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Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation

2022

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Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management

Indonesia: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Ayodeji George Dec 2022

Indonesia: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

The Indonesian government closed 16 banks on November 1, 1997. At the time, the government said it would guarantee depositors up to 20 million Indonesian rupiah (IDR; USD 6,000) per account. The lack of immediate full protection for large depositors caused deposit runs throughout the banking sector and undermined foreign confidence in the Indonesian financial system. In response, the Indonesian president on January 26, 1998, announced a blanket guarantee and created the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to administer the guarantee and other bank rehabilitation efforts. The blanket guarantee covered all depositors and nonsubordinated creditors in locally incorporated commercial banks. …

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Ecuador: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Bailey Decker Dec 2022

Ecuador: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

After a series of exogenous shocks hit the Ecuadorian economy in 1997–1998, foreign creditors reassessed their emerging-market risk and reduced external credit lines to Ecuador, thus draining liquidity. The closure of a small bank called Solbanco in April 1998 triggered deposit runs at other banks. Banks sought assistance from the Central Bank of Ecuador (Banco Central del Ecuador, or BCE). By the end of September 1998, the BCE had issued emergency loans to 11 financial institutions, totaling nearly 30% of the money base. The crisis accelerated in August 1998 when Banco de Prestamos, the sixth-largest bank, was closed; the existing …

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Finland: Government Guarantee Fund, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija Dec 2022

Finland: Government Guarantee Fund, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s, Finland’s financial system suffered steadily increasing loan losses and falling earnings beginning in 1990. The Finnish Parliament created the Government Guarantee Fund (GGF) in April 1992 to support banks with loans, capital, and guarantees. In a press release issued on August 6, 1992, the government said the GGF would “secure the stable functioning of the banking system under any circumstances [emphasis added]”. Six months later, the Parliament of Finland specifically required the GGF to guarantee that all Finnish banks could meet their commitments. The government …

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Denmark: General Guarantee Scheme, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner Dec 2022

Denmark: General Guarantee Scheme, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

As foreign credit in Denmark dried up during the summer of 2008, Danish banks became increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing. The government took over the failing Roskilde Bank, the country’s eighth-largest bank, in late August. On October 5, 2008, the government announced a voluntary General Guarantee Scheme to fully insure deposits and other senior liabilities of participating banks. Banks could participate in the scheme by becoming members of the financial sector’s banking consortium, Det Private Beredskab, or in English, the Private Contingency Association (PCA), before October 13, 2008. The General Guarantee Scheme fully insured all depositors and senior unsecured creditors …

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Blanket Guarantees Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick Dec 2022

Blanket Guarantees Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 10 blanket guarantee (BG) programs across 13 Key Design Decisions. The defining characteristics of these programs in terms of their inclusion in our BG series are (a) that they guaranteed a broader range of liabilities beyond deposit accounts and (b) that the guarantees covered existing liabilities in addition to newly issued ones. Each case represents an effort to eliminate creditors’ incentive to withdraw funding from institutions by guaranteeing that the funding will be paid back even if the institutions are unable to do so themselves. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the inability of blanket guarantees …

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Reserve Requirements Survey, June Rhee, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick Dec 2022

Reserve Requirements Survey, June Rhee, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Banks have a private motive to hold some level of cash and liquid reserves, but the negative externalities of bank runs create a public interest in setting a regulatory level higher than the privately optimal level. We can think of such reserve requirements (RRs) as the original form of liquidity regulation. In this paper, we focus on 14 cases in which central banks adjusted RRs after crises hit, typically to deal with liquidity shortages in the banking system. We observe that RR adjustments have several advantages in a crisis: (1) such changes require little process, and the change for banks …

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Lessons Learned: Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Maryann Haggerty Jul 2022

Lessons Learned: Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Zeti Akhtar Aziz, a Malaysian economist, was governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, her nation’s central bank, from 2000 to 2016; prior to that, she was acting governor and deputy governor. Dr. Zeti was a key leader in Malaysia’s response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997¬-98, as well as the financial sector restructuring that followed. This “Lessons Learned” summary is based on a 2022 interview with Dr. Zeti. At the time of the interview, she was co-chair of the board of governors of the Asia School of Business in Kuala Lumpur, which is a partnership between Bank Negara and the …

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Lessons Learned: Mark Van Der Weide, Matthew A. Lieber Jul 2022

Lessons Learned: Mark Van Der Weide, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

