Finance and Financial Management Commons^™

Sweden: Bank Support Authority, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s, Sweden’s financial system suffered its worst shock in the post–World War II period. Swedish banks were heavily dependent on foreign credit, which dried up amid signs of instability. The Swedish government announced a blanket guarantee on September 24, 1992, for all banks’ obligations except share capital and perpetual subordinated loans. According to a 1995 IMF Working Paper by Drees and Pazarbasioglu, the purpose of the blanket guarantee was “to guarantee the stability of the payments system and to safeguard the general supply of credit.” The …

Korea: Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Korea entered the Asian Financial Crisis in August 1997 with highly leveraged firms and a banking system inexperienced in managing systemic risk. Korea faced a currency crisis and a banking crisis, as foreign banks froze credit to Korean commercial banks and merchant banks. On August 25, 1997, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) announced that it would guarantee all Korean financial institutions’ foreign debt—both existing debt and new borrowings. Nonetheless, foreign lenders continued to withdraw credit from Korean financial institutions. On November 19, 1997, a newly appointed MOEF minister announced a suite of measures to promote foreign creditors’ confidence …

Jamaica: Finsac Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

After a period of sustained distress in the early 1990s, Jamaican financial institutions faced significant liquidity issues by 1996, evidenced by runs on banks by depositors. The government responded by creating the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) on January 29, 1997, to rehabilitate weak financial institutions and administer a blanket guarantee on financial sector liabilities. The blanket guarantee covered all deposit-taking financial institutions, life insurance policy providers, and pension funds registered under the Banking Act, Financial Institutions Act, and Insurance Act. Within eligible institutions, the blanket guarantee covered depositors’ funds in licensed deposit-taking institutions, pension funds managed by authorized institutions, …

Ireland: Credit Institution (Financial Support) Scheme, 2008, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

The Global Financial Crisis exposed fragilities in the Irish banking system and led to widespread runs on Irish banks. Irish authorities attempted to address the runs on September 22, 2008, by increasing the country’s deposit guarantee limit from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (USD 28,800 to USD 140,000) and raising the coverage of deposits from 90% to 100%. When the runs continued, the Irish minister for finance announced a blanket guarantee of bank liabilities on September 30 without consulting European Union authorities. The announcement specified the blanket guarantee would be effective immediately and remain in effect for two years. The …

Indonesia: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

The Indonesian government closed 16 banks on November 1, 1997. At the time, the government said it would guarantee depositors up to 20 million Indonesian rupiah (IDR; USD 6,000) per account. The lack of immediate full protection for large depositors caused deposit runs throughout the banking sector and undermined foreign confidence in the Indonesian financial system. In response, the Indonesian president on January 26, 1998, announced a blanket guarantee and created the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to administer the guarantee and other bank rehabilitation efforts. The blanket guarantee covered all depositors and nonsubordinated creditors in locally incorporated commercial banks. …

Ecuador: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

After a series of exogenous shocks hit the Ecuadorian economy in 1997–1998, foreign creditors reassessed their emerging-market risk and reduced external credit lines to Ecuador, thus draining liquidity. The closure of a small bank called Solbanco in April 1998 triggered deposit runs at other banks. Banks sought assistance from the Central Bank of Ecuador (Banco Central del Ecuador, or BCE). By the end of September 1998, the BCE had issued emergency loans to 11 financial institutions, totaling nearly 30% of the money base. The crisis accelerated in August 1998 when Banco de Prestamos, the sixth-largest bank, was closed; the existing …

Finland: Government Guarantee Fund, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s, Finland’s financial system suffered steadily increasing loan losses and falling earnings beginning in 1990. The Finnish Parliament created the Government Guarantee Fund (GGF) in April 1992 to support banks with loans, capital, and guarantees. In a press release issued on August 6, 1992, the government said the GGF would “secure the stable functioning of the banking system under any circumstances [emphasis added]”. Six months later, the Parliament of Finland specifically required the GGF to guarantee that all Finnish banks could meet their commitments. The government …

Denmark: General Guarantee Scheme, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

As foreign credit in Denmark dried up during the summer of 2008, Danish banks became increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing. The government took over the failing Roskilde Bank, the country’s eighth-largest bank, in late August. On October 5, 2008, the government announced a voluntary General Guarantee Scheme to fully insure deposits and other senior liabilities of participating banks. Banks could participate in the scheme by becoming members of the financial sector’s banking consortium, Det Private Beredskab, or in English, the Private Contingency Association (PCA), before October 13, 2008. The General Guarantee Scheme fully insured all depositors and senior unsecured creditors …

Blanket Guarantees Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 10 blanket guarantee (BG) programs across 13 Key Design Decisions. The defining characteristics of these programs in terms of their inclusion in our BG series are (a) that they guaranteed a broader range of liabilities beyond deposit accounts and (b) that the guarantees covered existing liabilities in addition to newly issued ones. Each case represents an effort to eliminate creditors’ incentive to withdraw funding from institutions by guaranteeing that the funding will be paid back even if the institutions are unable to do so themselves. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the inability of blanket guarantees …

