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Articles 1 - 21 of 21
Full-Text Articles in Corporate Finance
Institutional Cross-Ownership Of Peer Firms And Investment Sensitivity To Stock Price, Young Jun Cho, Holly I. Yang
Institutional Cross-Ownership Of Peer Firms And Investment Sensitivity To Stock Price, Young Jun Cho, Holly I. Yang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Theory suggests that stock price guides managers in corporate decisions as managers learn from price. We reason that cross-ownership lowers information processing costs and increases industry specialization, improving revelatory price efficiency (Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein 2012). Consistent with our expectations, we find that a firm’s investment-q sensitivity increases as its cross-ownership increases, suggesting that cross-ownership facilitates managerial learning from price and thus investment efficiency. We strengthen the causal inference by conducting a difference-in-differences analysis using financial institution mergers as an identification strategy. We also find that the increase in the investment-q sensitivity associated with cross-ownership is more pronounced for firms …
Mutual Fund Stewardship And The Empty Voting Problem, Jill E. Fisch
Mutual Fund Stewardship And The Empty Voting Problem, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
When Roberta Karmel wrote the articles that are the subject of this symposium, she was skeptical of both the potential value of shareholder voting and the emerging involvement of institutional investors in corporate governance. In the ensuing years, both the increased role and engagement of institutional investors and the heightened importance of shareholder voting offer new reasons to take Professor Karmel’s concerns seriously. Institutional investors have taken on a broader range of issues ranging from diversity and political spending to climate change and human capital management, and their ability to influence corporate policy on these issues has become more significant. …
Investment Decisions And Trading Behavior Of Institutional And Retail Investors, Antonia Kirilova
Investment Decisions And Trading Behavior Of Institutional And Retail Investors, Antonia Kirilova
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)
This dissertation consists of three studies in the areas of empirical asset pricing, market microstructure, and behavioral finance. I study the trading behavior and portfolio choices of institutions and retail investors in the equity and derivatives markets. Examining the ways in which different market participants make investment decisions allows us to understand their role in shaping financial market dynamics. This is important in order to know how to structure markets for enhanced market efficiency, and to protect less sophisticated investors through better policies and regulations. Although there is a considerable amount of literature disputing the ability of retail investors and …
The Sec's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Creating A Corporate Public Square, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
The Sec's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Creating A Corporate Public Square, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Faculty Scholarship
In this Article, we take advantage of this Symposium’s goals to think broadly about the future of Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the shareholder proposal rule. We set forth a vision for the rule to address boardroom insularity by likening the shareholder proposal rule as the public square for shareholders. The existence of such a forum would redound to the benefit of investors, officers, and boards of directors as a fount of current and useful information about their investors’ and stakeholders’ concerns.
The New Titans Of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework For Passive Investors, Jill E. Fisch, Asaf Hamdani, Steven Davidoff Solomon
The New Titans Of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework For Passive Investors, Jill E. Fisch, Asaf Hamdani, Steven Davidoff Solomon
All Faculty Scholarship
Passive investors — ETFs and index funds — are the most important development in modern day capital markets, dictating trillions of dollars in capital flows and increasingly owning much of corporate America. Neither the business model of passive funds, nor the way that they engage with their portfolio companies, however, is well understood, and misperceptions of both have led some commentators to call for passive investors to be subject to increased regulation and even disenfranchisement. Specifically, this literature takes a narrow view both of the market in which passive investors compete to manage customer funds and of passive investors’ participation …
Identifying Ineffective Monitors From Securities Class Action Lawsuits, Chi Shen Wei, Lei Zhang
Identifying Ineffective Monitors From Securities Class Action Lawsuits, Chi Shen Wei, Lei Zhang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We identify “ineffective” institutional monitors based on the prevalence of occurrences of securities class-action lawsuits in their overall portfolio. We find that firms with a higher representation of such institutional investors among the firms’ large shareholders have a greater likelihood of future litigation and experience more negative market reactions upon such litigation filings. These firms exhibit other unfavorable governance outcomes including poorer acquisitions and lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We find suggestive evidence that ineffective monitoring may be a result of higher operational risk.
