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Full-Text Articles in Corporate Finance
A State-Stewardship View On Executive Compensation, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog, Sunny Li Sun
A State-Stewardship View On Executive Compensation, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog, Sunny Li Sun
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible ‘stewards’ rather than ‘agents’ of the state. We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets. Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform. In a social welfare perspective, such compensation stimulates not the maximization of shareholder value but the preservation of the …
The Role Of Deferred Pay In Retaining Managerial Talent, Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Sheng Huang, Johan Maharjan
The Role Of Deferred Pay In Retaining Managerial Talent, Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Sheng Huang, Johan Maharjan
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We examine the role of deferred vesting of stock and option grants in reducing executive turnover. To the extent an executive forfeits all unvested stock and option grants if she leaves the firm, deferred vesting will increase the cost (to the executive) of early exit. Using pay Duration proposed in Gopalan, et al., (forthcoming) as a measure of the length of managerial pay, we find that CEOs and non-CEO executives with longer pay Duration are less likely to leave the firm voluntarily. Employing the vesting of a large prior-year stock/option grant as an instrument for Duration, we find the effect …
Optimal Ceo Compensation With Search: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang
Optimal Ceo Compensation With Search: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay-to-performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.