Reserve Requirements Survey, June Rhee, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Banks have a private motive to hold some level of cash and liquid reserves, but the negative externalities of bank runs create a public interest in setting a regulatory level higher than the privately optimal level. We can think of such reserve requirements (RRs) as the original form of liquidity regulation. In this paper, we focus on 14 cases in which central banks adjusted RRs after crises hit, typically to deal with liquidity shortages in the banking system. We observe that RR adjustments have several advantages in a crisis: (1) such changes require little process, and the change for banks …

Fire Sales, The Lolr, And Bank Runs With Continuous Asset Liquidity, Ulrich Bindseil, Edoardo Lanari

Journal of Financial Crises

Banks’ asset fire sales and recourse to central bank credit are modeled with continuous asset liquidity, allowing us to derive the liability structure of a bank. Both asset sales liquidity and the central bank collateral framework are modeled as power functions within the unit interval. Funding stability is captured as a strategic bank run game in pure strategies between depositors. Fire sale liquidity and the central bank collateral framework determine jointly the ability of the banking system to deliver maturity transformation without endangering financial stability. The model also explains why banks tend to use the least liquid eligible collateral with …

The Euro And Bumps In The Road: Historical Patterns Of Nonresident Holdings In Eurozone Bonds, 1980–2018, Michael H. Scarlatos

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

A developed bond market which attracts nonresident investors both enables and reflects a host currency’s transition from domestic to international status. My analysis of historical private nonresident holdings of Eurozone portfolio debt securities spanning the euro’s 1999 creation and its subsequent 2008 crisis reveals diverging patterns.

This analysis, complemented by coefficient stability tests, discovers that the conversion of national currencies to the euro was reflected by a pickup in nonresident holdings of bonds issued by countries adopting the euro, especially those of the periphery (Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain) relative to the core (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and the …

From ‘Homo Economicus’ To ‘Homo Culturalis’: Review Of Irrationally Rational By V. Raghunathan, Milind M. Shrikhande

Markets, Globalization & Development Review

No abstract provided.

Lessons Learned: Steven Rattner, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Steven Rattner, an investment banker and private equity professional, joined the Obama administration as counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury and head of the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensely throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path …

Lessons Learned: Harry Wilson, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Harry Wilson was one of four senior advisers to the US Department of the Treasury during the Obama administration and served on the President’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to General Motors and Chrysler, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a …

Lessons Learned: Sadiq Malik, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Sadiq Malik was a member of the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors, and later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers, to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path to stability. Malik, working for the Auto Task Force, helped take General Motors through …

Lessons Learned: Matthew Feldman, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Matthew Feldman was the chief legal advisor to the Department of the Treasury on the Obama administration’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to Chrysler and General Motors (GM), and later other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs. The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path to stability. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recognized …

Lessons Learned: Mara Mcneill, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Mara McNeill was senior counsel to the US Department of the Treasury on the Obama administration’s Automotive Investment Financing Program (AIFP) during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–09. As senior counsel, McNeill was responsible for the department’s $80 billon financing of General Motors, Chrysler, Ally Financial, and Chrysler Financial. She worked with the Auto Team Task Force, the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) legal team, and the Department of Treasury. The bipartisan AIFP team was charged with overseeing the government’s efforts to assist the companies toward a “new lease on life,” while exercising strong financial principles to protect the …

Lessons Learned: Ron Bloom, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

Ron Bloom served as senior adviser to Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner on President Barack Obama’s Task Force on the Automotive Industry and as assistant to the president for manufacturing policy (2009–2011). As senior adviser on the Auto Task Force team, Bloom helped lead the restructuring of General Motors and Chrysler LLC. Subsequently, he advised the Obama administration with policy development and strategic planning to revitalize the manufacturing sector. Bloom brought to Treasury his unique experience working with organized labor (including the United Steelworkers Union, United Auto Workers, the Teamsters, the Air Line Pilots Association), and in the investment …

Lessons Learned: Brian Stoker, Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

Brian Stoker served in Merrill Lynch’s structured credit division for seven years, producing and trading asset-backed securities (ABS). In 2005, Stoker moved to Citigroup as a director of ABS CDO (collateralized debt obligation) and CLO (collateralized loan obligation) structuring. After the financial crisis, Stoker was an analyst at Carlson Capital for three years. In 2011, he joined StormHarbour Securities, serving as a managing director until 2018. From 2019 to 2021, he was director of securitization at Korth Direct Mortgage. Presently, Stoker is a licensed real estate agent in Miami. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Stoker.