With more than two decades of continuing service at the Federal Reserve Board, Mark Van Der Weide brings a unique insider perspective on central bank policymaking before, during, and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), including the Fed’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. From 1998 to 2009, Van Der Weide served in the Fed’s legal division. De-tailed to the Treasury Department in 2009, he helped draft the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-form and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Back at the Fed in 2010, Van Der Weide served for eight years in the Division of Supervision and Regulation, where …

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Lessons Learned: David Wilcox, Mercedes Cardona Jul 2022

Lessons Learned: David Wilcox, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

David Wilcox was the deputy director of the Division of Research and Statistics of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-¬09. He assisted in developing the Federal Reserve policy response that ultimately stabilized the economy by providing insight into the economic and financial outlook to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) prior to each of its policy-setting meetings. Wilcox became director of the division in 2011 and served in that role through 2018, acting as the division’s chief economist, manager, and the senior adviser to three Fed chairs. After leaving the Fed, he joined …

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Lessons Learned: Brooksley Born, Maryann Haggerty Jul 2022

Lessons Learned: Brooksley Born, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Brooksley Born, a lawyer with decades of experience in derivatives law, served as chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) from 1996 to 1999. At the CFTC, she advocated for federal regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives (OTC) market, but legislation failed to pass. The OTC derivatives market had a central role in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09. Born, who returned to private practice after her CFTC term, served as a commissioner on the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which investigated the causes of the crisis and issued its report in January 2011. This “Lessons Learned” is based on …

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Lessons Learned: Michael Silva, Mercedes Cardona Jul 2022

Lessons Learned: Michael Silva, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Michael Silva was chief of staff to then-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) Timothy Geithner from 2006 to 2009, including the early stages of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). As such, Silva was critical in the coordination of personnel and information during the GFC, specifically during the period when the FRBNY was addressing liquidity stresses in the bank sector, including the bailout of Bear Stearns, the failure of Lehman Brothers, and the rescue of American International Group. When Geithner became President Barack Obama’s Treasury Secretary in 2009, Silva became chief of staff to his successor at …

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Lessons Learned: Scott G. Alvarez, Esq., Part 2, Steven Kelly Jul 2022

Lessons Learned: Scott G. Alvarez, Esq., Part 2, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

Scott G. Alvarez was general counsel of the Federal Reserve Board during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). He met with the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) to discuss a litany of legal aspects related to the Fed’s interventions under its emergency liquidity provision authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. We summarize some highlights from our interview with Mr. Alvarez. The transcript of this interview, conducted in April 2022, and one from an earlier Lessons Learned interview, in December 2018

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United States: Main Street Lending Program, Steven Kelly Jul 2022

United States: Main Street Lending Program, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic caused slowdowns and disruptions to economic activity, businesses faced disruptions to their revenues and experienced increased demand for credit. Yet, as the pandemic worsened the economic outlook, banks tightened credit. Starting on March 17, the Federal Reserve rolled out several emergency programs aimed at capital markets. Most of these programs tended to benefit relatively large companies. On March 23, the Fed said it would introduce a program targeting small and mid-sized companies. On April 9, 2020, the Federal Reserve announced its first design iteration of the novel Main Street Lending Program (MSLP). The …

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United States: Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility, Steven Kelly Jul 2022

United States: Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Congress passed and funded the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) to help small businesses facing business disruptions keep workers on their payrolls and meet other expenses. The PPP, signed into law on March 27, 2020, provided a mechanism for authorized lenders to extend concessionary, forgivable loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Lenders ultimately extended approximately $800 billion in PPP loans. The SBA distributed the funds when the loan either defaulted or met the law's terms for SBA forgiveness. To buttress lenders' ability to fund PPP loans, the Federal Reserve …

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United States: Primary Dealer Credit Facility, Carey K. Mott Jul 2022

United States: Primary Dealer Credit Facility, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, the uncertain outlook for the United States in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic prompted extremely high demand for cash and near-cash assets. Amid intense selling pressure from investors, securities dealers were unable to fully absorb the high volume of trade orders into their inventory due to balance sheet capacity and funding constraints. As dealer capacity declined and demand for liquidity continued rising, volatility spread to the critical and normally highly liquid market for US Treasury securities, prompting the Federal Reserve to increase open market operations (March 12) and begin historically large purchases of US Treasuries (March …

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United States: Municipal Liquidity Facility, Steven Kelly Jul 2022

United States: Municipal Liquidity Facility, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused severe financial stress for state and local municipalities. Municipalities' public health responses led to material increases in expenditures. At the same time, many municipalities faced revenue delays and declines due to extended tax deadlines and disruptions in taxable economic activity. Institutional investors also put heavy selling pressure on municipal bonds. In response to stresses in the municipal financing market, the Federal Reserve invoked its Section 13(3) emergency lending authority and created the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF). The Fed created the facility to backstop municipal entities' access to capital markets to help them manage …

