparts. Such megadeal transactions lead to lower acquirer post-M&A abnormal returns, suggesting that risky investment decisions are driven by CEOs’ career concerns. …

The Role Of Mutual Funds In Corporate Social Responsibility, Zhichuan Li, Saurin Patel, Srikanth Ramani

Business Publications

This paper examines the role of mutual funds in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using a fund-level, holdings-based CSR score, we find that CSR-friendly mutual funds improve firms’ CSR standings. This effect is more pronounced for firms with higher mutual fund ownership and stronger corporate governance. We further show that while CSR-friendly mutual funds have influence on almost all CSR categories, they focus on increasing CSR strengths rather than reducing CSR concerns. We also discover that CSR-friendly funds are more likely to vote in favor of CSR proposals, and that firms owned by CSR-friendly funds are more likely to link their …

Vega, Capital Ratios, And Real Estate Lending, Muna Alsheikh

Doctor of Business Administration Dissertations

The 2007 financial crisis revealed how excessive bank risk threatens financial system stability. This paper studies two aspects of the risk-taking incentives of banks– CEO compensation and capital. The vega of a bank executive’s equity compensation measures how compensation changes relative to the banks’ stock volatility. If CEO compensation vega is high, I expect the CEO to take more risk in areas where he exercises control. Conversely, if regulators demand that banks invest their own capital to encourage conservative behavior, then I expect risk-taking to be lower. This paper confirms that higher vega and lower capital ratios are associated with …

Compensation Clawback Policies And Corporate Lawsuits, Matteo Arena, Nga Nguyen

Finance Faculty Research and Publications

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to study the relation between compensation clawbacks and lawsuits and analyze how these two corporate disciplinary forces interact. This paper hypothesizes that by allowing firms to recoup compensation from managers who breach their fiduciary duty, clawbacks provide a form of discipline that potentially reduces the likelihood of managerial wrongdoing, which, in turn, lowers the risk of corporate lawsuits.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper identifies whether or not a company in the S&P 1500 had a clawback policy between 2007 and 2014 by searching the company filings and press releases. The authors also construct different proxies …

Occupational Fraud: Executive Compensation And Enforcements Against Auditors And Perpetrators., Erlina Papakroni

Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports

This dissertation is comprised of three studies that examine the association of executive compensation with financial statement fraud and enforcements pursued against the independent auditor and the principal perpetrators when occupational fraud is detected.

The first study examines competing, though non-mutually exclusive, hypotheses for the path that equity compensation follows on its way to financial misreporting. We find that firms that experience financial statement fraud pay their executives higher levels and a higher proportion of equity compensation across the entire executive’s tenure. This starts in the first year of an executive’s tenure and continues up until the fraud period. These …

Are Women Executives Hurting Firm Performance? An Examination Of Gender Diversity On Firm Risk, Performance, And Executive Compensation, Krystal Diane Sung

CMC Senior Theses

In order to assess the continuing imbalance of top executives between genders, I examine the effects of gender diversity within top management teams on firm risk, performance, and executive compensation. Capitalizing on previous analysis, I apply three unique differentiators. First, I utilize current data from 2012 to 2017 from Compustat, CRSP, and ExecuComp. Second, I provide a unique subset view on a firm and individual performance of female CEOs to examine executive compensation. Third, my scope of analysis expands to S&P Composite 1500 companies. I use separate models to estimate the effect of gender diversity on firm risk by examining …

Ceo Long-Term Incentive Pay In Mergers And Acquisitions, Randy Beavers

SPU Works

This paper analyzes the CEO incentives of inside debt in the form of deferred equity compensation in the context of M&A decisions. This study runs statistical regressions on the likelihood of a merger, whether the deal is diversifying, how much stock is used to pay for the deal, and the relative deal size controlling for CEO long-term incentive pay as the main variable of interest and including controls for firm characteristics, merger characteristics, industry, and year. This paper sheds light on LTIP effects before compensation changes occur after an M&A event. This study uses archival data from 1996 to 2005 …