Lessons Learned: Eric Kolchinsky, Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

Eric Kolchinsky served as managing director of ratings for ABS CDOs (asset-backed security collateralized debt obligations) at Moody’s Investor Services from 2005 to 2007. Kolchinsky started his career in structured finance with stints at Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch. He joined Moody’s in 2000 as vice president for credit. In 2007, after Kolchinsky raised questions concerning the ratings of new deals in light of subprime downgrades, Moody’s removed him from his client-facing position. Kolchinsky supervised methodology for structured finance valuations at Moody’s Analytics for two years, before Moody’s suspended him altogether in 2009. Separated from Moody’s, Kolchinsky testified before Congress …

Lessons Learned: Chris Ricciardi, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff

Journal of Financial Crises

Chris Ricciardi was a CDO pioneer who built the structured products units at CS First Boston and Merrill Lynch before moving to the asset management side. Ricciardi began his career structuring novel fixed-income securities at Prudential. At CS First Boston and Merrill, he catapulted each investment bank’s lagging unit into the top of the league tables for CDO (collateralized debt obligation) issuance. He was CEO of Cohen & Co. from 2006 to 2011, when he left to co-found investment management firm Mead Park Management. A graduate of the University of Richmond with an MBA from the Wharton School of the …

Lessons Learned: Sohail Khan, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff

Journal of Financial Crises

Sohail Khan was managing director of fixed-income sales at Citigroup from 2005–09. Khan started his finance career in 1996, after completing his MBA at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). Khan gained broad experience in product structuring and sales of credit derivatives at Citigroup. As managing director during the subprime securitization boom and bust, he was involved with institutional sales of asset-backed securities (ABS) including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs); his clients were hedge funds, structured vehicles, and institutional buyers. In 2009, Khan left Citigroup to co-found StormHarbour Securities, a boutique investment bank he has headed since as managing principal. This …

Lessons Learned: Stephen King, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff

Journal of Financial Crises

Stephen King started his career in finance at Bankers Trust in 1997 as a computer scientist with a business degree. He worked on structured credit transactions when credit derivatives were just being invented. In 2005, King joined Barclays’ structured credit group, where he managed a CDO (collateralized debt obligation) correlation desk that was different from standard dealer CDO units. In 2009, he launched C12 Capital Management to relieve Barclays of distressed subprime positions. Presently, King finances and builds luxury hotels as founder and CEO of Sardis Developments. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with King.

Lessons Learned: Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

Steve Kasoff was employed at Elliott Management Corporation from 2003 until 2020. His responsibilities centered on developing the structured products and real estate groups at Elliott. He was made senior portfolio manager, a member of the firm’s management committee, and equity partner. Kasoff has extensive experience in the origination, trading, and management of structured products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and mortgage-backed securities, including earlier posts at Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers. He earned his BA in economics from Yale College and his MBA in finance from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. In 2016, …

Lessons Learned: James Finkel, Steven H. Kasoff, Matthew A. Lieber

Journal of Financial Crises

A Wall Street veteran specializing in structured credit transactions, Jim Finkel was co-founder and director of the structured credit asset management firm Dynamic Credit Partners (DCP) from 2003 to 2009. Finkel started his career as a securities lawyer for the international law firm Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, before moving over to the banking side in 1992. He specialized in mortgage-backed securities and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) for several firms, including Bear Stearns and Deutsche Bank, where he headed the London-based CLO group. In 2003, Finkel returned to New York to launch and run DCP. In 2010, he joined financial …

A Special Project: Inside The Cdo Machine, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In this issue of the Journal of Financial Crisis, we feature Inside the CDO Machine—a special undertaking recently completed under the auspices of the Yale Program on Financial Stability Lessons Learned Oral History Project by Steven H. Kasoff, a Yale School of Management Fellow and former equity partner and head of real estate and structured products investments at the Elliott Management Corp., a global hedge fund. For the project, Kasoff undertook a series of interviews with industry professionals to focus on one of the critical derivatives products of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and how they …

Wall Street’S Subprime Debacle: Firsthand Accounts From Inside The Cdo Machine, Matthew A. Lieber, Steven H. Kasoff

Journal of Financial Crises

The observations, perceptions, and actions of participants in the subprime markets remain poorly documented and incompletely understood. Seeking to deepen our understanding, this study has produced seven interview summaries and one article telling the story of a hypothetical CDO deal. This article is organized in four parts. First, it presents our research questions and methods in relation to the existing knowledge on the topic. Second, it describes what we think are the study’s main contributions. Third, it previews the Lessons Learned summaries and interviews from each of the participants. And last, it identifies what we believe are some of the …

Anatomy Of A Trade: The Making Of A Subprime Cdo, Steven H. Kasoff

Journal of Financial Crises

This article presents a short story, a sketch in eight parts of a single fictitious subprime collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction. The story is informed by expert interviews, documentary research, and the author’s firsthand experience.

The Rescue Of The Us Auto Industry, Module G: The Auto Warranty Commitment Program, Benjamin Henken

Journal of Financial Crises

On March 30, 2009, President Barack Obama announced a plan for government-funded protection of warranties on new vehicles sold by General Motors (GM) and Chrysler while the companies underwent restructuring. The initiative, which would become known as the Auto Warranty Commitment Program (AWCP), was intended to bolster consumer confidence by alleviating a major risk—the loss of warranty benefits—to consumers associated with the companies’ potential bankruptcies. Under the AWCP, GM and Chrysler established independent special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to which they transferred a combination of their own money along with funding they received from Treasury in the form of a loan. …