The Impact Of Sustainability Reporting On Firm Profitability, Lancee L. Whetman
The Impact Of Sustainability Reporting On Firm Profitability, Lancee L. Whetman
Undergraduate Economic Review
Using a hand-collected representative sample of 95 publicly traded American firms from various sectors in 2015-2016, I examine how corporate sustainability reporting affects the financial performance of firms. I find a positive and significant effect of sustainability reporting on a firm’s return on equity, return on assets, and profit margin in the subsequent year. However, this relationship is found only for firms with low institutional ownership. These results suggest that sustainability reporting would be a worthwhile use of corporate resources for this subset of firms. Further, corporate sustainability reporting is shown to be an effective substitute for monitoring by institutional …
Shareholder Advocacy In Corporate Elections: Case Studies In Proxy Voting Websites For Retail Investors, Robin Miller
Shareholder Advocacy In Corporate Elections: Case Studies In Proxy Voting Websites For Retail Investors, Robin Miller
International Development, Community and Environment (IDCE)
One of the key rights shareholders retain is the right to vote on issues affecting the companies in which they invest. This voting right is seen as one of the primary means of exercising diligent corporate governance (Cole 2003, Fairfax 2009). Only 28 percent of individual investors vote in corporate elections compared with 91 percent of institutional investors. Informed voting decisions at corporate elections can be very information intensive, and theories of rational apathy and the free rider problem may explain a lack of participation from individual investors.
Many shareholders cannot attend annual corporate meetings, so they …
Institutional Trading During A Wave Of Corporate Scandals: 'Perfect Payday'?, Gennaro Bernile, Johan Sulaeman, Qin Wang
Institutional Trading During A Wave Of Corporate Scandals: 'Perfect Payday'?, Gennaro Bernile, Johan Sulaeman, Qin Wang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This paper examines the role of institutional trading during the option backdating scandal of 2006-2007. Unlike their inability to anticipate other corporate events, institutional investors as a group display negative abnormal trading imbalances (i.e., buy minus sell volumes) in anticipation of firm-specific backdating exposures. Consistent with informed trading, the underlying trades earn positive abnormal short- and long-term profits. Moreover, the negative abnormal imbalances are larger in magnitude when backdating is likely a more severe issue. Local institutions, in particular, display negative trading imbalances earlier in event-time and earn consistently higher trading profits than non-local institutions. Although we find some evidence …
Local Business Cycles And Local Liquidity, Gennaro Bernile, George Korniotis, Alok Kumar, Qin Wang
Local Business Cycles And Local Liquidity, Gennaro Bernile, George Korniotis, Alok Kumar, Qin Wang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This study examines whether state-level economic conditions affect the liquidity of local firms. We find that liquidity levels of local stocks are higher (lower) when the local economy has performed well (poorly). This relation is stronger when local financing constraints are more binding, the local information environment is more opaque, and local institutional ownership levels and trading intensity are higher. Overall the evidence supports the notion that the geographical segmentation of U.S. capital markets generates predictable patterns in local liquidity.
Essays On The Impact Of Institutional Investors On Firms' Liquidity And Payout Policy, Munira Ismail
Essays On The Impact Of Institutional Investors On Firms' Liquidity And Payout Policy, Munira Ismail
University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations
This dissertation consists of 2 essays in the area of corporate finance. The title of my first essay is “Impact of Institutional Investors on Firms’ Financial Constraint and Liquidity”. We can find ample evidences in existing literature which show that institutional investors play a vital role in the corporate world. Many researchers have linked institutional investors to activism, monitoring benefits, mitigating the cost of debt using government bond, spin off activities and improving information asymmetry problem. In the first essay, I would like to add another dimension to institutional investors’ literature by examining institutional investors’ role in mitigating financial constraint …
Introduction To Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds And Private Equity, Economics And Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
Introduction To Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds And Private Equity, Economics And Regulation, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery
All Faculty Scholarship
The increase in institutional ownership of recent decades has been accompanied by an enhanced role played by institutions in monitoring companies’ corporate governance behaviour. Activist hedge funds and private equity firms have achieved a degree of success in actively shaping the business plans of target firms. They may be characterized as pursuing a common goal – in the words used in the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, both seek ‘to increase the market value of their pooled capital through active engagement with individual public companies. This engagement may include demands for changes in management, the composition of the board, …
Two Essays In Finance: Analyzing The Value Of Cash To U.S. And Non-U.S. Firms And Institutional Trading In Stock Index Futures, Li Xu
University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations
In the first chapter, we analyze the role of market development, risk premium, and transparency as factors influencing the value of cash in firms listed as American Depository Receipts. Based on the method by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2002), our primary results are as follows. The market value of cash is greater on average for ADR firms than for U.S. firms, and within the ADR sample the value of cash is greater for firms based in less developed countries after 2007 financial crisis but not before. Together, the results suggest that the market development is especially important during more volatile periods. …
Non-Audit Fees, Institutional Monitoring, And Audit Quality, Chee Yeow Lim, David K. Ding, Charlie Charoenwong
Non-Audit Fees, Institutional Monitoring, And Audit Quality, Chee Yeow Lim, David K. Ding, Charlie Charoenwong
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on the extent of institutional monitoring. We suggest that institutional investors have incentives and the ability to monitor financial reporting quality. Because of the reputation concerns and potential litigation exposure, auditors are likely to provide high audit quality, when they also provide non-audit services to clients, particularly when clients are subject to high institutional monitoring. We find evidence that, as non-audit fees increase, audit quality (measured by performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals and earnings-response coefficients) reduces only for clients with low institutional ownership but not for clients with …
Institutional Investors And The Informational Efficiency Of Prices, Ekkehart Boehmer, Eric K. Kelley
Institutional Investors And The Informational Efficiency Of Prices, Ekkehart Boehmer, Eric K. Kelley
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Using a broad panel of NYSE-listed stocks between 1983 and 2004, we study the relation between institutional shareholdings and the relative informational efficiency of prices, measured as deviations from a random walk. Stocks with greater institutional ownership are priced more efficiently, and we show that variation in liquidity does not drive this result. One mechanism through which prices become more efficient is institutional trading activity, even when institutions trade passively. But efficiency is also directly related to institutional holdings, even after controlling for institutional trading, analyst coverage, short selling, variation in liquidity, and firm characteristics.
