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Corporate governance

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Articles 31 - 60 of 137

Full-Text Articles in Corporate Finance

The New Titans Of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework For Passive Investors, Jill E. Fisch, Asaf Hamdani, Steven Davidoff Solomon Jan 2019

The New Titans Of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework For Passive Investors, Jill E. Fisch, Asaf Hamdani, Steven Davidoff Solomon

All Faculty Scholarship

Passive investors — ETFs and index funds — are the most important development in modern day capital markets, dictating trillions of dollars in capital flows and increasingly owning much of corporate America. Neither the business model of passive funds, nor the way that they engage with their portfolio companies, however, is well understood, and misperceptions of both have led some commentators to call for passive investors to be subject to increased regulation and even disenfranchisement. Specifically, this literature takes a narrow view both of the market in which passive investors compete to manage customer funds and of passive investors’ participation …


Startup Governance, Elizabeth Pollman Jan 2019

Startup Governance, Elizabeth Pollman

All Faculty Scholarship

Although previously considered rare, over three hundred startups have reached valuations over a billion dollars. Thousands of smaller startups aim to follow in their paths. Despite the enormous social and economic impact of venture-backed startups, their internal governance receives scant scholarly attention. Longstanding theories of corporate ownership and governance do not capture the special features of startups. They can grow large with ownership shared by diverse participants, and they face issues that do not fit the dominant principal-agent paradigm of public corporations or the classic narrative of controlling shareholders in closely held corporations.

This Article offers an original, comprehensive framework …


Dual-Class Shares In Singapore – Where Ideology Meets Pragmatism, Pey Woan Lee Dec 2018

Dual-Class Shares In Singapore – Where Ideology Meets Pragmatism, Pey Woan Lee

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

This article seeks to understand the rationale for and potential implications of the introduction of dual class shares (DCS) in Singapore. It does so by first considering the theoretical as well as evidential arguments for and against the use of DCS, followed by a survey on the reception (or otherwise) of such structures in four common law jurisdictions with vibrant capital markets, viz., Canada, the United States, United Kingdom and Hong Kong. It observes that the chief argument cited by business founders to justify the use of DCS structures is the desire to enhance a firm’s long-term profitability by shielding …


Identifying Ineffective Monitors From Securities Class Action Lawsuits, Chi Shen Wei, Lei Zhang Oct 2018

Identifying Ineffective Monitors From Securities Class Action Lawsuits, Chi Shen Wei, Lei Zhang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We identify “ineffective” institutional monitors based on the prevalence of occurrences of securities class-action lawsuits in their overall portfolio. We find that firms with a higher representation of such institutional investors among the firms’ large shareholders have a greater likelihood of future litigation and experience more negative market reactions upon such litigation filings. These firms exhibit other unfavorable governance outcomes including poorer acquisitions and lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We find suggestive evidence that ineffective monitoring may be a result of higher operational risk.


Director Tenure Diversity And Board Monitoring Effectiveness, Na Li, Aida Sijamic Wahid Sep 2018

Director Tenure Diversity And Board Monitoring Effectiveness, Na Li, Aida Sijamic Wahid

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This study examines the impact of director tenure diversity on board effectiveness. We find that tenure-diverse boards exhibit significantly higher CEO performance-turnover sensitivity and that firms with tenure-diverse audit committees are less likely to experience accounting restatements. Furthermore, we document that tenure-diverse compensation committees also award less excess compensation and are less likely to overcompensate. Even though tenure-diverse boards seem to exhibit superior monitoring performance, there is limited evidence that their firms exhibit superior financial performance. The findings suggest that recent calls for board renewal, to the extent that it would increase tenure diversity rather than just decrease average board …


Reading Between The Lines: Not All Csr Is Good Csr, David K. Ding, Christo Ferreira, Udomsak Wongchoti Aug 2018

Reading Between The Lines: Not All Csr Is Good Csr, David K. Ding, Christo Ferreira, Udomsak Wongchoti