How Relevant Is The Disclosure Of A Ceo Pay Ratio?, Addison Stanfill

Accounting Undergraduate Honors Theses

An aftershock of the so called “Great Recession” in 2008, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act effective July 21, 2010 aimed to increase the transparency of public companies. Section 953(b) of this act is targeting the transparency of executive and employee compensation by requiring the disclosure of a CEO to median employee pay ratio. This disclosure requirement, set to affect all filings with a fiscal year beginning after January 1, 2017, was a response to the public outcry against excessive CEO compensation. Although it does promote the transparency initiative of the Dodd-Frank Act, this disclosure may be …

Two Essays On The Effects Of External Pressure On Executive Compensation: Evidenced Through Political Sensitivity And Pay For Performance Disclosure, Brandy Elaine Hadley

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation analyzes the impact of two external forces on executive compensation behavior. In the first chapter, the impact of political sensitivity is investigated as an external force on government contractor executive compensation. Compensation for top executives has come into the political spotlight, especially over the last decade, with many politicians publicly supporting limits on compensation. However, the impact of political scrutiny to limit compensation is debatable. This study analyzes the effect of political scrutiny on CEO compensation using a sample of Federal contractors, which represents a group of firms where politicians yield the most power. Results suggest that Federal …

The Compensation Committee Process, Dana Hermanson, James Tompkins, Rajaram Veliyath, Zhongxia Ye

James Tompkins

The article investigates the process used in executive compensation committees to meet their responsibilities, particularly noting the lack of research into the committee process itself. It discusses committee's areas of responsibility, approaches to meeting their responsibilities, and committee operational issues through the use of interviews with compensation committee members. It addresses themes of the interviews including achieving fair compensation, promoting the legitimacy of the committee's decisions, and monitoring the committee for appropriate behaviors. It comments on the tension between executive committees, shareholders, organizational management, and stakeholders.

Three Essays On Compensation And The Board Of Directors, Ian Cherry

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

In my first essay, I find a statistically and economically significant director-specific component in CEO pay following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). In the cross-section of firms, directors that award relatively higher (lower) CEO pay in one firm also award relatively higher (lower) CEO pay in other firms of whose boards they are members during the year. Based on my estimates, the director-specific component is responsible for around ±3.5% of total CEO pay or around ±$230,000 per CEO-year on average. In addition to affecting CEO pay levels, the director-specific component also has a significant effect on …

The Mess At Morgan: Risk, Incentives And Shareholder Empowerment, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

The financial crisis of 2008 focused increasing attention on corporate America and, in particular, the risk-taking behavior of large financial institutions. A growing appreciation of the “public” nature of the corporation resulted in a substantial number of high profile enforcement actions. In addition, demands for greater accountability led policymakers to attempt to harness the corporation’s internal decision-making structure, in the name of improved corporate governance, to further the interest of non-shareholder stakeholders. Dodd-Frank’s advisory vote on executive compensation is an example.

This essay argues that the effort to employ shareholders as agents of public values and, thereby, to inculcate corporate …

Two Essays On Governance At The National And Corporate Level, Laura Savory Miller

HCBE Theses and Dissertations

ESSAY 1
We examine the effect of governance environment on the composition of a country's external capital structure, specifically foreign equity investment. In addition to the absolute quality of the host country's governance environment, we consider the host country's governance quality relative to that of the source (investor) country. Unlike previous studies, which utilize country totals, we examine foreign investment positions between pairs of individual countries. Our sample includes 3,891 bilateral investment positions among 49 source countries and 69 host countries for years 2009 through 2011. We find that relative governance, rather than absolute governance, plays a role in foreign …

Insider Trading Restrictions And Top Executive Compensation, David J. Denis, Jin Xu

Purdue CIBER Working Papers

The use of equity incentives is significantly greater in countries with stronger insider trading restrictions, and these higher incentives are associated with higher total pay. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of insider trading restrictions and enforcement, and to panel regressions with country fixed effects. We also find significant increases in top executive pay and the use of equity-based incentives in the period immediately following the initial enforcement of insider trading laws. We conclude that insider trading laws are one channel through which cross-country differences in pay practices can be explained.