The Long-Term Effects Of Cross-Listing, Investor Recognition, And Ownership Structure On Valuation, Michael R. King, Dan Segal
The Long-Term Effects Of Cross-Listing, Investor Recognition, And Ownership Structure On Valuation, Michael R. King, Dan Segal
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We show that investor recognition and bonding associated with a U.S. cross-listing are distinct effects using a sample of Canadian firms. In contrast to the post-listing decline documented in the literature, we find that cross-listed firms with a single class of shares enjoy a permanent increase in valuation if they attract and maintain investor recognition over time. Valuations of firms that fail to widen their U.S. shareholder base return to pre-listing levels within two years. Cross-listed firms with dual-class shares exhibit a permanent increase in valuation regardless of the level of U.S. investor holdings, consistent with firm-level bonding.
The Implications Of Debt Heterogeneity For R&D Investment And Firm Performance, Parthiban David, Jonathan P. O'Brien, Toru Yoshikawa
The Implications Of Debt Heterogeneity For R&D Investment And Firm Performance, Parthiban David, Jonathan P. O'Brien, Toru Yoshikawa
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
An assumption in prior research is that debt is homogeneous and provides inappropriate governance for R&D investments. We argue that debt is heterogeneous: although transactional debt does indeed impose strict contractual constraints that provide inappropriate governance for R&D investments, relational debt has very different characteristics that provide more appropriate governance. Using a sample of Japanese firms, we find that firms that align their debt structures with their R&D investments perform better than those that are misaligned. Furthermore, firms tend to align their debt structure with R&D investments, but only after deregulation permits relatively free access to various types of debt.
Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li
Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Within a cost–benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the …
Firm Ownership Structure And Intellectual Capital Disclosures, Stephen Firer, S. M. Williamson
Firm Ownership Structure And Intellectual Capital Disclosures, Stephen Firer, S. M. Williamson
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the association between three ownership structure characteristics and voluntary intellectual capital (IC) disclosure practices. Data for this study is hand collected from the 2000 annual reports of 390 Singapore publicly traded firms. Empirical results indicate Singapore publicly traded firms more closely owned were less likely to voluntarily disclose IC related information than were those where executive directors had smaller holdings in the entity. Finally, findings indicate government linked corporations (GLCs) will likely make more voluntary IC disclosures than non-GLCs. Overall, this study makes several unique contributions to the literature. First, the …
Ownership Structure, Investment Behaviour And Firm Performance In Japanese Manufacturing Industries, Eric Gedajlovic, Toru Yoshikawa, Motomi Hashimoto
Ownership Structure, Investment Behaviour And Firm Performance In Japanese Manufacturing Industries, Eric Gedajlovic, Toru Yoshikawa, Motomi Hashimoto
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Using data spanning the 1996-98 fiscal years of 247 of Japan's largest manufacturers, we empirically evaluate the extent to which a firm's investment behaviour and financial performance are influenced by its ownership structure. To do so, we examine six distinct categories of Japanese shareholders: foreign investors, investment funds, pension funds, banks and insurance companies, affiliated companies and insiders. Our findings strongly indicate that the relationship between the equity stakes of a particular category of investor and a firm' s financial performance and investment behaviour is considerably more complex than is depicted in simple principal-agent representations. Such a result emphasizes the …
How Do Institutional Investors Trade, Paul G. J. O'Connell, Melvyn Teo
How Do Institutional Investors Trade, Paul G. J. O'Connell, Melvyn Teo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Using a novel and detailed custody trades dataset, this paper analyzes the trading behavior of institutions. Extant studies have examined the effects of past performance on trading by retail investors, day traders, and futures floor traders. Yet very little work has been done on institutions. We find that unlike other investors, institutions take on more risk following an increase in net profit and loss. However, the responses to a gain and loss are highly asymmetric. Institutions aggressively reduce risk in the wake of losses, but only mildly increase risk in the wake of gains. This asymmetry is more pronounced for …