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Purpose: This paper aims to investigate whether corporate social responsibility (CSR), as evidenced in annual financial reports, is associated with a firm’s financial performance in New Zealand. Design/methodology/approach: A word count approach of several key CSR indicators found in the audited financial reports of NZX50 constituent firms is used. Several variables are constructed that measure the presence of CSR within the annual report such as sustainability, responsibility, social, environment, diversity, employee and community, and eight other variables within the annual report that measure the penetration of stakeholder engagement. Control variables and alternative measures of CSR are also included. Descriptive statistics …


Shareholder Litigation And Corporate Disclosure: Evidence From Derivative Lawsuits, Thomas Bourveau, Yun Lou, Rencheng Wang Jun 2018

Shareholder Litigation And Corporate Disclosure: Evidence From Derivative Lawsuits, Thomas Bourveau, Yun Lou, Rencheng Wang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we study the effect of shareholder litigation risk on corporate disclosure. We find that disclosure significantly increases after UD laws make it more difficult to file derivative lawsuits. Specifically, firms issue more earnings forecasts and voluntary 8-K filings, and increase the length of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) in their 10-K filings. We further assess the direct and indirect channels through which UD laws affect firms' disclosure policies. We find that the effect of UD laws on corporate disclosure is driven by firms facing relatively higher ex …


Individual Autonomy In Corporate Law, Elisabeth De Fontenay Jan 2018

Individual Autonomy In Corporate Law, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

The field of corporate law is riven with competing visions of the corporation. This Article seeks to identify points of broad agreement by negative implication. It examines two developments in corporate law that have drawn widespread criticism from corporate law scholars: the Supreme Court's recognition of corporate religious rights in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and the Nevada legislature's decision to eliminate mandatory fiduciary duties for corporate directors and officers. Despite their fundamental differences, both resulted in expanding individual rights or autonomy within the corporation-for shareholders and managers, respectively.

The visceral critiques aimed at these two developments suggest a broadly shared …


Lobbying In Finance Industry: Evidence From Us Banking System, Omer Unsal, M.Kabir Hassan, William Hippler Nov 2017

Lobbying In Finance Industry: Evidence From Us Banking System, Omer Unsal, M.Kabir Hassan, William Hippler

Finance Faculty Publications

We examine the relationship between corporate lobbying, shareholder-based litigation outcomes, and firm value for financial firms. First, we show that political lobbying lowers the litigation likelihood for financial institutions. Secondly, lobbying firms experience a higher likelihood of having litigation dismissed, and the average settlement amount is significantly lower for lobbying institutions. In addition, shortly after a litigation announcement, lobbying firms experience significantly higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), compared to non-lobbying firms. Finally, we show that lobbying firms have higher long-run buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns (BHARs) following lobbying activities. Our results link financial institution lobbying activity with improved legal outcomes and …


Credit Risk And Corporate Governance, Olivier Mugisho Mudekereza Aug 2017

Credit Risk And Corporate Governance, Olivier Mugisho Mudekereza

Theses and Dissertations

Is the executive’s compensation structure influenced by the credit rating assigned to his company? I analyze a panel of U.S. public firms using the random-effects and fixed-effects estimations. Compared to firms with lower credit risk, I find that firms facing higher probability of default provide more incentives for their CEOs.