Executive Compensation, Firm Performance And Liquidity Under Imperfect Corporate Governance, Yongli Luo

Theses and Dissertations - UTB/UTPA

This dissertation examines the relationship between executive compensation, firm performance and liquidity under imperfect corporate governance institution by using a novel Chinese dataset over 2001-2010. The first essay examines the determinants of Chinese executive compensation from the agency-based theoretical framework. I find that there is a positive relationship between Chinese executive compensation and firm performance. The weak corporate governance in China exhibits strong liquidity and control effects after the split-share structure reform. It seems that CEO duality, the establishment of compensation committee, and the involvement of state ownership in Chinese public firms may lead executive compensation to a relation-based rather …

Two Essays On Executive Pay And Firm Performance, Thuong Quang Nguyen

Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration

Two essays of this dissertation study the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. These essays analyze both compensation level and compensation structure, and focus not only on CEO compensation but also on Top Management Team (TMT) compensation as well as Chief Financial Officer (CFO) compensation. Methodologically, these essays use different regression techniques to explore the nature of time series over cross sections of executive compensation data in order to find a reliable relationship between executive compensation and firm performance.

The first essay investigates the TMT compensation - firm performance relationship and finds that the compensation dispersion among TMT members …

The Diminishing Returns Of Incentive Pay In Executive Compensation Contracts, Gregg D. Polsky, Andrew Lund

Scholarly Works

For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We argue, however, that in light of evolving corporate governance mechanisms, the marginal net benefit of incentive-laden pay packages is both smaller than appreciated and getting smaller over time. As a result, the assumption that higher proportions of incentive pay are beneficial is no longer warranted.

A number of corporate governance mechanisms have evolved to duplicate …

Executive Compensation: The Role Of Shari’A Compliance, William Martin, Karen Ahmed

Publications – Dreihaus College of Business

Abstract Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illuminate issues surrounding executive compensation as it relates to current understandings of Islamic business law. Methodology We review the emerging bodies of literature in the fields of executive compensation and opinions of stock options under Shari’a law. Findings It appears that the trend in offering employee stock options as part of a Shari’a compliant compensation package is acceptable in most cases, yet because of its close association with the more problematic idea of derivative transactions, the company must be vigilant in obtaining the approval from its Shari’a Standards Board before offering …

Executive Compensation: The Role Of Shari’A Compliance, William Marty Martin, Karen Hunt Ahmed

Karen Hunt Ahmed

Abstract Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illuminate issues surrounding executive compensation as it relates to current understandings of Islamic business law. Methodology We review the emerging bodies of literature in the fields of executive compensation and opinions of stock options under Shari’a law. Findings It appears that the trend in offering employee stock options as part of a Shari’a compliant compensation package is acceptable in most cases, yet because of its close association with the more problematic idea of derivative transactions, the company must be vigilant in obtaining the approval from its Shari’a Standards Board before offering …

Executive Compensation: The Role Of Shari’A Compliance, William Marty Martin, Karen Hunt Ahmed

William Marty Martin

Abstract Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illuminate issues surrounding executive compensation as it relates to current understandings of Islamic business law. Methodology We review the emerging bodies of literature in the fields of executive compensation and opinions of stock options under Shari’a law. Findings It appears that the trend in offering employee stock options as part of a Shari’a compliant compensation package is acceptable in most cases, yet because of its close association with the more problematic idea of derivative transactions, the company must be vigilant in obtaining the approval from its Shari’a Standards Board before offering …

Executive Compensation And The Maturity Structure Of Corporate Debt, Paul Brockman, Xiumin Martin, Emre Unlu

Department of Finance: Faculty Publications

Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. Theory suggests that short-maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short-maturity debt. We also find that shortmaturity debt mitigates the influence of vega- and delta-related incentives on bond yields. Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short-term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk.

