Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons^™

Corporate Historical Responsibility (Chr): Addressing A Past Of Forced Labor At Volkswagen, Claudia Janssen Danyi

Claudia I. Janssen Danyi, PhD

This article introduces corporate historical responsibility (CHR), a concept that can guide organizations when addressing dark corporate histories. CHR holds that organizations have responsibilities toward victims of past corporate practices and toward present reconciliatory discourse. Volkswagen’s discourse about its history of forced labor during WW II serves as an example of CHR. The rhetorical analysis illustrates that CHR hinges on the recognition of the past as a moral issue and on the organization’s ability to create historical accountability, take responsibility, make public acknowledgements, and remember its past. It further illustrates that CHR creates sustainable policies that can strengthen corporate citizenship …

The Merits Of Cooperative Corporate Governance In The Digital Age, Meredith-Anne Kurz

Meredith-Anne Kurz

No abstract provided.

Informal Opportunity Among Smes: An Empirical Study Of Denmark’S Underground Economy, Shahamak Rezaei, Marco Goli, Leo Paul Dana

Leo- Paul Dana

Based on interviews with (legal and illegal) immigrants to Denmark, meetings with stakeholders and with experts in the field, this article addresses issues regarding the underground economy. Our findings show that, in Denmark, the existence of an underground economy makes it possible for semi-compliant and non-compliant immigrants to make a living. We suggest that the underground economy in Denmark will continue to provide networks of illegal residents with opportunities for informal economic activities as trust allows entrepreneurs to function below the radar, by owning enterprises registered using the names of people who are legally in this country.

Corporate Historical Responsibility (Chr): Addressing A Past Of Forced Labor At Volkswagen, Claudia Janssen Danyi

Faculty Research and Creative Activity

This article introduces corporate historical responsibility (CHR), a concept that can guide organizations when addressing dark corporate histories. CHR holds that organizations have responsibilities toward victims of past corporate practices and toward present reconciliatory discourse. Volkswagen’s discourse about its history of forced labor during WW II serves as an example of CHR. The rhetorical analysis illustrates that CHR hinges on the recognition of the past as a moral issue and on the organization’s ability to create historical accountability, take responsibility, make public acknowledgements, and remember its past. It further illustrates that CHR creates sustainable policies that can strengthen corporate citizenship …

The Use Of Management Control Systems To Formulate And Implement Csr Strategy: A Levers Of Control Perspective, Diane-Laure Arjaliès, Julia Mundy

Business Publications

Little is known about the role of management control systems (MCS) in managing the strategic processes that underpin Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). To enhance our understanding of this phenomenon, this study employs Simons’ (1995) levers of control framework to explore how organizations leverage MCS in different ways in order to drive strategic renewal and trigger organizational change while simultaneously supporting society’s broader sustainability agenda. Drawing on data gathered from France’s largest listed companies – members of the CAC 40 – we provide insights into the structures and processes that companies employ to design, implement and monitor their CSR strategy. In …

Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, Lisa Fairfax

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article not only argues that corporations must be encouraged to enhance the level of communication between shareholders and the board, but also maintains that the benefits of increased engagement are significant enough that we should consider developing standards for incentivizing, if not mandating, more robust board-shareholder engagement for corporations that fail to respond to such encouragement. In the last several years, shareholders not only have gained increased authority over corporate elections and governance matters, but also have demonstrated a willingness to use that authority to challenge, and even reject, management policies and practices. Shareholders also have begun to demand …

A Transactional Genealogy Of Scandal: From Michael Milken To Enron To Goldman Sachs, William W. Bratton, Adam J. Levitin

All Faculty Scholarship

Three scandals have reshaped business regulation over the past thirty years: the securities fraud prosecution of Michael Milken in 1988, the Enron implosion of 2001, and the Goldman Sachs “ABACUS” enforcement action of 2010. The scandals have always been seen as unrelated. This Article highlights a previously unnoticed transactional affinity tying these scandals together—a deal structure known as the synthetic collateralized debt obligation involving the use of a special purpose entity (“SPE”). The SPE is a new and widely used form of corporate alter ego designed to undertake transactions for its creator’s accounting and regulatory benefit.

The SPE remains mysterious …

Sue On Pay: Say On Pay’S Impact On Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, Lisa Fairfax

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article advances a normative case for using say on pay litigation to enhance the state courts’ role in policing directors’ compensation decisions. Outrage over what many perceive to be excessive executive compensation has escalated dramatically in recent years. In 2010, such outrage prompted Congress to mandate say on pay—a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation. In the wake of say on pay votes, some shareholders have brought suit against directors alleging that a negative vote indicates a breach of directors’ fiduciary duties. To date, the vast majority of courts have rejected these suits. This Article insists that such rejection …

Agency Theory And Bounded Self Interest: The Moderating Role Of Fairness, Robert Phillips, Douglas Bosse

Robert Phillips

While agency theory’s contributions to our understanding of economic organization and strategic management are unparalleled, reviews of the empirical tests call for more explanatory muscle at the extremes. This paper provides arguments that answer that call. Relying on well-established findings from social psychology and other disciplines, we propose that agency theory’s assumption of pure self-interest be replaced with the more descriptively accurate assumption of self interest that is bounded by norms of fairness and reciprocity. The resulting arguments explain that perceptions of fairness/justice moderate the effectiveness of incentive alignment and monitoring mechanisms.