Do High Ceo Pay Ratios Destroy Firm Value?, Qiang Cheng, Tharindra Ranasinghe, Sha Zhao Jul 2017

Do High Ceo Pay Ratios Destroy Firm Value?, Qiang Cheng, Tharindra Ranasinghe, Sha Zhao

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

There is growing public concern over the rapid growth in CEO pay relative to average worker pay (CEO pay ratio). Critics contend that high CEO pay ratios could destroy firm value by damaging employee morale and/or signal CEO rent extraction. In this paper, we use a proprietary dataset to examine the relationship between CEO pay ratio and firm value/performance. Contrary to critics’ arguments, we find that industry-adjusted CEO pay ratios are positively associated with both firm value and performance. We also find that high CEO pay ratios are associated with higher quality acquisitions and stronger CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Our results …


Who Bleeds When The Wolves Bite? A Flesh-And-Blood Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism And Our Strange Corporate Governance System, Leo E. Strine Jr. Apr 2017

Who Bleeds When The Wolves Bite? A Flesh-And-Blood Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism And Our Strange Corporate Governance System, Leo E. Strine Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the effects of hedge fund activism and so-called wolf pack activity on the ordinary human beings—the human investors—who fund our capital markets but who, as indirect of owners of corporate equity, have only limited direct power to ensure that the capital they contribute is deployed to serve their welfare and in turn the broader social good.

Most human investors in fact depend much more on their labor than on their equity for their wealth and therefore care deeply about whether our corporate governance system creates incentives for corporations to create and sustain jobs for them. And because …


The Role Of Social Enterprise And Hybrid Organizations, Ofer Eldar Jan 2017

The Role Of Social Enterprise And Hybrid Organizations, Ofer Eldar

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have brought remarkable growth in hybrid organizations that combine profit-seeking and social missions. Despite popular enthusiasm for such organizations, legal reforms to facilitate their formation and growth—particularly, legal forms for hybrid firms—have largely been ineffective. This shortcoming stems in large part from the lack of a theory that identifies the structural and functional elements that make some types of hybrid organizations more effective than others. In pursuit of such a theory, this Article focuses on a large class of hybrid organizations that has been effective in addressing development problems, such as increasing access to capital and improving employment …


Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, And Corporate Responsibility, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2017

Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, And Corporate Responsibility, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Domestic and international regulatory efforts to prevent another financial crisis have been converging on the idea of trying to end the problem of “too big to fail”—that systemically important financial firms take excessive risks because they profit from success and are (or at least, expect to be) bailed out by government money to avoid failure. The legal solutions being advanced to control this morally hazardous behavior tend, however, to be inefficient, ineffective, or even dangerous—such as breaking up firms and limiting their size, which can reduce economies of scale and scope; or restricting central bank authority to bail out failing …


Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2017

Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.


Controlling Systemic Risk Through Corporate Governance, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2017

Controlling Systemic Risk Through Corporate Governance, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Most of the regulatory measures to control excessive risk taking by systemically important firms are designed to reduce moral hazard and to align the interests of managers and investors. These measures may be flawed because they are based on questionable assumptions. Excessive corporate risk taking is, at its core, a corporate governance problem. Shareholder primacy requires managers to view the consequences of their firm’s risk taking only from the standpoint of the firm and its shareholders, ignoring harm to the public. In governing, managers of systemically important firms should also consider public harm. This proposal engages the long-standing debate whether …


Regulatory Competition And The Market For Corporate Law, Ofer Eldar, Lorenzo Magnolfi Jan 2017

Regulatory Competition And The Market For Corporate Law, Ofer Eldar, Lorenzo Magnolfi

Faculty Scholarship

This article develops an empirical model of firms’ choice of corporate laws under inertia. Delaware dominates the incorporation market, though recently Nevada, a state whose laws are highly protective of managers, has acquired a sizable market share. Using a novel database of incorporation decisions from 1995- 2013, we show that most firms dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for officers, and that Nevada’s rise is due to the preferences of small firms.Our estimates indicate that despite inertia, Delaware would lose significant market share and revenues if it adopted protectionist laws. Our findings support the hypothesis that …


Socially Responsible Firms, Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog Dec 2016

Socially Responsible Firms, Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally be run to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) considers CSR an agency problem and a waste of corporate resources. Given our identification strategy by means of an instrumental variable approach, we find that well-governed firms that suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control wedge, strong minority protection) engage more in CSR. We also find that a positive relation exists between CSR and value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value.