The Relationship Between Incentive Compensation And Forced Ceo Turnover, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz Sheikh, Narayanan Subramanian

Atreya Chakraborty

We study the relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover. Our theoretical model predicts that the slope of the compensation contract and forced turnover may be complements. Our results support this prediction. We find that incentives and turnover are positively related. This relationship however, varies with the equity ownership of CEOs and does not hold for CEOs who own more than 5% equity. Moreover, this relationship is stronger if the firm under performs its industry. Our results suggest that high-powered incentives may increase the signaling power of performance measures and lead to higher likelihood of turnover.

Dual Agency: Corporate Boards With Reciprocally Interlocking Relationships, Kevin F. Hallock

Kevin F Hallock

[Excerpt] This paper studies reciprocal interlocks of boards of directors of large firms where an employee of firm A sits on firm B's board and at the same time an employee of firm B sits on firm A's board. The study of Boards of Directors by those in economics and finance is not new. In fact, Dooley (1969) writes of interlocking directorates, but his definition is different in that he presents evidence of interlock where "at least one director ... sat on the board of at least one other of the largest companies". Books by Mizruchi (1982) and Pennings (1980) …

The Timeliness Of Performance Information In Determining Executive Compensation, Kevin F. Hallock, Paul Oyer

Kevin F Hallock

We study whether boards of directors concentrate on performance near compensation decision times rather than providing consistent incentives for chief executive officers (CEO). throughout the fiscal year. We show empirically that managers can profit by moving sales revenue among fiscal quarters. Though this may suggest that boards use short-term trends when determining rewards, we find evidence consistent with boards tying pay to recent sales growth so as to use the best information about future performance. We also find that the timing of profits throughout the year does not affect CEO pay, which may suggest that smoothing firm income is important …

Termination Risk And Managerial Risk Taking, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz A. Sheikh, Narayanana Subramanian

Atreya Chakraborty

We test the hypothesis that managers who face a high termination risk make less risky investments than the managers who face a low termination risk. A 10% increase in our measure of termination risk is associated with a 5%–23% decline in stock returns volatility for the median firm in our sample. We also find that for CEOs who are more likely to be fired in the event of investment failure, the inhibiting effect of termination risk appears to offset the positive effect of convexity of managerial compensation on managerial risk taking. These results are robust to alternative definitions of forced …

Repricing And Executive Turnover, Narayanan Subramanian, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz Sheikh

Atreya Chakraborty

We examine whether the threat of executive turnover faced by a firm affects its decision to reprice stock options held by its executives. We estimate a model of voluntary turnover among top executives and show that the predicted turnover from this model is positively related to the probability of repricing. The relationship is robust to the inclusion of several known determinants of repricing. Our results are consistent with a model in which a tight labor market makes executives hard to replace, forcing firms to reprice stock options when they go underwater.

Changes In Ceo Compensation Structure And The Impact On Firm Performance Following Ceo Turnover, David W. Blackwell, Donna M. Dudney, Kathleen A. Farrell

Department of Finance: Faculty Publications

We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate them to future performance. Compared to outgoing CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new stock grants. The voluntary turnover sample shows similar changes in compensation structure while the forced turnover sample results suggest that new stock grants drive the significant increase in incentive compensation following turnover. Post-turnover performance is positively associated with new stock grants as a percentage of total compensation in the full sample and when analyzing forced and voluntary turnovers separately. We find limited evidence that future operating …

Managerial Ability And The Valuation Of Executive Stock Options, Tung-Hsiao Yang

LSU Doctoral Dissertations

The executive compensation literature argues that executives generally value stock options at less than market value because of suboptimal ownership and risk aversion. Implicit in this finding is the assumption that executives are, like shareholders, price takers. That is, they have no ability to influence the outcomes of the firm’s investments. Clearly, executives do have the ability to influence these outcomes, because that is the purpose of granting them the options. In this paper, we develop a model in which managers can exert effort and alter the distribution of the returns from the firm’s investments. We find that when executives …