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United States: Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, Carey K. Mott, Mallory Dreyer Jul 2022

United States: Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, Carey K. Mott, Mallory Dreyer

Journal of Financial Crises

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, prime and tax-exempt money market funds (MMFs) faced increased demands for redemption. Meeting redemptions required MMFs to sell assets into increasingly illiquid markets. Using the emergency authority outlined in Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve established the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF), a facility similar in structure and purpose to a program that the Fed implemented in 2008 amidst the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The MMLF extended nonrecourse loans to banks and their affiliates for the purchase from some …

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United States: Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Ii, Lily S. Engbith Jul 2022

United States: Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Ii, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 caused widespread economic uncertainty, prompting government officials to act swiftly to combat potentially severe fallout. On March 23, 2020, the Federal Reserve announced a series of monetary policy measures and established several emergency lending facilities to assist the US economy. Among these, the Fed revived the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), a Global Financial Crisis (GFC)-era facility that used a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to encourage the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS). Its main purpose was to restore the flow of credit to households and businesses. TALF II made $100 …

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United States: Commercial Paper Funding Facility Ii, Lily S. Engbith Jul 2022

United States: Commercial Paper Funding Facility Ii, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 caused widespread economic uncertainty, prompting government officials to act swiftly to combat potentially severe fallout. On March 17, 2020, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve announced the revival of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), a program that the government had utilized during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to provide a liquidity backstop to domestic issuers of commercial paper (CP). As with the first iteration of the program, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) funded a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to purchase highly rated, US dollar-denominated CP, …

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United States: Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility And Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, Natalie Leonard Jul 2022

United States: Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility And Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

The COVID-19 pandemic reached a critical stage in early 2020 causing severe distress and disruption in financial markets, and the United States government declared a federal state of emergency in the second week of March. As institutional investors including mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies withdrew from corporate bond markets and funding options for large US businesses dried up, the Federal Reserve became concerned that solvent businesses might have difficulty financing their operations. On March 23, the Federal Reserve Board invoked Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, creating two novel emergency lending facilities to support the corporate bond …

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United Kingdom: Covid Corporate Financing Facility, Adam Kulam Jul 2022

United Kingdom: Covid Corporate Financing Facility, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

During the COVID-19 crisis, sterling-denominated money markets froze, and otherwise-healthy companies were shut out of short-term, wholesale funding markets. To unfreeze these markets, the UK government announced a series of corporate funding measures. One of the measures was the Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF), which enabled the Bank of England (BoE), acting on behalf of Her Majesty's Treasury's, to purchase commercial paper (CP) on primary and secondary markets from eligible dealers. The purpose of the CCFF was to provide stopgap wholesale funding to large, financially healthy firms while preserving British banks' capacity to serve small and medium-sized companies. Under the …

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Thailand: Bond Stabilization Fund, Corey N. Runkel Jul 2022

Thailand: Bond Stabilization Fund, Corey N. Runkel

Journal of Financial Crises

Early in the COVID-19 crisis, non-financial businesses grew concerned that they would be unable to roll over their maturing bonds. To calm corporate debt markets, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced the Bond Stabilization Fund (BSF) on March 22, 2020. The BSF planned to purchase newly issued commercial paper from viable companies that could not roll over their maturing bonds. However, the program was not used. The BOT, seeking to avoid public criticism for directly supporting large corporations, imposed restrictions that made the program less attractive to borrowers. The main deterrent to participation was the requirement that borrowers must have …

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United Kingdom: Asset Purchase Facility, Adam Kulam Jul 2022

United Kingdom: Asset Purchase Facility, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

The global outbreak of COVID-19 spurred investors to sell the British gilt in a synchronized fashion, which caused dysfunction in primary and secondary gilt markets. Yield spreads spiked, and primary dealers temporarily stepped back from dealing in gilts during a trading session on March 19, 2020. Liquidity premia were also high in non-gilt, fixed-income markets. That same day, the Bank of England (BoE) announced GBP 200 billion (USD 234 billion) of asset purchases through the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) to preserve liquidity in both gilt and corporate bond markets as part of larger efforts to prevent an undesirable tightening of …

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Sweden: Corporate Bond Purchases, Carey K. Mott Jul 2022

Sweden: Corporate Bond Purchases, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