Audit Committees And Financial Reporting Quality In Singapore, Yuanto Kusnadi, Kwong Sin Leong, Themin Suwardy, Jiwei Wang Nov 2016

Audit Committees And Financial Reporting Quality In Singapore, Yuanto Kusnadi, Kwong Sin Leong, Themin Suwardy, Jiwei Wang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We examine three characteristics (independence, expertise, and overlapping membership) of audit committees and their impact on the financial reporting quality for Singapore-listed companies. The main finding is that financial reporting quality will be higher if audit committees have mixed expertise in accounting, finance, and/or supervisory. In addition, we do not find evidence that incremental independence of audit committees enhances financial reporting quality because audit committees already consist of a majority of independent directors. Finally, we fail to find any impact of overlapping membership on audit and remuneration committees on financial reporting quality. Overall, the results have policy implications on improving …


Does It Pay To Be Different? Relative Csr And Its Impact On Firm Value, David K. Ding, Christo Ferreira, Udomsak Wongchoti Oct 2016

Does It Pay To Be Different? Relative Csr And Its Impact On Firm Value, David K. Ding, Christo Ferreira, Udomsak Wongchoti

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Conventional aggregation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) raw scores and its interpreted impact on firm value have provided mixed evidence in the literature. We show that the value impact of CSR activities relies heavily on the industry-specific relative position of the firm. Only firms that distinguish themselves over their peers are associated with increased firm value. This finding is robust and holds for both responsible and irresponsible behaviors. Information concerns and portfolio construction can allude to a possible CSR clientele, suggesting the existence of an optimal CSR level. Our peer-effect results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity along the lines of …


Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, And The Jurisprudence Of Threat, William W. Bratton Aug 2016

Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, And The Jurisprudence Of Threat, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

This chapter reviews the single high profile case in which twentieth century antitakeover law has come to bear on management defense against a twenty-first century activist challenge—the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision to sustain a low-threshold poison pill deployed against an activist in Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht. The decision implicated an important policy question: whether a twentieth century doctrine keyed to hostile takeovers and control transfers appropriately can be brought to bear in a twenty-first century governance context in which the challenger eschews control transfer and instead makes aggressive use of the shareholder franchise. Resolution of the question …


Socially Responsible Firms, Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog Aug 2016

Socially Responsible Firms, Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

In the corporate finance tradition starting with Berle & Means (1923), corporations should generally be run so as to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) considers CSR as an agency problem and a waste of corporate resources. Given our identification strategy by means of an IV approach, we find that well-governed firms who suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control wedge, strong minority protection) engage more in CSR. We also find a positive relation between CSR and value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value.


Leveraging Foreign Institutional Logic In The Adoption Of Stock Option Pay Among Japanese Firms, Xuesong Geng, Toru Yoshikawa, Asli M. Colpan Jul 2016

Leveraging Foreign Institutional Logic In The Adoption Of Stock Option Pay Among Japanese Firms, Xuesong Geng, Toru Yoshikawa, Asli M. Colpan

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder-oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder-oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self-serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option …


Essays In Corporate Finance, Yiwei Yu Jun 2016

Essays In Corporate Finance, Yiwei Yu

Dissertations and Theses Collection

Innovation is vital to companies’ competitive advantages and is an important driver of economic growth. However, innovation is costly, since the innovation process is long, idiosyncratic, and uncertain, often involving a very high failure probability and great positive externalities .We thus launch the investigation from the following three aspects to explore how to create a better environment for producing innovation: Financing of innovation; dual-class share structure of innovation; and regulation and policy (e.g. SOX Act.)'s impact on innovation.

