Corporate Finance Commons^™

Managers' Pay Duration And Voluntary Disclosures, Qiang Cheng, Young Jun Cho, Jae B. Kim

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Given the adverse effect on their welfare, managers are reluctant to disclose bad news in a timely fashion. We examine the effect of managers' pay duration on firms' voluntary disclosures of bad news. Pay duration refers to the average period that it takes for managers' annual compensation to vest. We hypothesize and find that pay durations can incentivize managers to provide more bad news earnings forecasts. This result holds after controlling for the endogeneity of pay duration. In addition, we find that the effect of pay duration is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance and with poorer information environments, …

Are Women Executives Hurting Firm Performance? An Examination Of Gender Diversity On Firm Risk, Performance, And Executive Compensation, Krystal Diane Sung

CMC Senior Theses

In order to assess the continuing imbalance of top executives between genders, I examine the effects of gender diversity within top management teams on firm risk, performance, and executive compensation. Capitalizing on previous analysis, I apply three unique differentiators. First, I utilize current data from 2012 to 2017 from Compustat, CRSP, and ExecuComp. Second, I provide a unique subset view on a firm and individual performance of female CEOs to examine executive compensation. Third, my scope of analysis expands to S&P Composite 1500 companies. I use separate models to estimate the effect of gender diversity on firm risk by examining …

A State-Stewardship View On Executive Compensation, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog, Sunny Li Sun

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible ‘stewards’ rather than ‘agents’ of the state. We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets. Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform. In a social welfare perspective, such compensation stimulates not the maximization of shareholder value but the preservation of the …

The Role Of Deferred Pay In Retaining Managerial Talent, Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Sheng Huang, Johan Maharjan

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We examine the role of deferred vesting of stock and option grants in reducing executive turnover. To the extent an executive forfeits all unvested stock and option grants if she leaves the firm, deferred vesting will increase the cost (to the executive) of early exit. Using pay Duration proposed in Gopalan, et al., (forthcoming) as a measure of the length of managerial pay, we find that CEOs and non-CEO executives with longer pay Duration are less likely to leave the firm voluntarily. Employing the vesting of a large prior-year stock/option grant as an instrument for Duration, we find the effect …

Optimal Ceo Compensation With Search: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay-to-performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay-to-performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.

Two Essays On Executive Pay And Firm Performance, Thuong Quang Nguyen

Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration

Two essays of this dissertation study the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. These essays analyze both compensation level and compensation structure, and focus not only on CEO compensation but also on Top Management Team (TMT) compensation as well as Chief Financial Officer (CFO) compensation. Methodologically, these essays use different regression techniques to explore the nature of time series over cross sections of executive compensation data in order to find a reliable relationship between executive compensation and firm performance.

The first essay investigates the TMT compensation - firm performance relationship and finds that the compensation dispersion among TMT members …

Executive Equity Compensation And Earnings Management: A Quantile Regression Approach, Chih-Ying Chen, Ming-Yuan Li

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Prior research has investigated the association between executive equity compensation and earnings management but the evidence is not conclusive. We investigate this question using the quantile regression approach which allows the coefficient on the independent variable (equity compensation) to shift across the distribution of the dependent variable (earnings management). Based on a sample of 18,203 U.S. non-financial firm-year observations from 1995 to 2008, we find that chief executive officer (CEO) equity compensation is positively associated with the absolute value of discretionary accruals at all quantiles of absolute discretionary accruals, but the association becomes weaker as the quantile decreases. The association …

Dual Agency: Corporate Boards With Reciprocally Interlocking Relationships, Kevin F. Hallock

Kevin F Hallock

[Excerpt] This paper studies reciprocal interlocks of boards of directors of large firms where an employee of firm A sits on firm B's board and at the same time an employee of firm B sits on firm A's board. The study of Boards of Directors by those in economics and finance is not new. In fact, Dooley (1969) writes of interlocking directorates, but his definition is different in that he presents evidence of interlock where "at least one director ... sat on the board of at least one other of the largest companies". Books by Mizruchi (1982) and Pennings (1980) …