In the spring of 2020, corporate revenues in Sweden felt the direct effects of the coronavirus pandemic and the resulting public health measures. With future cash flows in question, many investors sold corporate debt for safe assets. Sweden's corporate bond market-particularly vulnerable to stress due to its heterogeneity, fragmentation, and lack of transparency-saw diminished liquidity. On March 19, 2020, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank) announced it would purchase commercial paper and corporate bonds as part of a much larger bond-buying scheme, announced three days earlier, that included Swedish government, municipal, and covered bonds. It authorized the program under Chapter 6, Article …

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South Korea: Corporate Liquidity Support Organization, Lily S. Engbith Jul 2022

South Korea: Corporate Liquidity Support Organization, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in the early months of 2020 strained liquidity in short-term corporate funding markets around the world. In response, the Korean government enacted a variety of direct and indirect measures to promote the smooth flow of credit to households and businesses. Most of these measures focused on highly rated companies. Recognizing the need to extend assistance to lower-rated issuers, the Bank of Korea (BoK) invoked its authority under Article 80 of the Bank of Korea Act to establish and fund the Corporate Liquidity Support Organization, Co., Ltd., a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) authorized to purchase up …

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Sweden: Commercial Paper Purchases, Carey K. Mott Jul 2022

Sweden: Commercial Paper Purchases, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 2020, governments took measures to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic that significantly impacted corporate revenues. The uncertainty surrounding the pandemic drove investors out of corporate securities and into safe assets, complicating the ability of Swedish nonfinancial corporations to finance their operations. As the volume of commercial paper issuance dropped, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank) announced on March 19, 2020, it would purchase commercial paper and corporate bonds as part of a much larger bond-buying scheme that included Swedish government, municipal, and covered bonds. It authorized the program under Chapter 6, Article 5 of the Sveriges Riksbank Act. …

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Japan: Special Funds-Supplying Operations, Sharon M. Nunn Jul 2022

Japan: Special Funds-Supplying Operations, Sharon M. Nunn

Journal of Financial Crises

The Bank of Japan responded to the COVID-19 economic downturn in March 2020 with several financial stability interventions. The Special Funds-Supplying Operations to Facilitate Financing in Response to the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) (SFSO) offered interest-free loans of up to one year in maturity to eligible financial institutions in an attempt to encourage broader lending to Japanese businesses and households. Counterparties could pledge as collateral a broad range of corporate and private debt, including corporate bonds and asset-backed securities. Enhancements made throughout the program's operation led to substantial increases in SFSO use. First, the BoJ expanded institution and collateral eligibility, as …

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Israel: Corporate Bond Purchase Program, Natalie Leonard Jul 2022

Israel: Corporate Bond Purchase Program, Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

By March 2020, the quickly spreading novel coronavirus began disrupting business activity and industry, generating uncertainty throughout the global economy. As financial panic spread, Israeli investors fled to liquidity, impacting equities, corporate bonds, and even Israeli treasury securities. As short-term horizon mutual funds experienced high withdrawals in the first few weeks of March, they were forced to sell corporate bonds. This increase in supply pushed corporate bond prices down, and yields spiked. Between March and May, domestic rating agencies downgraded 23 companies (12% of all rated companies), and by July 2020, yields remained in the double-digits for 23% of corporate …

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Eurozone: Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program, Corey N. Runkel Jul 2022

Eurozone: Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program, Corey N. Runkel

Journal of Financial Crises

The COVID-19 pandemic quickly engulfed the European Union's economy in 2020. As investors sought safe assets, marketable debt yields rose dramatically. To lower the cost of borrowing, the European Central Bank (ECB), alongside the 19 national central banks (NCBs) that comprise the Eurosystem, purchased marketable debt in secondary markets. Asset eligibility mirrored that of the ECB's Asset Purchase Program (APP), an ongoing quantitative easing program which the ECB expanded during the pandemic. The main difference was that the PEPP allowed debt issued by Greece, which did not have an investment-grade credit rating. The rate that the PEPP purchased securities within …

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Canada: Provincial Bond Purchase Program, Natalie Leonard Jul 2022

Canada: Provincial Bond Purchase Program, Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

In the beginning of 2020, the outbreak of the novel coronavirus placed significant strain on financial markets and especially affected commodity-producing countries like Canada. As the broad economy contracted, oil-exports fell, and the government imposed public health restrictions to contain coronavirus, the Bank of Canada (BoC) announced emergency measures to ensure functioning of financial markets and to "reach companies and households and foster a robust recovery" (Poloz 2020, 1). One market that faced acute strain was the Canadian provincial bond market. The BoC announced the Provincial Bond Purchase Program (PBPP) through a notice published on April 15, 2020. The stated …

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