First of all, we study the effect of firms’ real estate collateral on innovation. In the presence of financing frictions, firms can …


Shareholder Advocacy In Corporate Elections: Case Studies In Proxy Voting Websites For Retail Investors, Robin Miller May 2016

Shareholder Advocacy In Corporate Elections: Case Studies In Proxy Voting Websites For Retail Investors, Robin Miller

International Development, Community and Environment (IDCE)

One of the key rights shareholders retain is the right to vote on issues affecting the companies in which they invest. This voting right is seen as one of the primary means of exercising diligent corporate governance (Cole 2003, Fairfax 2009). Only 28 percent of individual investors vote in corporate elections compared with 91 percent of institutional investors. Informed voting decisions at corporate elections can be very information intensive, and theories of rational apathy and the free rider problem may explain a lack of participation from individual investors.

Many shareholders cannot attend annual corporate meetings, so they …


Essays In Corporate Finance, Bingqiao Li Apr 2016

Essays In Corporate Finance, Bingqiao Li

Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)

Based on a constructed index measuring the corporate governance quality of public firms, this paper focus on the role of corporate governance and its association with the performance of Singapore Exchange listed firms. We investigate the following three aspects centred on the topic of firm corporate governance in Singapore.

First, we examine the performance of the Chinese firms listed on the Singapore Exchange (S-Chips) and the role of their corporate governance. S-Chips indeed underperform local firms in terms of Tobin’s Q within both univariate and multivariable frameworks, as well as base on size matched and Propensity Score Matching samples. Higher …


Female Board Representation And Corporate Acquisition Intensity, Guoli Chen, Craig Crossland, Sterling Huang Feb 2016

Female Board Representation And Corporate Acquisition Intensity, Guoli Chen, Craig Crossland, Sterling Huang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This study examines the impact of female board representation on firm-level strategic behavior within the domain of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We build on social identity theory to predict that greater female representation on a firm's board will be negatively associated with both the number of acquisitions the firm engages in and, conditional on doing a deal, acquisition size. Using a comprehensive, multi-year sample of U.S. public firms, we find strong support for our hypotheses. We demonstrate the robustness of our findings through the use of a difference-in-differences analysis on a sub-sample of firms that experienced exogenous changes in board …


The Effect Of Board Independence On Information Asymmetry, Beng Wee Goh, Jimmy Lee, Jeffrey Ng, Kevin Ow Yong Jan 2016

The Effect Of Board Independence On Information Asymmetry, Beng Wee Goh, Jimmy Lee, Jeffrey Ng, Kevin Ow Yong

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Boards have an important role in ensuring that investors’ interests are protected. Our paper first examines whether the independence of a firm's board affects information asymmetry among investors. We provide evidence that greater board independence leads to lower information asymmetry. Next, we provide evidence that more voluntary disclosure and greater analyst coverage are two underlying mechanisms via which greater board independence reduces information asymmetry. Of the two mechanisms, we find that analyst coverage is more significant in influencing how board independence affects information asymmetry. Overall, our paper contributes to a better understanding of the effect of board independence on information …


The Determinants And Consequences Of Disclosure Committee Adoption, Lyle Roy Schmardebeck Jul 2015

The Determinants And Consequences Of Disclosure Committee Adoption, Lyle Roy Schmardebeck

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

After the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission recommended that companies voluntarily adopt disclosure committees to aid in preparing company disclosures. In this paper, I investigate the determinants and consequences of disclosure committee adoption. I find that companies with material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting and less readable 10-K filings are more likely to adopt disclosure committees. In consequences analyses, using a propensity score matched control sample and a difference-in-differences research design, I find that 10-K filings are longer and less readable after disclosure committee adoption. However, consistent with institutional theory, I …


Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From Recent Regulatory Reforms, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Xin Wang Jun 2015

Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From Recent Regulatory Reforms, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Xin Wang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

In this paper, we examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board independence are effective in reducing earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority of independent directors prior to the reforms (referred to as non-compliance firms) are required to increase their board independence. We find that overall, compared to the other firms, noncompliance firms do not experience a significant decrease in the extent of earnings management from prior to the reforms to afterwards. However, we find that non-compliance firms with low information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in earnings management compared with the other firms. The results …